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Abstract 
This study seeks to uncover the prevailing food ideology of Southern Africa, by exploring South 
Africa, Malawi, and Zimbabwe’s approach to food security. The explorative discussion is aided by 
three supplementary research questions: 1) how does the Southern African context influence the 
region's ideologies around food?; 2) what is Southern Africa's institutional response to food 
insecurity?; and 3) how does the Southern African institutional response to food security differ from 
the actual orientation towards food and the economic model on which it is based? The theoretical 
framework employed is Holt-Giménez &Shattuck’s food regime/food movements framework, which 
has its foundation in Freedman and McMichael’s food regime analysis. 
To contextualise the study, the development of the global food regime is traced as it manifested in 
three historical eras: the settler-colonial regime (1870-1914); the surplus-regime (1945-1973); and the 
corporate food regime. The transition between these regimes is explained by drawing on the 
Gramsican notion of hegemony; as Britain’s dominance in the global political economy decreased, the 
United States came to influence food politics, subsequently resulting in the second food regime. 
Amidst globalisation, which saw a decrease in the power of nation states, the food regime was 
restructured once again as neoliberalism came to shape food production and distribution. However, 
the 2007-2008 food price crisis served as a turning point when this dominant food ideology came 
under threat, as indicated by widespread food riots in both the developed and developing world. 
Consequently the need for a new food regime arose. 
The effects of the crisis were especially detrimental in Southern Africa which is characterised by low 
levels of food security. The socio-economic evolution of food insecurity in Southern Africa can 
largely be attributed to the role the region played throughout the development of the global food 
regime; each era having a lasting impact on the formation of political institutions, economic 
rationales, and social configurations in the region. As the marginalised position of Southern Africa 
within the global food regime became more apparent, and amidst the backdrop of the United Nations’ 
Millennium Development Goals, attempts to address food security manifested in an array of food 
security frameworks. South Africa, Malawi, and Zimbabwe (the three dominant agricultural countries 
in Southern Africa) each adopted a different official approach to food security, and subsequently these 
countries offer great insights into both the challenges in the region, and more importantly, into how 
the state, private sector and international relations intersect to produce distinct food security 
ideologies. 
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Opsomming 
Hierdie studie poog om die heersende kos-ideologieë van Suider-Afrika te ontbloot, deur die 
verkenning van Suid-Afrika, Malawi, en Zimbabwe se benadering tot voedselsekuriteit. Die 
ondersoekende bespreking word aangehelp deur drie aanvullende navorsingsvrae: 1) hoe beïnvloed 
die Suider-Afrikaanse konteks die streek se ideologieë rondom kos?; 2) wat is Suider-Afrika se 
institusionele reaksie aangaande voedselonsekerheid?; en 3) hoe verskil die Suider-Afrikaanse 
institusionele reaksie op voedselsekuriteit van die werklike oriëntasie teenoor kos en die ekonomiese 
model waarop dit baseer is? Die teoretiese raamwerk maak gebruik van Holt-Gimenez & Shattuck se 
voedsel-regime/voedsel-bewegings raamwerk, wat sy wortels in Freedman en McMichael se voedsel-
regime analise het. 
Om die studie te kontekstualiseer, is die ontwikkeling van die globale voedsel-regime nagespoor soos 
dit gemanifesteer het in drie historiese eras: die setlaar-koloniale regime (1870-1914); die surplus-
regime (1945-1973); en die korporatiewe voedsel-regime. Die oorgang tussen hierdie regimes word 
verduidelik deur gebruik te maak van die Gramsicaanse idee van hegemonie; namate Brittanje se 
oorheersing in die globale politieke ekonomie afgeneem het, het die Verenigde State van Amerika 
ingetree om voedsel-politiek te beïnvloed, wat sodoende na die tweede voedsel-regime gelei het. Te 
midde van globalisering, wat 'n afname in die mag van die nasie-staat tot gevolg gehad het, was die 
voedsel-regime weereens herstruktureer toe neoliberalisme prominensie verkry het deur die globale 
produksie en verspreiding van kos te bepaal. Die 2007-2008 voedselpryskrisis het egter gedien as 'n 
keerpunt waar hierdie dominante kos-ideologie bedreig geword het, soos aangedui deur 
wydverspreide voedsel-onluste in beide die ontwikkelde en ontwikkelende lande. Gevolglik het die 
behoefte aan 'n nuwe voedsel-regime ontstaan. 
Die gevolge van die krisis was veral nadelig in Suider-Afrika wat gekenmerk word deur lae vlakke 
van voedselsekuriteit. Die sosio-ekonomiese ontwikkeling van voedselonsekerheid in Suider-Afrika 
kan grootliks toegeskryf word aan die rol wat die streek regdeur die ontwikkeling van die globale 
voedsel-regime gespeel het; elke era het 'n blywende impak op die vorming van politieke instellings, 
ekonomiese denke en sosiale konfigurasies in die streek gehad. Namte die gemarginaliseerde posisie 
van Suider-Afrika binne die globale voedsel-regime duideliker geword het, en te midde van die 
agtergrond van die Verenigde Nasies se Millennium Development Goals, het pogings om 
voedselsekuriteit aan te spreek, gemanifesteer in 'n verskeidenheid van voedselsekuriteit-raamwerke.  
Suid-Afrika, Malawi, en Zimbabwe (die drie dominante landbou lande in Suider-Afrika) het elk 'n 
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verskillende amptelike benadering tot voedselsekerheid, en daarom bied hierdie lande waardevolle 
insig omtrent beide die voedsel-uitdagings in die streek, maar ook oor hoe die staat, die private sektor 
en internasionale betrekkinge deurkruis om verskillende voedselsekuriteit-ideologieë te produseer.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1. Introduction to the topic 
In the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights the United Nations (UN) enshrined the right to 
food under Article 25(1) and since then the UN has come to acknowledge that food is vital for the 
enjoyment of other rights (UN, 1999). According to the United Nations' World Food Programme 
(WFP) hunger is the most pressing global health issue since more deaths per year can be attributed 
to hunger than HIV/AIDS
1
, malaria, and tuberculosis combined (WFP, 2009). Problems related to 
increasing food availability, feeding the population, improving their nutritional status, and reducing 
poverty continue to confront decision makers in developing and developed countries alike. Because 
of this, food issues are given high priority on the global development agenda.  
The UN lists eradicating extreme poverty and hunger as the first of eight Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) to be achieved by the end of 2015 (UN, 2015a). One of the targets used to measure 
whether this goal has been met, is to halve the proportion of people who suffer from hunger 
between 1990 and 2015. Although it is reported that this target is within reach, about an eighth of 
the world's population still experience chronic hunger. As part of their post-2015 development 
agenda the UN introduced the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that set out to transform the 
world by 2030. The second goal specifically addresses food security; it reads that the UN aspires to 
"[e]nd hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition, and promote sustainable agriculture" 
(UN, 2015b). 
However, due to the complex web of interrelated factors that impact food security, ending chronic 
hunger is not a straightforward task. The main long-term challenges to achieve food security as 
identified by the UN's Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) are: the agriculture-hunger-
poverty nexus, the global water crisis, land degradation, land deals, climatic change, agricultural 
diseases, biotechnology, dictatorship and kleptocracy, and women and children's skewed access to 
food (FAO, 2012). What is striking is that several of these challenges are entrenched in the current 
food system due to the nature of and the relations within the global political economy. In an era of 
food abundance food security has become an issue of access as opposed to one of availability. 
Contemporary hunger is thus about poverty instead of scarcity. Local problems can often be 
ascribed to political-economic decisions and the subsequent configurations of food production and 
                                                        
1
 This refers to a range of conditions caused by the infection of the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) of which the 
later symptoms are referred to as acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS). 
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distribution. Consequently the real answer to food security depends on acknowledging the social, 
economic, and political dimensions of the global food system. The notion that "there is no such 
thing as an apolitical food problem" (Sen, 1982: 452) serves as a theoretical underpinning for 
further inquiry to the impact that the current food regime
2
 has had on food security.  
1.2. Conceptualisation of food security
3
 
Although the phenomenon of hunger is timeless, the concept of food security is only 40 years old; it 
was first defined at the 1974 World Food Conference. At the time food security was defined at a 
national level and in economic terms: a situation where there is "availability at all times of adequate 
world food supplies of basic foodstuffs to sustain a steady expansion of food consumption and to 
offset fluctuations in production and prices (emphasis added)" (UN, 1975). With its emphasis on 
availability, this definition solely focuses on the volume and stability of food supplies which 
reflects the institutional set of concerns at the time of the mid-1970s global food crisis.  
During the 1980s there was a shift in the understanding of food security. Amartya Sen (1982: 451) 
proposed that there is something wrong with the Malthusian approach
4
 to food security; since the 
food supply exceeds the population, chronic hunger cannot be deemed a problem of availability. As 
such Sen advanced the entitlements approach as a generalised way of understanding hunger in the 
midst of ample food availability. In short Clay (2002: 6) explains that "[e]ntitlement as a construct 
introduce[d] an ethical and human rights dimension into the discussion of food security". By 
understanding people's entitlement to food, the analytical focus shifts from food production 
(availability) to also addressing food distribution (access). An analysis of distribution involves 
focusing on the role of politics, economics, and the ideological context of the area in question. 
Pritchard (2012: 53) acknowledges that the entitlement approach was significantly influential in 
                                                        
2
 In brief, "food regime" refers to a "rule-governed structure of production and consumption of food on a world scale" 
(Friedman, 1993: 30). The concept is discussed in great detail in Chapter Two. 
3
 This section serves as a mere introduction to the concept of food security since there is an inherent difficulty in 
precisely defining the scope and nature of the concept. Ever since it has been coined, food security has become an 
operational concept that reflects the wider recognition of various complex issues involved (FAO, 2003: 25). More than 
200 published definitions of food security further points to the term's flexible and evolutionary character (Maxwell, 
1996: 156). Thus food security is a broad and multifaceted concept; there are numerous definitions, interpretations and 
permutations of the ideas involved depending on the reader. A conceptualisation of "food security" is provided in 
Appendix A with regards to the dimensions, levels, and forms of food security. A more specific understanding of "food 
security", as it is relevant for this study, is developed throughout the discussion in the main text 
4
 At the turn of the 18th century Thomas Malthus, writing under the alias of Joseph Johnson, published An Essay on the 
Principle of Population (1798) which presents population growth as exponential and the growth in the food supply as 
arithmetical. Consequently he foresaw that unchecked population growth would quickly lead to widespread chronic 
hunger. He proposed a series of population control measures to prevent this perceived catastrophe.   
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redefining food security in the 1990s. Since then the most common operational definition of food 
security is that of the FAO which reads that "[f]ood security [is] a situation that exists when all 
people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food 
that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy lifestyle" (FAO, 1996).  
In alignment with post-modern thinking, an important historical shift in food security debates saw 
the FAO and the World Bank placing more emphasis on the individual. Food security for both the 
FAO and World Bank evolved from an emphasis on assuring national food supply/availability in 
the 1970s, to a greater emphasis on food access in the 1980s, to increased recognition of food 
utilization issues in the 1990s (Koç, 2011; Hinrichs, 2013: 8). Thus although still regarded as an 
important dimension for ensuring food security, the question on how to achieve food security is no 
longer framed as a purely supply, or availability, problem. Along with the availability dimension, 
the FAO acknowledges that access, utilisation, and stability are of importance as well. 
As inferred above, food availability refers to the quantity of food at disposal for consumption. This 
is determined by production, distribution, and exchange. Food access relates to the ability to 
purchase or produce sufficient food. Thus, even though a sufficient food supply might be available, 
access to food might be constrained by physical and financial barriers. Food utilisation refers to 
individuals' absorption of nutrients, and the dimension of stability addresses the inherent, impending 
or conditional risks that impact the availability, access and/or utilisation of food.  
The stability dimension, which was initially excluded from the food security framework, is 
becoming more ingrained in the food security literature since the FAO's official definition of food 
security stipulates that to be food secure means to have access to adequate food "at all times" (FAO, 
1996). By adding the time dimension it is recognised that food security conditions should not be 
regarded as fixed, highlighting that food security only exists when there is sufficient protection 
against chronic, temporal, and cyclic food insecurity via the availability, access, and utilisation 
dimensions. 
1.3. Food security in the 21st century: Spring of hope, Winter of despair 
The famous opening lines of Charles Dickens' A Tale of Two Cities (1859) portrays the matched 
struggle between the pursuit of prosperity and that of justice; the universal plight of societies till this 
day: 
It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of 
foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of the Light, it 
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was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair, we had everything 
before us, we had nothing before us... 
Drawing on the comparison to Dickens' depiction of the two cities and with reference to food 
security, Allen (2013: 135) explains that the 21st century, with its record levels of inequality, can 
also be regarded as both the "best of times" for those with power and capital, and the "worst of 
times" for those marginalised within the food system. 
Due to technological advances the human story of food has overall been a best-of-times narrative of 
constant improvement that resulted in not only a continued increase in food production but also 
advancements in food quality and food safety. It is frequently stated there is currently no 
agricultural reason for hunger since the global production of food has increased more rapidly than 
the population over the past 50 years. It is commonly cited that even despite the projected 
population growth, the world is not at risk of the so-called Malthusian trap since there is currently 
an abundance of food produced. In fact, this overproduction sometimes even compels developed 
countries to draw up policies to clear "mountains" and "lakes" of food and drink (Love, 2010).  
Furthermore, the current food era can also be considered as the best-of-times because there is an 
unprecedented set of efforts to solve the food security problem; with several individuals, groups, 
and political bodies "working to improve ecological and social conditions [by] creating new modes 
of production, distribution, and consumption" (Allen, 2013: 135). The plethora of proposed 
strategies to address food security mirrors the explosion of interest in and discourse about the topic; 
never before has the global community been more equipped to address the challenge of food 
security
5
. 
Nevertheless and alarmingly so, the current era can also be considered the worst-of-times because 
more people suffer from chronic hunger now than at any other point in human history. Following 
the 2008 financial crisis, which resulted in high food prices, the number of hungry people in the 
world was at a historic high, with 1.02 billion individuals considered to be undernourished (FAO, 
2009). Now that the effects of the crisis have largely subsided, with national economies steadily 
recovering, the FAO estimates that the number of people suffering from chronic hunger is 842 
million. Despite these recent gains which have pushed the figure below 1 billion, the United 
Nations' MDGs to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger by the end of 2015 seems unachievable in 
                                                        
5
 In 2002 the FAO noted that, unlike ever before, the world is "well equipped with the financial and technical resources 
to ensure that all people have adequate access to food" (FAO, 2002).  
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many parts of the world. The MDG Report of 2015 estimates that the prevalence of chronic hunger 
has decreased from 23.3% in 1990-1992 to 12.9% in 2014-2016 (UN, 2015c: 21). Although the 
target of halving the worldwide hunger rate has almost been reached, it is important to note that sub-
Saharan Africa, the region with the highest prevalence of chronic hunger, has showed limited 
progress. 
1.4. Food security in Southern Africa 
The impact of the food price crisis is of special concern for Africa. Since most African countries are 
net-food importing
6
 the continent was hit hardest by the crisis. Sub-Saharan Africa in particular is 
the most food-insecure region in the world and is furthermore characterized by various factors that 
are associated with poverty such as: underdeveloped infrastructure and markets, low life 
expectancy, a high incidence of HIV/AIDS, and a large number of failed states (Lee, Berazneva & 
Ndulo, 2013: 2). Chang (2009: 482) stresses the irreversible long term effects of chronic hunger by 
stating that the impact food insecurity has on individuals not only influences those affected, but that 
there is also a human cost to pay in terms of the loss of the labour force. In this regard he further 
mentions that national food security should be an especially pressing matter when the country is at a 
low level of economic development. Food security should thus be a core concern for African 
countries. Furthermore, Holt-Giménez, Patel & Shattuck (2010: 130) point out that "[s]uccesses or 
failures in Africa reflect the potential or the limitations of the global food system to serve the 
interests of the world's poor majorities" which acknowledges that addressing food security in 
Southern Africa is of global interest for human development.  
An over-arching and common pitfall for addressing food security in Sub-Saharan Africa is that the 
region is often presented as a single entity. Similarly, generalised comments are also made about the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC). However, when one takes into account the 
degree to which politics plays a role in shaping food security discourse, it becomes apparent that 
African countries are not all similar: countries' history and the role of the state intersect to reflect 
different regimes and economic logics. As such an analysis of food politics in Southern Africa
7
 can 
                                                        
6
 This refers to countries whose food imports are higher than their agricultural and food exports (FAO, 2011: vii). 
Despite its vast agricultural potential, many African countries do not produce enough food to feed its citizens. 
Consequently these countries have to import food from other countries. 
7
 Throughout the discussion "Southern Africa" refers to the member countries of the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC): Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
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offer great insights into both the challenges in the region but also how the state, the private sector 
and international relations shape the agricultural system.  
The latest UN World Food Programme's Hunger Map (WFP, 2015) reveals exactly how different 
Southern African countries' prevalence of hunger is. The WFP rates hunger within each country 
based on the prevalence of undernourishment in the population
8
. Table 1 presents how each of the 
SADC countries' conditions of chronic hunger is rated by the WFP. 
Table 2. Prevalence of undernourishment in the population for Southern African countries 
 *The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is excluded due to missing or insufficient data 
This table shows that despite geographical similarities there is a large dispersion in the countries' 
hunger rate: the prevalence of hunger ranges from very low in Mauritius and South Africa, to very 
high in Namibia and Zambia. Furthermore, it is important to note for this discussion, that the 
arguably dominant agricultural countries of the region, namely South Africa, Zimbabwe and 
Malawi, each experience a different prevalence of undernourishment. Since these countries have a 
shared British colonial history, and are subjugated to largely similar environmental constraints, it is 
once again apparent that politics has a powerful role to play in human development issues such as 
chronic hunger.   
1.5. The significance of the food price crisis  
The food price crisis of 2007-2008 served as a point of departure when the dominant food ideology 
came under threat. Prior to the crisis there was a general sense that, at a global scale, hunger was 
associated with environmental disaster or only to be found in conflict-ridden areas. Thus rather 
"than acknowledging a fundamental flaw in the global food system, the crisis was [initially] seen as 
                                                        
8
 Since food security is such a diverse concept (see footnote 3 and Appendix A), different research organisations 
employ different indicators to quantify food security. Appendix B presents a list of the indicators used to measure each 
of the dimensions of food security, as employed in the FAO (2015a) operationalisation of food security. To analyse and 
comment on the validity of these indicators, fall beyond the scope of this discussion. 
Very low 
(<5%) 
Moderately low  
(5-14.9%) 
Moderately high  
(15%-24.9%) 
High 
 (25-34.9%) 
Very high 
(35%<) 
Mauritius 
South Africa 
Angola 
Lesotho 
Seychelles 
Botswana 
Malawi 
Madagascar 
Mozambique 
Swaziland 
Tanzania 
Zimbabwe 
Namibia 
Zambia 
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a situation that could be alleviated without revising existing approaches to food security" (Rosin, 
Stock & Campbell, 2012: 4).   
Recently the causes of the food price crisis
9
 were reassessed by both the media and global food 
system experts. It became clear that the spike in food prices was a symptom of a food system 
already under stress. Years of skewed agricultural policies, unsustainable development, and 
inequitable trade have left the food regime lacking. Rosin et al., (2012: 6) explain that "the dramatic 
changes ushered in through the violent reorganisation of geopolitics through two world wars, and 
numerous other conflicts and the upending of historical colonialism led to massive structural 
changes in the food system". Before this restructuring, countries and regions were for the most part 
food self-sufficient and historic food crises related more to catastrophic environmental events or 
despotic/colonial oppression. However, the causes of the 2007-2008 food price crisis were 
substantially different from previous crises. Currently corporate interests have a major presence in 
the global food system and although not solely responsible for the crisis, these parties still continued 
to accumulate wealth whilst over a sixth of the globe experienced massive hunger (Roisin et al., 
2012: 9).   
As noted earlier, the food crisis cannot be attributed as a function of food production since the crisis 
occurred alongside record harvests of at least 1.5 times the food demand at the time (Holt-Giménez 
et al., 2010: 7). The contradiction of increasing hunger amidst abundance and wealth sparked a 
flurry of worldwide protests over food prices. The impact of the food price spikes were felt around 
the world. Civil unrest, including food riots and protests in support of lower prices and/or higher 
wages, occurred in at least 33 countries in late 2007-2008 (Lee et al., 2013: 1). McMahon (2013: 9) 
cites the example of protesters in Tunisia facing down riot police with "nothing more than 
baguettes" as a symbol of how anger over food even helped sparked the Arab Spring. Numerous 
international actors urged for a rapid response to the crisis because of its potential to destabilise 
governments. The ongoing worldwide food protests, located not only in poor countries but also in 
resource-rich areas and the industrialised nations, signal that people are not merely rebelling against 
hunger but against the ideologies around food upheld by the corporate entities in the food system.  
Furthermore, the reaction from civil society highlights how food security should not be regarded as 
a purely socio-economic problem; hunger should be framed as a political problem too. To view 
food as the most basic human need is to acknowledge that power relations determine the 
                                                        
9
 Both the indirect and direct causes of the food price crisis are discussed in section 2.4.1.  
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organisation thereof – just like other resources. Despite the fact that there is an abundance of food 
available, the inequality in access to food leaves 842 million people chronically undernourished; 2 
billion people lacking in basic nutrients; and 1.3 billion people overweight (Dogliotti, Giller & van 
Ittersum, 2014: 299). All of which indicates that the pattern of food use is a function of political 
choices and economic disparities. With the abundance of food available it is clear that the issue is 
not about food per se but about the politics that determines how food is produced, distributed, and 
consumed.   
1.6. Problem statement 
Food insecurity amidst food abundance highlights a fundamental flaw in the food regime. 
Consequently it is valuable to explore different ideologies around food in order to determine which 
is most suited to provide a viable model for addressing hunger. It is widely accepted that the most 
recent food crisis was an indication of the underlying malfunction of the food system. In response to 
the food crisis, the dominance of the ideologies perpetuated by the current food regime was 
challenged by other ideologies. However, given the hegemonic status of the current regime, 
alternative food models are often unintentionally overlooked or ideologically disregarded. In 
challenging the hegemony
10
 of the current regime, the focus should be placed on those that are 
marginalised within the current system. With the highest prevalence of chronic hunger, sub-Saharan 
Africa remains marginalised within the current food regime despite the UN's MDG efforts. As such 
it is necessary to draw attention to the intricacies of this region. 
1.7. Research questions
11
  
The main research question this study seeks to answer is: 
 What is the prevailing food ideology in Southern Africa? 
In answering the above question a number of supplementary questions will be addressed:  
 Supplementary question 1: How does the Southern African context influence the region's 
 ideologies around food?   
The goal of this question is to gauge in which contextual factors the prevailing food ideology in 
Southern Africa is rooted, as well as to determine the extent to which these factors impact the 
region's approach to food security. In short, this question is aimed at uncovering the causes of food 
                                                        
10
 In this discussion the concept is employed in the Gramscian sense to refer to "shared ideas or beliefs which serve to 
justify the interests of dominant groups" (Giddens, 1997: 583). See section 2.3 and 3.3.2 for a detailed explanation. 
11
 Please see Appendix C for an important visual representation of the research questions' relation to the theoretical 
framework (section 1.8). This diagram can be useful for navigating the discussion. 
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insecurity in Southern Africa. This determines the socio-economic and political logic in which the 
region's response to the crisis is rooted. 
 Supplementary question 2: What is Southern Africa's institutional response to food 
 insecurity?  
Through this question the official food security policies of the region is explored in an attempt to 
root these policies in a particular food ideology.  
 Supplementary question 3: How does the Southern African institutional response to food 
 security differ from the actual orientation towards food and the economic model on which it 
 is based? 
This question aids the investigation of the current actualities of food security in the region, as these 
might deviate from the institutional response to food security.  
By uncovering the causes of food insecurity in Southern Africa  (supplementary question 1) in 
which the official response geared at addressing this issue is rooted (supplementary question 2), as 
well as accounting for how this response might deviate from actual experiences (supplementary 
question 3), a contextualised and nuanced answer to the main research question can be provided. 
1.8. Theoretical framework 
The theoretical framework used to guide and support this study is Holt-Giménez & Shattuck's 
(2011) food regimes/food movements framework
12
. Following the 2008 food price crisis this 
comparative analytical framework was introduced to display the "politics, production models and 
approaches to the food crisis" (Holt-Giménez & Shattuck, 2011: 114). The framework itself is 
rooted in food regime theory which holds that beneath the apparent natural food order is a 
hegemonic food order that defines "the relations within which food is produced, and through which 
capitalism is produced and reproduced" (McMichael, 2009a: 281). As such the theoretical 
framework presents a distinction between responses from those who seek to stabilize the corporate 
food regime
13
 and those that seek to transform the system thereby highlighting the workings of 
capitalism's so-called double movement of liberalism and reform. Accordingly Holt-Giménez & 
                                                        
12 This framework is presented in full in Chapter 3. The theoretical underpinning of the framework is discussed with 
reference to Friedmann and McMichael's (1989) seminal work on food regime analysis which, as discussed below, is 
rooted in critical International Relations theory – following the likes of Marx, Wallerstein, Gramsci, and Polanyi. The 
chapter also presents a detailed discussion on each of the food ideologies of the Holt-Giménez & Shattuck (2011) 
framework. 
13
 This concept will be clarified and discussed in detail in section 2.4. 
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Shattuck (2010) identifies four food ideologies: neoliberal; reformist; progressive; and radical. 
Each of these ideologies upholds a different narrative of present-day hunger and consequently 
proposes different ways in which it should be addressed. Their framework presents how each of 
these food ideologies differs in their discourse, model, orientation, and approach to the crisis. It also 
identifies the main institutions and guiding documents for each.  
1.9. Research design and methods 
The study is primarily exploratory since it aims to uncover what the prevailing food ideology in 
Southern Africa is. Exploratory studies are of use since they provide a basic understanding of 
relatively new topics (Babbie & Mouton, 2002: 79). This is what this study aims to do given the 
emerging analysis of other food ideologies following the recent food crisis. Babbie & Mouton 
(2002: 80) also mentions that exploratory studies are "appropriate for persistent phenomena" – 
which undoubtedly include hunger – since it leads to greater insight and comprehension. 
Furthermore, exploratory studies are in determining "priorities for future research" (Babbie & 
Mouton, 2002: 81). This study, although limited to Southern Africa, is applicable to many other 
contexts and could thus guide future research of a similar nature. The study is further supported by 
explanatory research; particularly with regards to the discussion of causality in the historical 
development of the food regime and the build-up to the 2007-2008 food crisis.  
This study makes use of qualitative research methods. Babbie & Mouton (2002: 278) explains that 
with qualitative methods the “emphasis is on studying human action in a natural setting [….] 
together with an emphasis on detailed description and understanding phenomena within the 
appropriate context". In this regard the study examines the structure and relations through which 
food is produced and distributed to determine the prevailing food ideology in Southern Africa The 
study follows a single case study model with South Africa, Malawi, and Zimbabwe discussed as 
representative of the Southern African case. 
An inductive approach is used with the objective to gather more general knowledge on Southern 
Africa's prevailing food ideology following the food price crisis. Given the time constraint on the 
study the analysis will be based on secondary sources in the form of books, journal articles, 
newspaper articles, and government briefings, and policy papers. 
1.10. Limitations and scope of the study 
The main limitations of this study primarily relate to the limitations of the qualitative method. Even 
though a qualitative approach is the most appropriate given the research design and aims, it is not as 
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measureable as quantitative data due to the nature thereof. The use of secondary sources also results 
in limited control of the data. A further limitation of this study arises due to its exploratory design. 
Exploratory research may deliver unprecedented findings, and seldom provide specific answers to 
research questions (Babbie & Mouton, 2002: 80). In an attempt to mitigate this limitation, Chapter 
Five thematically presents the findings of the study, while Chapter Six concludes the overall discuss 
by specifically addressing and reflecting upon the research questions.  
This discussion assumes that the 2007-2008 food crisis was a turning point for food security 
analysis. As such, the framing of the crisis as a significant event presupposes that, following the 
crisis, there has been a rupture in how food security is viewed. In other words, the fact that the food 
crisis occurred, is taken as a sign that the food system had failed to "maintain and reinforce a 
particular set of power relations in global society" (Rosin et al., 2012: 5). Consequently it is 
assumed that the failure of the food system, as signified by the crisis, necessarily created a platform 
for exploring alternative food systems. Relatedly, it should also be noted that the food regime/food 
movements framework of Holt-Giménez and Shattuck (2011), that depicts the various potential 
food systems, is not without its conceptual drawbacks. It can be argued that the framework is too 
simplistic since it "ignores the phenomenal diversity [….] within each of [the] categories (Young, 
2012: 346).   
A further limitation to the study relates to the scope thereof. Due to the restrictive level of analysis, 
not all dimensions of food security can be studied. Of importance for this study are the global food 
system (international level of analysis) and its influence on Southern Africa (state/society level of 
analysis
14
). The international and state/society level of analysis only accounts for the availability, 
access, and stability dimensions of food security. Consequently the utilisation dimension, linked to 
the individual level of analysis, is not addressed. It is acknowledged that this is a significant 
omission, especially given the poor nutritional status of the region's citizens
15
. 
It should also be noted that food security is by nature a complex concept, and because of the scope 
of the study, it is not possible to account for all the interpretations and permutations thereof. The 
way in which the concept is defined determines how it is measured. It is acknowledged that 
different actors, with diverse agendas, define and measure food security in accordance with their 
                                                        
14
 Through the examples of South Africa, Malawi, and Zimbabwe as representative of the Southern African case study. 
15
 Malnutrition is widespread in Southern Africa due to the high prevalence of HIV/AIDS, and the region's overreliance 
on maize – see Chapter Four. 
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perspectives thereof. Throughout the discussion, unless clearly stated otherwise, it is assumed that 
analyses of food security are objective; that the findings do not serve to advance particular interests.   
1.11. Overview and chapter outline 
Chapter One: Introduction – This chapter provides the outline of the research problem and the 
background for its justification. This chapter introduces the reader to the concept of food security 
and highlights the 2007-2008 food crisis as a turning point in the way in which food security is 
perceived. The research questions, design and methodology as well as the limitations of the research 
are also presented. 
Chapter Two: Evolution of the food regime and the development of the 2007-2008 food price crisis 
– An historical overview of the various food regimes that led to the formation of the corporate food 
regime is given. The corporate food regime is discussed, and in particular how this regime led to the 
food crisis, with reference to the indirect and direct causes thereof. It is shown that these causes did 
not arise out of a vacuum but are in fact specifically linked to neoliberalism.  
Chapter Three: The food regime/food movements framework – This chapter highlights the link 
between the food crisis and the greater crisis of neoliberalism as it manifested in the financial crisis. 
These crises are presented as turning point for food security analysis, and the differences between 
the old and emerging analysis of food security are pointed out. Holt-Giménez & Shattuck's (2011) 
food regime/food movement framework, which depicts the responses to the food crisis, is 
introduced as the theoretical foundation. The differences between neoliberal, reformist, progressive, 
and radical streams of food politics are discussed according to this framework.  
Chapter Four: Food politics in Southern Africa – The case study is contextualised through an 
introductory discussion of the socio-economic evolution of food insecurity in the region, and 
subsequently providing an overview of the context-specific causes of food insecurity. Thereafter, 
Southern Africa's approach to food security is explored by presenting the institutional food security 
framework of SADC and South Africa, Malawi, and Zimbabwe. The food security orientation and 
model of each country is also presented along with commentary on how it deviates from the 
country's institutional framework.    
Chapter Five: Analysis and key findings – This chapter reflects on the research question by 
summarising the findings on Southern Africa's prevailing food ideology. Other key findings of this 
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explorative study are also highlighted by considering the applicability of the theoretical framework, 
and discussing recommendations for future research. 
1.12. Navigational scheme for the discussion 
The diagram on the following page provides the reader with an aid for navigating the discussion on 
Southern Africa's food politics, especially with regards to the research questions and the theoretical 
framework of the study.  
With reference to Chapter Two, the diagram presents the chronological development of the food 
regime from the settler-colonial regime, to the surplus regime, and finally the corporate regime. The 
diagram also accounts for both the direct and indirect causes of the global food crisis and shows 
how this is embedded in the corporate food regime.  
Following this causal logic, the effect of the crisis in turn spurred on developments in food politics. 
These responses correspond to those identified by Holt-Giménez and Shattuck (2011) in their food 
regime/food movements framework discussed in Chapter Three. The scheme shows the split 
between the food ideologies that seek to maintain the corporate regime (neoliberal and reformist) 
and those that aim to transcend it (progressive and radical). In accordance with the food 
regime/food movements framework, the discourse and orientation of each stream of food politics is 
also depicted in the diagram. 
The diagram also highlights the relationship between the research questions and the development of 
the food regime and its subsequent influence on food politics, thereby anchoring this explorative 
study in a solid theoretical framework. 
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Chapter Two: Evolution of the food regime and the 
development of the 2007-2008 food price crisis 
2.1. Introduction 
Throughout history food has been one of the core components around which societies evolved. In 
pre-capitalistic societies food was the principal factor around which material, cultural, and 
institutional structures were formed (Sodano, 2012: 375). The commodification of food increasingly 
integrated food-related activities into the economic sphere. Consequently the development of the 
food system closely followed the development of capitalism itself and food soon become governed 
at an international level through the workings of the global political economy. 
The aim of this chapter is to provide context to the theoretical framework presented in the following 
chapter. This first part of this chapter briefly introduces food regime analysis as it was first 
developed by Friedmann and McMichael (1989) and subsequently highlights the development of 
the international food system along the lines of three food regimes: the settler-colonial regime; the 
surplus regime; and the corporate regime. The second part of the chapter presents the unravelling of 
the corporate food regime with reference to the 2007-2008 food price crisis. The indirect and direct 
causes of the crisis are discussed; highlighting that these causes are entrenched in neoliberalism
16
. 
The final section portrays the food crisis as a part of the greater crisis of capitalism.  
2.2. Food regime analysis 
In 1989 Friedmann and McMichael published an essay that aimed to explore the role of agriculture 
in the development of the capitalist world economy. Subsequently this paper became regarded as 
the foundational work on food regime analysis. Influenced by Wallerstein's world-systems analysis 
(1983) they adopted a world-historical perspective that "links international relations of food 
production and consumption to forms of accumulation" (Friedmann & McMichael, 1989: 95) 
thereby distinguishing different periods of capitalist accumulation that they refer to as "food 
regimes". Friedmann (1993: 30) defines a food regime as a "rule-governed structure of production 
and consumption of food on a world scale". An all-encompassing definition by Otero (2012: 283) 
terms a food regime as a "temporally specific dynamic in the global political economy of food [….] 
                                                        
16
 Neoliberalism, as it relates to the food regime, is explained in section 2.4 when discussing the corporate food regime. 
The concept is further explained in section 3.3.2.1 when "neoliberal food politics" is discussed as one of the components 
of the food regime/food movements framework of Holt-Giménez and Shattuck (2011). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
16 
 
that is characterised by particular institutional structures, norms, and unwritten rules around 
agriculture and food that are geographically and historically specific".  
McMichael (2009a: 289) explains that the food regime concept is not only historical, but also 
methodological since it can be used to interpret capitalist history; the relations through which food 
is produced is used as a lens for the transitions within the history of capitalism itself. In their 
seminal work Friedmann and McMichael (1989) identified two food regimes: the first spanning 
from 1870-1914 under British hegemony, and the second from 1945-1973 during United States 
(US) hegemony.  
2.2.1. The first regime: the settler-colonial regime (1870-1914) 
The first food regime is characterised by "British 'outer-oriented development'" (McMichael, 2010: 
610). During this historical period, Britain outsourced its staple food production to its settler-
colonies. Specialised meat and grain production in Argentina, Canada, USA, Australia, and New 
Zealand supplied Britain's working class with cheap food (Bernstein, 2015: 3). A key innovation of 
the first food regime is the fully commercial American farm that relied on family labour 
(McMichael, 2009b: 144). Campbell (2012: 32) notes that "grain [flowed] in 'rivers' out of the 
American Mid-West to feed" Britain's rapidly increasing urban class
17
. Cheap settler labour 
produced cheap food imports which fuelled Britain's industrial growth.  
This international division of labour was political in nature. As a political superpower Britain 
mediated international trade between European nations and settler states in accordance with the 
Ricardian theory of comparative advantage
18
 (Bernstein, 2015: 4). Britain orchestrated product 
specialisation in its colonies by taking differences in climate and social organisation into account 
when implementing trade in bulk commodities like sugar, wheat, and coffee. In order to optimise 
the mass production of these food staples, Britain imposed a system of monocultural agriculture in 
colonial states which compromised their food systems and ecological resources (McMichael, 
2009b: 141; Burch & Lawrence, 2009: 267). Sodano (2012: 376) notes that during the first food 
regime many regions in Africa and Latin America moved from food self-sufficiency to food 
                                                        
17
 Following the Industrial Revolution, Britain underwent a "tumultuous transformation" with a "rapid shift in [its] 
population from being almost entirely rural to being almost entirely urban" (Campbell, 2012: 31). Thus, through 
urbanisation, Britain's population became separated from easily available food.   
18
 By employing simple mathematics, David Ricardo attempted to prove that when combined with industrial 
specialisation, international free trade is always beneficial (Southgate, Graham & Tweeten, 2007: 125). As such nations 
should concentrate their resources in their industries that offer the greatest scope for competitive edge and focus 
predominantly on developing those industries.  
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scarcity and famine because of its dependence on the trade of monocultures. The South's 
agricultural dependence paved the way for the second food regime.   
2.2.2. The second regime: the surplus regime (1945-1973) 
The second food regime is characterised by "American 'inner-oriented development'" (McMichael, 
2010: 610). After the Second World War the Bretton Woods system secured the United States' 
hegemony in world capitalism. The US' economic hegemony during this historical period clearly 
reflects the international division of trade that ensued during the second food regime. McMichael 
(2010: 611) explains that the second food regime had a "political anchoring in the US farm belt and 
its agro-industrial form [that was] exported first to Europe through the Marshall Plan and then to the 
Third World via the Green Revolution". Large-scale industrial farming in the US brought on issues 
of overproduction. This was addressed by combining agricultural policy with foreign policy, which 
resulted in the US transferring its agricultural surpluses in the form of food aid. In the First World 
the US disposed of grain surpluses under the pretext of facilitating post-war reconstruction 
(Bernstein, 2015: 7), and in the Third World the US encouraged selective industrialisation through 
food aid programmes that served to secure loyalty against communism during the Cold War by 
"clutching them in the grip of external debt" (Sodano, 2012: 376).  
The US' nation-centred mode of development was further characterised by the industrialisation of 
agriculture which created a new pattern of transnational agribusiness. The global spread of 
industrial agriculture was carried out by the new technologies of the Green Revolution which 
involved the heavy use of subsidized fertilizers, pesticides, irrigation, and machinery, along with the 
introduction of high-yielding varieties of a few cereals in the Global South (McMichael, 2009b: 
141). As such, the second food regime had very different effects in the North and South. Holt-
Giménez and Shattuck (2011: 110) explain that the Green Revolution deepened class, gender and 
regional inequalities since "[t]he development of industrial agriculture oriented to the global market 
weakened peasant agriculture and increased the power of large landowners". The consolidation of 
farm land into the hands of a few, coupled with the mechanisation of agriculture, estranged peasants 
from the means to feed themselves, which is why the Green Revolution upon evaluation became 
viewed in a negative light. 
2.3. Hegemony and transition in food regimes 
McMichael (2010: 610) explains that food regimes are "commonly associated with hegemonic 
moments" since these historical periods embody a specific ideology of political economy due to the 
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"geo-political relations and modes of capitalist development" at the time. Britain's hegemony during 
the first food regime was grounded in its influence as an imperial power, as well as the London-
based gold standard. Harnessing the resources of its settler-colonies, Britain shaped the international 
division of labour by importing cheap food from its extensive empire for its urban population. 
Although reasons for the demise of the first regime have not been explored in depth (Bernstein, 
2015: 6), its end has been clearly marked by Britain's loss in hegemony, which occurred in the 
aftermath of the global restructuring of the world economy due to the two World Wars and the 
Great Depression.   
It is of note how the features that took shape during the first regime led to the formation of the 
second. The first food regime established a system of large-scale family farms in the US to provide 
Britain with cheap grain and meat. During the second food regime the agricultural successes of the 
family-farm model led to an overproduction of food in the US. At the time, the hegemonic status of 
the US resulted in a certain international division of trade: in Europe the US model of national 
regulation of agriculture was duplicated, and in the Third World the US dumped its surpluses in the 
form of food aid (Bernstein, 2015: 10). The outcome for the global food order was the second food 
regime which involved a new stage in the industrialisation of farming in the North and an 
entrenched dependence on imports in the South. As such the South became increasingly reliant on 
industrial agriculture and manufactured foods (Burch & Lawrence, 2009: 267). 
Of importance is that the food regimes that came to be under these specific historical circumstances 
were not the result of the "direct expression of interest" (McMichael, 2009b: 143) by Britain or the 
US respectively. Friedmann (2005: 234) notes that "[e]ach of the past two food regimes was the 
combined outcome of social movements intersecting with state strategies and profit-seeking 
corporations". Food regimes are thus reflective of historical political and economic struggles since 
the development of the food system closely follows the development of capitalism itself. As such, 
hegemony in the food regime should be viewed as more than state dominance and rather as "an 
expression of broadly based ideas supported by material resources and institutions" (Morton, 2003: 
156).  
Drawing on the seminal work of Karl Polanyi in The Great Transformation (1944) Friedmann 
(2005: 231) remarks that a crisis within one food regime spurs on the transition to another regime. 
These transitions are characterised by Polanyi's so-called "double movement" of capitalism which 
alternates periods of liberalism with periods of reform. Holt-Giménez & Shattuck (2011: 112) 
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explain that the implications of the Polanyian thesis with regards to the food regime is that liberal 
food regimes can undergo regulatory change due to social pressure, and that "highly Keynesian or 
'embedded liberal'" food regimes can succumb to liberal influences from society. So far the food 
regime narrative clearly resembles this "double movement". The first food regime's colonial-
imperial development through free trade sparked working class unrest as the new frontier of farmers 
in settler-colonies feared that increased international trade would result in a collapse of their 
livelihood (Friedmann, 2005: 236). These concerns paved the way for the second food regime that 
adopted mercantilist sentiments under a nation-centred mode of development. Friedmann (2005: 
236) explains that the second food regime was built on "agricultural support and protectionism 
programmes [that fuelled agro-industrialisation] behind tariff walls [only] breached by a public 
'food aid' programme". 
Similarly, a historical analysis of the second food regime shows that its mercantilism was countered 
with the neoliberal agenda embodied by Thatcherism and Reagonism. This was exemplified in the 
rolling back of the state, reduced public spending on social services, and a reduction in the scale and 
scope of public enterprises (Burch & Lawrence, 2009: 269) all of which led to the weakening of the 
role of the state in economics. Subsequently, the development of the hegemony concept entailed 
that the definition extends beyond state-centric terms (Morton, 2003: 157). Viewed in such a light, 
the loss of US hegemony – and ultimately the demise of the second food regime – can be attributed 
to the rise of neoliberalism. Previously the economic sphere was rooted in the social and political 
spheres, in what Harvey (2005) refers to as an "embedded liberalism", where the state intervenes to 
achieve its goals. However, with the rise of neoliberalism, the economic sphere became increasingly 
independent from the social and political one. The market was left to run rampant which laid the 
foundation for the configuration of the corporate food regime. 
2.4. The third regime: the corporate food regime
19
 
Sodano (2012: 377) explains that the "four credos of neoliberalism" namely deregulation, 
international trade liberalisation, reduction of public expenditure, and privatisation have produced a 
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 The notion of the "corporate food regime" adopted here is attributed to McMichael (2009b: 148). Although 
Friedmann and McMichael (1989), writing after the collapse of the second food regime, jointly identify key ideas and 
arguments concerning a third food regime, Friedmann (2005) has been more hesitant to elaborate on the dynamics of the 
third food regime and consequently only offers a tentative analysis of what she calls the "corporate-environmental food 
regime". As such the existence of the third food regime is contested in food regime literature. For an overview of this 
debate, see McMichael (2009b), Friedmann (2009), and Burch and Lawrence (2009). Despite their divergence in 
emphasis, both McMichael and Friedmann "acknowledge the interplay between neoliberal regulatory restructuring and 
social movements" (Pechlaner & Otero, 2010: 183). This forms the basis of the theoretical framework presented in the 
following chapter.  
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new food regime that is fundamentally different from the previous ones. Unlike the previous food 
regimes, which were governed by the empire or the state, the corporate food regime's organising 
principle is the market (McMichael, 2009a: 285), which in other words led to a shift from state food 
governance to private food governance. This shift occurred due to the knock-on effect of the end of 
the Bretton Woods system which weakened the US' hegemony in the global political economy. 
Weakened state sovereignty coupled with blind faith in the rational choice model contributed to the 
emergence of neoliberalism, which brought on "new strategies of internationalisation" (Sodano, 
2012: 378); most notably in the form of the financialisation of the market and the construction of a 
global supply chain.  
Under the hegemony of neoliberalism, supermarkets and other retailers, as prominent agents in this 
global supply chain, have become dominant in dictating the overall operation of the corporate food 
regime. Thus even though the third food regime is conditioned by the previous food regimes, it has 
its own unique set of features. Akram-Lodhi (2012: 132-133) discuses a number of aspects that 
contributes to the corporate food regime's distinctiveness. First he explains that this food system is 
unique because it offers both Fordist foods and post-Fordist foods. Fordist foods refers to food that 
is produced in bulk and has a low profit margin, consequently large volumes of Fordist foods have 
to be sold in order for retailers to turn a profit. In this regard, through the consolidation of 
agribusinesses – the strategic alliances between agribusiness, the chemical industry, and 
biotechnology – the neoliberal food regime continues to sustain the expansion of industrialised 
monoculture production associated with the previous regime (McMichael, 2009a: 287). However, 
the neoliberal food regime has also come to be based on the production of post-Fordist foods since 
retailers not only seek to capture the middle-class food-consuming groups but also the affluent ones. 
Akram-Lodhi (2012: 132) notes that over the past two decades there has been a massive increase in 
"globally sourced fresh fruit and vegetables, horticultural products, fresh fish and seafood, along 
with the introduction and expansion of culturally specific foods in the supermarkets of the global 
North". These post-Fordist foods have a higher profit margin which means fewer volumes have to 
be sold to uphold the agribusiness nexus. The production of post-Fordist foods distinguishes the 
third food regime from the previous ones which relied on Fordist foods. 
Another distinct attribute of the corporate food regime is that it is more resource-intensive than the 
previous regimes. The increased industrialisation of agriculture for Fordist food production resulted 
in a "meatification" (Weis, 2007) of the middle-class' diet as meat became more affordable. Akram-
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Lodhi (2012: 132) explains that this meatification coupled with large-scale monoculture production 
has deepened the industrial grain-livestock complex, which increased both the hydrocarbon 
intensity and water intensity of food production. A related unique aspect of the corporate food 
regime is the expansion of the industrial grain-livestock complex. This mass production of 
monocultures and cheap meat significantly contributes to green-house gas emissions and 
consequently to climate change. Noting another ecological unsustainable feature of the corporate 
food regime, Akram-Lodhi (2012: 133) mentions that this regime is unique because of its 
historically unparalleled cruelty to animals through morally questionable meat production.  
The workings of the neoliberal forces behind this distinct set of attributes associated with the 
corporate food regime came under scrutiny during a series of high food prices during 2007-2011. 
This period was marked by record hunger present despite record harvest and record profits for 
major agribusinesses (Holt-Giménez & Shattuck, 2011: 111; Akram-Lodhi, 2012: 133) which 
brought to light the skewed distribution and unsustainable practices that is built into the corporate 
food regime. Following the 2008-2009 financial crisis, the hegemony of neoliberalism in the global 
political economy was further thrown into question. The remainder of the chapter outlines the 
contributing factors that led to the food price crisis. 
2.4.1. Unravelling the 2007-2008 food price crisis 
Rosin et al. (2012: 1) note that "[u]nderstanding the causes of the global food crisis has proved 
elusive, not for any lack of potential contributing factors, but for the absolute abundance of 
competing explanations". Despite the multitude of causes presented by different discourses in an 
attempt to narrate the development of the crisis, it is clear that the crisis was an evident product of 
the normal every-day working of the corporate food regime. This section presents the constructs and 
characteristics of the corporate food regime that caused it to be inherently unstable. Two sets of 
causes
20
 are discussed: indirect causes of the crisis – causes which are rooted in the historical 
development of the food regime as a whole, and direct causes of the crisis – causes which are 
embedded in the neoliberal foundation of the corporate food regime.  
2.4.1.1. Indirect causes of the food price crisis 
The indirect causes of the crisis stem from the fact that the corporate food regime does not exist in 
isolation of the previous two food regimes, but rather is the product of the long term development of 
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 This outline is largely modelled off Holt-Giménez, Patel and Shattuck's deconstruction of the crisis as presented in 
Food Rebellions! (2010). Their outline distinguishes between "root causes" (as discussed in section 2.4.1.1 of this 
document) and "proximate causes" (section 2.4.1.2) of the crisis. 
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the food regime as a whole. Key components of the current regime's make-up can be attributed to be 
the result of what was deemed positive amendments to food relations in the previous regimes. As 
such the corporate food regime has its foundation in: overproduction and food aid; the Green 
Revolution; and structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) and the World Trade Organisation's 
(WTO) Agreement on Agriculture (AoA). These causes can be viewed as indirect causes of the 
food price crisis since they contributed to create the neoliberal climate in which the direct causes of 
the crisis are rooted. This section briefly discusses these causes' role in the food price crisis.   
Overproduction and food aid 
As discussed earlier, the second food regime saw the spread of new technologies like fertilizer, 
pesticides, and machinery that led to an overproduction of food in developed countries.                      
Holt-Giménez et al. (2010: 24) explain that the overproduction in the North was used to open up 
markets in the global South through dumping food surpluses in developing countries under the 
guise of food aid. The US made strategic use of food aid by providing it to newly decolonialised 
countries in order to have an influence over their politics and economics amidst the perceived threat 
of communism during the Cold War. Food aid was branded as a form of benevolence to the Third 
World, when most of the developing countries in fact had quite a robust agricultural system based 
on small-scale sustenance farming and local trade. However, the Third World's supposed 
underdevelopment was framed as a problem resulting from a lack of technology, investment, and 
entrepreneurial culture, which the First World was eager to remediate by reconstructing Western 
capitalism in these states (Thomson, 2004: 178). Consequently the developed world set out to 
modernise agriculture in the developing world by introducing mechanical and technical production 
methods through what was later coined the Green Revolution. 
Development and the Green Revolution  
Broadly the Green Revolution can be understood as the "modernisation of agriculture based on the 
industrialisation of farm inputs" (Holt-Giménez et al., 2010: 24). The period spanning from the 
1960s to the 1990s marked an era that involved the development of high-yielding varieties of cereal 
grains; the expansion of irrigation infrastructure; modernisation of management techniques; and the 
distribution of hybridized seeds, synthetic fertilizers and pesticides to farmers (Pimentel, 2014: 81). 
The Green Revolution was supported through a well-financed global research campaign that led to 
dramatic increases in production with the global food availability per person rising with 11% from 
1970 to 1990 (Holt-Giménez et al., 2010: 27). However, these gains did not transfer equally across 
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and within countries. A quantitative study by Freebairn (1995) reviewed more than 300 research 
reports published on the Green Revolution and showed that 80% of these reports found that 
inequality increased during this era. To make way for larger and more capital-efficient farms, poor 
people were forced to migrate to the cities. With the loss of their agrarian land, the poor could no 
longer be food self-sufficient. Furthermore, they did not possess the skills necessary to secure a job 
in the city and could thus not afford the food that was produced. Thus a major problem of the Green 
Revolution was that its positive gains to combat hunger through increased food availability was 
offset by a decrease in food access which arguably resulted in greater global hunger.  
The socioeconomic impact of the Green Revolution and its forced development philosophy are 
widely criticised in food security literature. Rosin et al. (2012: 7) notes that during this era lives 
were lost due to the "diversion of food crops into cash crops, debt-driven poverty as farmers had to 
borrow to access more expensive technologies, farmer suicides in the Punjab, the lack of financial 
support into different kinds of agronomic research, vitamin A deficiency, and political instability". 
Furthermore, from an ecological perspective, the Green Revolution set off an increased 
consumption of water and energy resources, the spread of monocultures, the loss of food quality and 
safety in exchange for high production volumes, and an increase in chemical and biological 
pollution (IBON International, 2012: 36). Overall the Green Revolution created dependence on 
large-scale and technologically intensive food production. With the advent of neoliberal economics 
this method of production became entrenched in the food regime due to the increased 
commodification of food. The logics of neoliberalism called for a pure market system with minimal 
interference from the state; trade came to be upheld as the engine for growth. This development 
paradigm was enshrined in the Washington Consensus that was put in to practice through the 
structural adjustment policies during the 1980s (Holt-Giménez et al., 2010: 37). 
Structural adjustment programmes and the WTO's Agreement on Agriculture 
From 1989 onward, under the so-called Washington consensus, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank entrenched neoliberal globalisation by imposing structural adjustment 
programmes (SAPs). SAPs constituted a standard reform package for crisis-wracked developing 
countries to follow. The SAPs policy prescriptions maintained that the principles of market 
fundamentalism would pave the way towards equity and prosperity. Holt-Giménez et al. (2010: 37) 
notes that the IMF and the World Bank forced developing countries into opening up their 
economies "[u]nder the guise of macroeconomic stability". As such these policies of trade 
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liberation, foreign investment, deregulation, and privatisation aimed to push developing countries 
into the arena of international competition. This favoured developed countries and multinational 
corporations which, as opposed to developing countries, already established domestic industries on 
the free market doctrine. Under market liberalisation, trade inequalities between the developed and 
the developing world worsened since the latter was forced to allow cheap food imports and 
agricultural products to be dumped in local markets. As developing countries started to incur trade 
deficits, they began to look to international banks and financial institutions for loans. This 
aggravated the developing South's dependence on the North since developing countries' public 
funds had to be allocated to debt-servicing instead of supporting agriculture and development.  
The formation of the WTO after the Uruguay Round further ensured the global integration of 
industrial agriculture. The WTO was founded as a "permanent negotiating forum for global trade 
policy" (Holt-Giménez et al., 2010: 48) but since it was built on the principles of market 
fundamentalism its orientation reflects those of developed countries. Essentially the WTO was 
established to reduce trade barriers which further restricted the rights of sovereign states to regulate 
their own food and agriculture (Fairbairn, 2010). Under the WTO's Agreement on Agriculture 
(AoA) (1995) agriculture became incorporated into the core of the multilateral trading system, 
albeit not in the envisioned way of ensuring greater trade equality. The AoA institutionalised a set 
of binding obligations
21
 on members to reduce the support provided for their agricultural sectors. 
The effects of these policies exposed developing countries to subsidised agricultural imports from 
the developed world and restricted their agri-exports to the developed world (Pritchard, 2012: 41). 
This undermined developing countries' local production and development, and ultimately led to 
what McMichael (2010: 614) refer to as an export-oriented "world farm", where food-secure 
Northern countries produce food staples and where food-insecure Southern countries are compelled 
to produce luxury high-value crops. As such the AoA sustained the trade inequalities enforced by 
SAPs since it "tied Southern food security to global markets dominated by multicultural 
agribusinesses from the industrial North instead of encouraging developing countries to increase 
self-sufficiency through local farm production" (Holt-Giménez et al., 2010: 25). 
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 The AoA rests on three pillars: domestic support, market access, and export subsidies (Pritchard, 2012:48-49). Under 
domestic support the WTO classified subsidies granted to farmers according to the extent that they distort the market – 
those subsidies that offers support for farmers to sell output at below-market prices have to be cut back on by local 
governments. Market access involves reduction in tariff barriers which results in imports being more competitive. 
Through export subsidies large scale dumping occur because it allows governments to offload surplus production on the 
world market by selling commodities at a price below the cost of production. 
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The world-historical conjunctures of overproduction, the Green Revolution, SAPs and the AoA 
institutionalised a neoliberal approach to food production and food relations which entrenched 
inequalities within the corporate food regime that ultimately gave way to the direct causes of the 
food price crisis.   
2.4.1.2. Direct causes of the food price crisis 
As Rosin et al. (2012: 4) explain, the food price crisis occurred due to the "compounding effects of 
coincidental factors" and as such it is difficult to pin point the exact causes thereof. Although high 
food prices are assigned the blame for the food crisis, it should be emphasised that the problem is 
not high food prices per se, but rather high food prices amidst poverty. Poverty prevents food access 
which leads to food insecurity. What is of note is how the corporate food regime with its neoliberal 
foundation continues to produce increasingly unequal outcomes for the developed-rich and the 
developing-poor, with the former’s growth inherently linked to the exploitation of the latter. 
The bedrock of neoliberal inequality provided a platform for the direct causes of the crisis to 
develop. Kotz (2009: 307) notes that neoliberalism set two important developments in motion: an 
increase in inequality within society; and an increase in the financial sector’s involvement in 
speculative and risky activities – both of which contributed to encourage the direct causes of the 
food crisis. It is widely regarded that the volatile price of oil; investment in biofuels; rising meat 
consumption; an unfavourable climate; and food speculation are the most prominent causes of the 
crisis. The following section describes how these various factors contributed to rising food prices 
that eventually culminated in the 2007-2008 food price crisis.  
The volatile price of oil 
Between January 2008 and July 2008 the price of oil per barrel rose from $92 to $147 which 
increased the price of agricultural inputs and consequently led to higher production costs and food 
prices (IMF, 2008). The corporate food regime, with its reliance on oil for large-scale production 
and distribution and its neoliberal financialisation of the commodity market, is heavily affected by 
changes in the oil price. The corporate food industry is significantly more oil-intensive than the 
previous regimes. Lucas, Jones & Hines (2007:13) illustrate this by noting that over the past 50 
years the food system has undergone major changes that intensified the pressure on oil resources: 
the mechanisation of agriculture; a dramatic increase in global food trade; the entrenchment of the 
supply-chain and warehouse system; and the shift to highly processed and packaged food.  
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Interestingly, Holt-Giménez et al. (2010: 11) explain that a decrease in oil prices typically does not 
reflect in the food price; the difference is pocketed as profits by grain traders and retailers. 
Consequently high food prices tend to "stick" even after the price of oil drops thereby creating a 
new price level that will endure until the next spike in oil prices which will lead to a higher food 
price level. The implication for food security is that once certain consumers are excluded from the 
food market because of an increase in food prices, this restriction of food access is likely to endure 
thereby resulting in chronic food insecurity. 
Aryeetey & Moyo (2013: 24) explain that high oil prices fuel increasing food prices via three ways. 
First higher oil prices make food production and distribution more costly: oil is not only used to 
transport food an average of 2400 kilometres, it is also used to manufacture inorganic fertilizers and 
pesticides, and to operate machinery (Holt-Giménez et al., 2010: 110). A second way higher oil 
prices contribute to higher food prices is via the increased incentive for investment in biofuels, and 
third the tight link between energy and agricultural commodity markets in the corporate food 
regime stimulates speculation in commodities. Both the effect of biofuel investment and speculation 
are discussed below. 
Investment in biofuels 
As mentioned above, the increase in the price of oil spurred on investment in biofuels. Dwindling 
oil reserves and climate change signalled a demand for grain to be used in biofuel production: the 
higher oil price created an incentive to invest in food crops as an alternative energy source whilst 
the developed world's commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions further led to increased 
interest in "oil from soil" (Havnevik, 2011: 23).  
Windengård (2011: 51) notes that biofuels are presented as a win-win-win construct since it is 
promoted as an all-encompassing solution to energy security, environmental protection, and rural 
development. Similarly Holt-Giménez et al. (2010: 70) refer to biofuels as a perceived "industrial 
one-stop-shop" to solve agribusiness' problems. This is because the transformation of food to fuel 
creates a market for overproduced commodities to be turned into fuel, thereby inflating the value of 
those commodities in both the food and the fuel market, which ultimately combats agribusiness' 
falling rate of profit. The rising use of food crops for biofuels led to higher prices of grain which in 
turn contributed to the food price crisis (Aryeetey and Moyo, 2013: 22). 
The increased investment in biofuels also had an impact on food security through the related issue 
of land grabbing. The increased investment in biofuels resulted in large-scale land acquisitions of 
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foreign land by companies, governments and individuals through land deals with the often corrupt 
host country. The most important impetus is for biofuel production, although some land is also 
being used for forestry plantations to offset carbon emissions of rich countries (Broughton, 2013: 
25). Another reason for land grabbing is to ensure food security in the investing country often at the 
cost of the host country's food security (Young, 2012: 134).  Land grabbing has been referred to as a 
neo-colonial practice that systemically exploits the economically marginalised world (Broughton, 
2013: 25). People in the developing world are being forced off their land. Once in an urban setting, 
unemployment prevents former peasants access to the food market due to their lack of skills. 
Furthermore, following urban migration, their food access is restricted since they cannot live off the 
land like they were used to do – much like during the Green Revolution described earlier. 
McMichael (2009b: 142) notes that, like with most inventions of the corporate food regime, the 
"food/fuel agricultural complex is [thus] in tension with forms of localism" which has an adverse 
effect on food security. 
Increased consumption of meat 
Rapid population growth coupled with income growth in China and India has added pressure on the 
corporate food regime to produce more meat. As income rises, consumer demands shifts to a more 
Western diet with preference for high-value foods like meat and dairy (Lee et al., 2013: 4). This 
meatification of global diets affects food security via different channels. First is its direct effect on 
food prices: meat production puts strain on the world's food supply since it takes seven to eight 
kilos of grain to produce on kilo of beef (Holt-Giménez et al., 2010: 14) and as such crops that 
could have been used for human consumption are used for feed
22
.  
Second is the meatification of diets' adverse effect on food security through the expansion of 
industrialised agriculture. An overproduction by factory-farms has led to large parts of these 
surpluses being dumped in the markets of developing countries (Fritz, 2014: 15). The meatification 
of diets also "requires significantly more land per person to be cultivated than would be required on 
plant-based diets" (Weis, 2007: 42) which encourages land grabbing in developing countries. 
Dumping and land grabbing push local and less commercial producers out of business, which 
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 However, it has to be noted that there are different ways to produce meat. The link between increased meat 
consumption and higher food prices is the factory-farm production of meat in particular which has shown to be a highly 
inefficient production method. De Schutter (2009: 3) explains that "animals raised in industrialized countries consume 
more than 5 calories in feedstock for each calorie of meat or dairy food produced" but in countries like "Kenya, where 
animals are not fed grain but live off grass or agricultural by-products which humans cannot eat, livestock actually yield 
more calories than they consume". Thus it is not the meatification of diets per se that is problematic for food security, 
but rather the industrialisation of agriculture. 
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results in unemployment and ultimately restricts food access thereby leading to greater food 
insecurity. 
A third channel through which increased meat consumption negatively impacts food security is via 
its effect on the environment. The degradation of soil due to overgrazing renders it unsuitable for 
future food production thereby driving up the food prices. Meat production is also one of the prime 
contributors to the emission of greenhouse gases: De Schutter (2009: 2) states that these 
"[u]nsustainable forms of agriculture [….] are accelerating the trend towards global warming".  
Climate change and the weather 
While agriculture is an obvious culprit of climate change, it is also a victim thereof. At the time of 
the crisis it was reported that an average of 500 weather-related disasters were taking placed each 
year compared with 120 in the 1980s (Oxfam, 2007).  
In the period leading up to the crisis, several distinct natural disasters that are associated with the 
effects of climate change have caused disruptions in crop production, with a drought in Australia 
being one of the most notable (Rosin et al., 2012: 4). Reporting for The New York Times, Bradsher 
(2008) notes that Australia's rice crop was reduced by 98 percent which led to a doubling of rice 
prices over three months. Also, instead of producing its good-year quantity of 25 million tons of 
wheat, Australia's 2006 harvest only delivered 9.8 million tons (Bradsher, 2008) which put a 
significant strain on the supply thereby driving up the price. Poor harvests could also be attributed 
to the 2006 heat wave in California (Blakemore & Sandell, 2006); unseasonal rains in Kerala (The 
Economic Times, 2008); and multiple hurricanes in 2008 in Burma, Cuba, and Haiti (Holt-Giménez 
et al., 2010: 14). Furthermore, ongoing water depletion and soil erosion negatively impacts crop 
production which also contributed to higher prices in the era preceding the crisis. 
Speculation 
A main characteristic of the corporate food regime is the financialisation in the food system Epstein 
(2002: 3) defines financialisation as the "increasing importance of financial markets, financial 
motives, financial institutions, and financial elites in the operation of the economy and its governing 
institutions, both at the national and international levels". Heightened financialisation in the food 
system thus has an effect on the distribution of power and influence over the governance of the food 
system. Clapp (2013: 2) explains that agri-food investments abstract food “from its physical form 
[by turning it] into highly complex agricultural commodity derivatives”. She further explains that 
financialisation has brought about a “new kind of ‘distancing’ within the food system” by 
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increasing the number of actors involved in the global commodity chains. This has come to be 
associated with a lack of transparency and a constraint of information feedback within the system 
which makes it difficult to determine the true effect that investors’ buying and selling of agricultural 
commodities have on the price of food. This lack of clarity can be strategically utilised by financial 
actors that seek to portray themselves as the providers of solutions instead as the root of the 
problems.  
Burch and Lawrence (2009: 271) note that, foregoing the crisis, the use of new and more intricate 
financial derivates bourgeoned, and that there has also been an increase in a variety of agri-food 
investments ranging from investment in farmland, agricultural inputs, and logistics to significant 
direct investments by Goldman Sachs. The addition of new types of agri-food derivates provided a 
basis for increased speculation within the commodities market. As the combination of the increase 
in the oil price, investment in biofuels, and rising meat consumption signalled that food prices were 
on the rise, speculators rushed to the commodities market with the hope to benefit from rising 
prices. Holt-Giménez et al. (2010: 17) explain that the flooding of the commodities market by 
speculators drove up food prices even further, which amidst banking deregulation became beyond 
the control of the governments. 
2.5. Conclusion 
Over the past century the development of capitalism inspired similar developments in the 
production and distribution of food. In accordance with capitalism's development, the food regime 
underwent eras of liberation and eras of reform that reflect the economic logics of the political 
hegemon at the time. Attempts at altering the food regime for the better resulted in the formation of 
new food regimes, with a transformation from the settler-colonial regime under British hegemony, 
to the surplus regime under US hegemony, which ultimately gave way to the corporate food regime 
under neoliberal hegemony. Since the food price crisis of 2007-2008, the corporate food regime has 
become characterised as unsustainable. It was shown that each of the causes that contributed to the 
food crisis is rooted in the neoliberal foundation of the corporate food regime. Consequently the 
crisis should not be regarded as a sudden event, but rather as one that has been years in the making. 
In this regard Holt-Giménez et al. (2011: 114) note that "disasters, be they sudden or gradual, can 
provide insights into politics and society" that can point to ways in which state and market functions 
can be replaced by alternative logic. The following chapter is devoted to map out the dominant and 
alternative logics of food politics that emerged in a response to the food crisis.   
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Chapter Three: The food regime/food movement framework 
3.1. Introduction 
It was established in the previous chapter that the food price crisis was the result of a combination 
of concurrent factors. Since these factors are all inherent to neoliberalism and subsequently to the 
corporate food regime, the crisis drew attention to the limitations of this system. In the discussion 
below it is shown that, following the financial crisis of 2008-2009, the food crisis also came to be 
understood as part of the greater crisis of neoliberalism. Amidst the backdrop of these crises, the 
general understanding of chronic hunger was called into question. This chapter first explains how 
the respective crises served as a turning point for food security analysis by highlighting the 
differences between old and emerging food security analysis. Second, the food regime/food 
movements framework of Holt-Giménez & Shattuck (2011) is presented in detail. The framework 
identifies four ideologies of food politics that represent the different voices in the ongoing debate on 
food security. It is argued that, due to the influence of Polanyi and Gramsci, the framework is 
grounded in critical theory, which is the dominant narrative within which the framework is 
constructed. After noting the frameworks theoretical roots, the framework is presented by providing 
an overview of the ideologies of food politics: neoliberal, reformist, progressive and radical. Each 
of these ideologies has a distinct orientation that reflects its perspective of food security. The bulk 
of the chapter is spent to explain each of these ideologies. On overview of each ideology's discourse 
and the main institutions associated with the particular ideology are presented. A description of their 
divergent orientations and models are provided, and the key documents that enshrine each ideology 
are also discussed. 
3.2. Towards altered perspectives on chronic hunger 
3.2.1. The food crisis as turning point 
The 2007-2008 food price crisis once again highlighted the shortcomings of the corporate food 
regime. Drastic food price increases immobilised the poor that spend up to 80 per cent of their 
income on food, and who are particularly vulnerable (Aryeetey & Moyo, 2013: 23). Consequently, 
in the wake of these price increases, the amount of undernourished people in the world increased 
from 842 million in 2008 to 1.02 billion by the end of 2009 (FAO, 2009). The food crisis disturbed 
the complacency around global hunger. Previously the public perceived chronic hunger as the 
product of environmental or political shocks and as such food insecurity was deemed as a temporary 
situation in the developing world; a situation that can be reversed quickly by the provision of food 
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aid. However the effects of the food crisis were felt in the developed and developing world alike 
which brought to light a more accurate public perception of chronic hunger. Soon it became 
apparent that the crisis is indicative of a problem in the food regime as a whole. 
At the height of the crisis civil unrest indicated "a growing global awareness of and discontent with 
the fact that the basic necessity of food is not reaching hundreds of millions of people around the 
world" (Schanbacher, 2010: vii). Numerous international experts pushed for a rapid response to the 
food crisis in order to prevent political instability. Importantly, it is only after political stability was 
threatened that the state of food security was referred to as a crisis. Prior to the unrest widespread 
chronic hunger was considered a "normal and acceptable" feature of market volatility despite the 
fact that up to 1.02 billion people were chronically hungry (Rosin et al., 2012: 3). It is only when 
general public discontent surfaced with the potential to destabilise governments that these 
unprecedented level of hunger was framed as a crisis. 
3.2.2. The food crisis as part of the crisis of neoliberalism 
Following on the heels of the food crisis was the global financial crisis. The conjunction of food, 
energy, and financial crises, or the "general accumulation crisis" (McMichael, 2012: 690) caused 
opinionated journalists, historians, economists, and political scientists to re-evaluate the structure of 
the interconnected economic system with its far-reaching effects. Since the food system does not 
operate in isolation the food crisis can be viewed as a signal of a greater systemic crisis. Shortly 
after the food crisis The Great Recession of 2008-09 affirmed the relevance of a renewed debate 
around the sustainability of neoliberal economic policies. Since its advent neoliberalism and its 
ideals have been widely criticized from different standpoints, but Gamble (2009: 69) is of opinion 
that this financial crash of 2008 finally "burst the ideological bubble of neoliberalism". The 
neoliberal ideology of limitless growth as upheld by faith in the market is fundamentally questioned 
by Thomas Friedman (2009) who hints at the crisis as a signal that "the whole growth model we 
created over the last fifty years is simply unsustainable, economically and ecologically". The root of 
this unsustainable growth is to be found in the fact that the neoliberal growth model subjugates 
nature and its resources to the free market. Vandana Shiva (2013: 18) points out that in The Great 
Transformation (1944) Polanyi already warned against the foreseeable adverse effects of a growth 
model based on the commodification and reduction of nature and society to the market. In the 
absence of governance and proper intervention, the current growth model has come to be associated 
with environmental decline and social inequality.  
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The Food Ethics Council (2010: 79) comments on the scale of the challenge by noting that social 
justice and sustainability problems are rooted in the structural features of the system and across all 
aspects of the production and consumption of food. Economic liberalisation has not proved to be the 
most appropriate strategy to advance sustainable solutions to food security, quite the contrary. The 
corporate food regime has failed society and the environment. This is highlighted by the crisis 
which brought to the forefront the food failures of current times thereby showcasing the 
contradictions and shortcomings of neoliberalism. Sodano (2012: 382) states that it was with the 
2008 food crisis and the contemporary financial crisis that the "issues of food security and the 
fragility of the global food system were brought to the fore as hot topics". In the process of 
uncovering the causes of the global financial crisis it has been ascertained that the crisis did not 
represent a problem to be overcome but rather a system to be restructured. 
3.2.3. Old versus emerging perspectives on food security 
The abovementioned crises served as a turning point for food security discourse since the way food 
security was understood before the crisis could not fully explain the onset thereof.  Since the 
definition of food security is largely a definition of a goal, the concept can be interpreted most 
broadly. Windfuhr & Jonsén (2005: 23) note that the definition of food security does not 
automatically recommend a specific programme to achieve the goal thereof and consequently food 
security can be viewed from diverse perspectives which all attempts to achieve the same goal.   
Lang and Barling (2012: 316-317) distinguish between two set of perspectives that they label the 
"old" and "emerging" perspectives on food security. The old perspectives on food security deem 
under-production as the core problem. This productionist perspective holds that the increasing 
human population along with changing food preferences left the food system unable to keep up with 
demand. Food insecurity is thus framed as a supply-side problem that can be overcome by 
improving the efficiency of food production through technological innovations and managerial 
changes. Underlying this perspective is a positive vision of human ingenuity to ensure more 
efficient production. Consequently a great body of literature is devoted to issues of new 
productivism in an attempt to intensify production through precision agriculture, next generation 
genetic engineering and nanotechnology. A strong belief in consumer freedom and the workings of 
the market are also central to this production perspective.  
However, after an assessment of the crises it became clearer that approaches to address hunger 
should be less production-focused since the crisis signalled that poverty and overproduction, as 
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opposed to scarcity and overpopulation, sit at the core of the food security dilemma. In 1982 
Amartya Sen already distinguished between a "nature-focused" and "society-focused" approach to 
food security. The former involves technical and environmental solutions from the fields of natural 
sciences and engineering, whereas the latter focuses on political economy solutions rooted in the 
social sciences. At the time Sen (1982: 443) noted that the nature-focused approach to food security 
is the most dominant. Although it has since remained the prevailing approach, the crises highlighted 
the prominent role politics and economics have to play in addressing food security. 
A greater understanding of food security has led Garnett (2013: 31-33) to identify additional 
perspectives on food security beyond that of the producer challenge. These emerging perspectives 
frame food security as a consumption challenge and/or socio-economic challenge. These views 
reflect the emerging perspectives on food security and emphasise the importance of sustainable food 
systems where the success thereof is not measured purely through production quantities but in 
environmental, health, social, cultural, ethical, economic, and political factors as well (Lang, 2010: 
275). By framing food security as a consumption challenge, solutions are focused on demand 
restraint. This perspective stresses solutions that drive down the consumption of high-impact foods 
such as meat and dairy. Viewing food security as a socio-economic perspective highlights 
inequality as the core concern. The transformation of the food system through the development of 
local food systems, and fairer trade between nations are emphasised as solutions that would promote 
equality across and within countries.  
Furthermore, in contrast with the old perspective on food security, the emerging perspective does 
not view food price crisis as a sudden event caused by external or market shocks. Instead the 
emerging food security analysis views this crisis as the exposure of a long-running failure; a 
symptom of a system already under stress. The core concern of emerging food security analysis is 
the mismatch of production, consumption, and policy. Subsequently it is advocated that the food 
system should be redesigned for social, environmental and economic sustainability (Lang & 
Barling, 2012: 317).  
3.3. A food regime/food movements framework 
3.3.1. Context-setting and outline 
In line with the emerging perspective on food security that views the crisis as product of the normal 
everyday workings of the system, the corporate food regime continues to be under scrutiny. Holt-
Giménez and Shattuck (2011: 117-118) constructed a framework to distinguish between the main 
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ideological differences between proposed food security models. They recognize four distinct 
streams of food politics: neoliberal, reformist, progressive, and radical. Each of these streams 
harbours and reproduces a different discourse and subsequently has a particular orientation to solve 
chronic hunger. Accordingly specific institutions can be associated with each stream of food politics 
depending on the discourse they use and the orientation they adhere to. What further differentiate 
each steam of food politics are their different approaches to the food crisis. Each ideology advocates 
a different model to govern food and food-related resources like labour and land. The framework is 
presented as Table 2, and a discussion on each of these ideologies follows in the sections below.   
Holt-Giménez and Shattuck (2011: 114) explain that the "diversity of approaches […] reflects 
important class, race, and systemic divides". As such the framework is especially useful for 
understanding the agendas of a diverse range of groups and individuals. As Allen (2013: 135) points 
out, "how we define the problem, of course, makes some solutions seem obvious and others seem 
much less obvious". Thus focusing on the similarities and differences between these approaches is 
essential for mapping out an alternative food system that is both fair and sustainable. 
3.3.2. Critical theory as foundation of the framework 
It is necessary to acknowledge that framework regime/food movements framework rests on critical 
theory. Within the context of International Relations
23
 Robert Cox distinguishes between problem-
solving theory and critical theory. Cox (1981: 128-130) explains that problem-solving theory "takes 
the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into 
which they are organised, as the given framework for action" whereas critical theory “does not take 
institutions and social and power relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning 
itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of changing".  
The food regime/food movements framework highlights that there is a definite ideological split 
between "those that seek to stabilise the corporate food regime, and those that want to change it" 
(Holt-Giménez & Shattuck, 2011: 114). The framework above can thus be said to have its 
foundation in critical theory since it accounts for the fact that the corporate food regime is the 
construct of an inherent set of power relations which the neoliberal and reformist streams seek to 
maintain, as opposed to the progressive and radical streams that aim to deliberately adopt a critical 
approach in order to transcend the corporate food regime. By acknowledging food politics 
                                                        
23
 "International Relations" is used interchangeably with "International Relations Theory" to refer to the academic study 
field or discipline, whereas "international relations" (without capitals) is used to refer to the practice of world politics. 
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approaches that are rooted in critical theory, the framework itself can be viewed as a construct of 
critical theory. 
Holt-Giménez & Shattuck (2011: 114) furthermore point out another ideological split in their 
framework, the one between the neoliberal stream and the reformist stream that respectively 
corresponds to the opposing forces of liberalisation and reform within Polanyi's "double movement 
of capitalism". According to Polanyi (1944: 76) one of capitalism's core characteristics is its 
cyclical nature that alternates periods of unregulated markets with periods of state intervention that 
seeks to address social concerns. This double movement of capitalism is kept in motion by 
contesting demands placed on the system. Political and social contestations within civil society 
culminate in a "range of political possibilities for social opposition and government reforms to 
liberalised markets" (Holt-Giménez & Shattuck, 2011: 113). As such the double movement of 
capitalism is representative of a greater struggle within civil society which is consistent with the 
Gramscian depiction of civil society as an arena of struggle where the dominant class exercise 
power not only through the mechanism of the state institutions but also through ideological 
coercion.  
The food regime/food movements framework is furthermore rooted in critical theory since it builds 
on Friedmann and McMichael's (1989) food regime theory
24
. Food regime theory also has a strong 
foundation in critical theory, especially in Gramscianism since it offers a historical account of the 
food system's development by drawing on the ideas, production relations, and institutions that 
contributed to form and maintain the hegemony within each of the food regimes. As discussed 
earlier, the concept of hegemony is central to food regime analysis in so much as each of the food 
regimes was the product of a particular hegemon with Britain setting tone during the first food 
regime, the US during the second, and neoliberalism in the third and current food regime. At this 
point it is necessary for the ensuing discussion to elaborate on the Gramscian concept of hegemony. 
Hegemony is more encompassing than a mere monopoly power on the state's institutions. Morton 
(2003: 156) explains that although a hegemon legitimises its power through the state, it establishes 
its ideological dominance through the institutions of civil society (churches, schools and 
universities, the media). As such the ideological standpoint of the hegemon becomes entrenched in 
society and ultimately viewed as the natural order of affairs. Hegemony is thus not an explicit 
dominance but rather one that is based on a blend of force and consent. 
                                                        
24
 See section 2.2. 
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Corporate Food Regime Food Movements 
Politics Neoliberal Reformist Progressive Radical 
Discourse Food Enterprise Food Security Food Justice Food Sovereignty 
Main institutions International Financial 
Corporation (World 
Bank): IMF; WTO; 
Green Revolution;  
Cargill; Monsanto; 
ADM; Tyson; 
Carrefour; Tesco; 
Walmart  Bill and 
Melinda Gates 
Foundation 
International Bank for 
Reconstruction & 
Development (World 
Bank); FAO; Slow 
Food Movement; some 
Food Policy Councils; 
most food banks & 
food aid programmes 
Alternative fair trade 
and many Slow Food 
chapters; many 
organizations in the 
Community Food 
Security Movement; 
many Food Policy 
Councils and youth 
food and justice 
movements; many 
farmworker and labour 
organisations 
Viá Campesina, 
International Planning 
Committee on Food 
Sovereignty; many food 
justice and rights-based 
movements 
Orientation Corporate Development Empowerment Entitlement 
Model Overproduction; 
corporate 
concentration; 
unregulated markets 
and monopolies; 
monocultures 
(including organic) 
GMOs; biofuels; mass 
global consumption of 
industrial food; 
phasing out of peasant 
and family agriculture 
in local retail 
Mainstreaming/ 
certification of niche 
markets (e.g. organic, 
fair, local, sustainable); 
maintaining northern 
agricultural subsidies; 
"sustainable" 
roundtables for soy, 
forest products, etc.; 
market-led land reform; 
microcredit 
Agroecologically 
produced local food; 
investment in 
underserved 
communities; new 
business models and 
community benefit 
packages for 
production, processing, 
and retail; better wages 
for agricultural 
workers; solidarity 
economics; land & food 
access; regulated 
markets and supply  
Dismantle corporate 
agri-foods monopoly; 
power; parity; 
redistributive land 
reform; community 
rights to water and 
seed; regionally based 
food systems; 
democratisation of food 
system; sustainable 
livelihoods; protection 
from dumping/ 
overproduction; revival 
of agroecologically 
managed peasant 
agriculture to distribute 
wealth and cool planet; 
regulated markets and 
supply 
Approach to the 
food crisis 
Increased industrial 
production; 
unregulated corporate 
monopolies; land 
grabs; expansion of 
GMOs; public-private 
partnerships; liberal 
markets; international 
sourced food aid 
Same as neoliberal but 
with increased medium 
farmer production and 
some locally sourced 
food aid; more 
agricultural aid but tied 
to GMOs and "bio-
fortified/climate-
resistant" crops 
Right to food; better 
safety nets; sustainably 
produced locally-
sourced food; 
agroecologically based 
agricultural 
development 
Human right to food 
sovereignty; locally 
sourced, sustainably 
produced, culturally 
appropriate, 
democratically 
controlled focus on 
UN/FAO negotiations 
Guiding 
document 
World Bank 2009 
Development Report 
World Bank 2008 
Development Report; 
Comprehensive 
Framework for Action 
IAASTD Declaration of Nyéléni; 
UN Declaration of 
Peasant Rights;  
IAASTD 
Table 2. A food regime/food movements framework 
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It is along these lines that the hegemony of neoliberalism is constructed and upheld within a global 
class structure that benefits those who have capital at the cost of those who have not. True to 
hegemonic nature, the neoliberal ideology has become so embedded in civil society that it has 
become difficult to think outside of the framework of free market capitalism. Consequently it is 
equally difficult to fathom solutions to chronic hunger beyond the framework of neoliberalism. 
Even the concept of food security is a construct of neoliberalism!
25
 Thus one of the key challenges 
to addressing chronic hunger "is to remove the structural barriers that are holding back all [the] 
promising alternatives" (Holt-Giménez & Shattuck, 2011: 85). In this regard Allen (2013: 136) as 
well as Lang and Barling (2012: 317) highlight the importance of social sciences' role to illuminate 
and challenge the dominant epistemological frameworks that assign problem definitions and 
solutions.  
The remainder of the chapter discuses the food regime/food movements framework, and illustrates 
the ideological divergence in the approaches that seek to maintain the current food regime and those 
that challenge the neoliberal hegemony. A detailed discussion of the neoliberal, reformist, 
progressive, and radical streams of food politics are presented below along with their corresponding 
discourses, orientations, models, and approaches. The main institutions and guiding documents for 
each stream are also described.   
3.3.3. Food politics within the corporate food regime 
At one end of the food politics spectrum is the approaches rooted in the corporate food regime. 
These approaches seek to address chronic hunger by making adjustments to the current food system 
in order to still preserve the production and distribution patterns of the corporate food regime. 
Although the productionist policy paradigm that's associated with the corporate food regime is now 
widely challenged when presented as a solution to food security (Lang & Barling, 2012: 313) this 
perspective still dominates the debates on food security. Garnet (2013: 31) argues that the 
dominance of this perspective can be ascribed to the fact that it serves existing power structures 
                                                        
25
 The concept "food security" was first coined at the 1974 World Food Summit at the advent of neoliberalism and was 
initially rooted in the productionist paradigm. As such the first definition of the concept is exemplary of the neoliberal 
trend in food politics as discussed below. However, throughout the development of the current food regime, the concept 
has undergone significant chances. Currently it is associated with the reformist ideology, and to a lesser extent with the 
progressive one – see below. It should be noted that the way in which the concept is employed depends on the 
interactions of many political, social and economic considerations. For the purpose of this discussion the term is used in 
a depoliticised manner in the sense that it does not presuppose an allegiance with a particular ideology of food politics. 
Within this discussion food security simply refers to the absence of chronic hunger. 
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within the corporate food regime. Both the neoliberal and reformist approaches' orientation is based 
on the assumption that economic growth – albeit via different models – is the guiding force behind 
eliminating chronic hunger.  
3.3.3.1. Neoliberal food politics 
Discourse and main institutions 
The discourse of neoliberal food politics is that of food enterprise which constitutes a global 
corporate and industrially-based food system with very few restrictions placed on business 
activities. Some of the most notable institutions that subscribe to neoliberal include Northern-
dominated international finance and development institutions like the World Bank, WTO, and 
IMF
26
. Other major role-players include agri-food monopolies (like Cargill, Monsanto, ADM, 
Tyson, Carrefour, Tesco, and Walmart) and organisations of big philanthropy capital like the Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation. Holt-Giménez & Shattuck (2011: 119) note that the discourse of 
food enterprise is advocated by the ruling corporate classes. These institutions and actors propagate 
a certain vision of economic and social globalisation as reflected in their corporate orientation and 
industrial model. This approach currently dominates food politics since it relies on the established 
hegemony of neoliberalism within the current food regime. The dynamics of the corporate food 
regime, as detailed in the previous chapter, precisely reflects the food order that neoliberal food 
politics set out to maintain.  
The advocates of neoliberal food politics draw on the fact that neoliberalism is the governing 
principle of the current regime to reproduce and further entrench neoliberalism. Morvaridi (2012: 
243) explain that neoliberal actors use their economic capital to gain symbolic capital which they in 
turn use to reproduce economic capital. Symbolic capital can be understood as these actors' resource 
base of prestige, honour, or recognition that they receive from advocating neoliberal values within 
the climate of neoliberal hegemony. The legitimacy they gain from their symbolic capital is 
eventually used to deepen the discourse of food enterprise in order to create new economic 
opportunities for themselves within the framework of neoliberal food politics.   
Orientation and model  
The resultant orientation for such free market economics is a corporate one based on an agricultural 
model of increased capitalisation. Thus, "rather than acknowledging a fundamental flaw in the 
                                                        
26
 For a historical analysis of these institutions' contribution to neoliberal food politics, see Schanbacher (2010: 35-49). 
Schanbacher accounts for specific policies and agreements of the World Bank, WTO, and IMF that secured the 
hegemony of neoliberalism by projecting this ideology on the world through these institutions.  
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global food system", proponents of neoliberal food politics viewed the food crisis as a "situation 
that could be alleviated without revising the existing approaches" (Rosin et al., 2012: 5). As such 
they promote the idea of broad-based economic growth through a corporate orientation with the 
support of an industrial model that seeks to address complex issues like food security by the 
application of business solutions.  
The corporate orientation to food security finds expression in what is called the New Green 
Revolution. Similar to the Green Revolution, the New Green Revolution is aimed at agrarian 
restructuring by increasing productivity in an attempt to reduce poverty and ensure greater food 
security. This industrial model focuses on investment against chronic hunger in the form of 
macroeconomic development – especially in the developing world. The understanding is that in 
these areas the development of the capitalism is incomplete which accounts for poverty and food 
insecurity. Consequently intergovernmental institutions and large agri-businesses aim to facilitate 
the commodification process in especially the rural areas of the developing world in order to expand 
the market economy (Morvaridi, 2012: 246). The expansion of the market economy is supported by 
increased productivity through free trade, innovation, new technology, genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs), and investment in biofuels – as described with reference to the corporate food 
regime in the previous chapter.  
Guiding document 
The food enterprise discourse is enshrined in the 2009 World Development Report (WDR) of the 
World Bank which serves as a guiding document for neoliberal food politics. The message of this 
report is that "economic growth is seldom balanced" and that "[e]fforts to spread it prematurely will 
jeopardise progress" (The World Bank, 2009: 5-6). Considering that the neoliberal ideology holds 
that economic growth is the key to address chronic hunger, the report essentially states that chronic 
hunger is an inevitable part of the market economy and that attempts to address this product of 
unequal development will be detrimental to growth in the North.  
The report encourages governments not to work against the grain of the global economy, and 
subsequently the development of poor areas and communities should not be the policy goal. Instead 
economic growth as a whole should be targeted by incorporating the poor areas and communities 
into the market economy. In order to achieve this, the report calls on the so-called three Ds of 
development: density, distance, and division. With regards to density, the report cites the example 
of Singapore as both the densest and richest country thereby highlighting that increased density 
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increases production (The World Bank, 2009: 15). The discourse of food enterprise praises 
increased production since it is a sign of economic growth. In this view, the more than 1 billion 
people that live in slums in urban areas are not necessarily viewed as a social concern but rather as a 
positive sign for economic development. The logic goes that presence of slums is a signal that more 
individuals are in pursuit to take advantage of the economic opportunities that an urban setting has 
to offer, and by drawing on the upsurge of small businesses in slums, the report reiterates that 
increased density is to be encouraged. The message for policy makers is that these communities can 
be made into vibrant living economic communities. Following the same rationale, the report 
encourages a decrease in the distance within the global economy by encouraging and supporting the 
move of people from rural areas into the cities. It is highlighted that the issue of distance can also be 
addressed by reducing transaction cost through less government intervention in the form of less 
strict border control and taxes. With regards to division, the report refers to all man-made barriers 
that prevent transaction and especially note international borders, but also cultural divergence as 
divisions that restrict the free-flow of products and services. The report thus advises governments to 
further open up their economies and not to try and fight the forces of the free market. 
3.3.3.2. Reformist food politics 
Discourse and main institutions  
The discourse of reformist food politics is food security. The concept is employed broadly in the 
sense that it refers to the 1996 World Food Summit definition that encompasses food security to be 
a "a situation that exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to 
sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active 
and healthy lifestyle" (FAO, 1996). This definition is an expansion on the concept as it was first 
defined at the 1974 World Food Conference at the advent of neoliberalism. Essentially "food 
security" is thus a neoliberal food politics concept. In line with neoliberal food politics, the initial 
definition focused solely on the volume and stability amidst fluctuations in production and prices 
(UN, 1975). However throughout the development of the corporate food regime, and through the 
double movement of capitalism, the term has been modified in order to reflect a focus on social 
concern instead of economic concern. As explained above, both the neoliberal and reformist 
streams of food politics are "structurally integral to the corporate food regime" since they reflect the 
two dimensions of capitalism's double movement of liberation and reform (Holt-Giménez & 
Shattuck, 2011: 123). It is through this process of liberalisation and reform that the concept of food 
security has been adjusted to account for social issues. 
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The main institutions of the corporate food regime also have both neoliberal and reformist projects. 
Key actors in reformist food politics include the intergovernmental institutions like the World Bank, 
and the UN's FAO, but also organisations like the corporate mainstreaming faction of Fair Trade, 
some chapters of the Slow Food Movement, along with most food banks and food aid programmes. 
Orientation and model  
Reformist food politics have become more influential since the food crisis. Ultimately it aims to 
lessen the social and environmental burden of the corporate food regime by making modifications 
to the current system. Although its goal is to mitigate the externalities of a corporate food regime, 
the position of reformist food politics is in effect identical to neoliberal politics: to reproduce the 
corporate food regime (Holt-Giménez & Shattuck, 2011: 115). Subsequently the reformist actors do 
not advocate drastically new policies; they rather focus on mainstreaming socially and 
environmentally sustainable alternatives into existing market structures. 
The orientation of reformist food politics is that of development, and in particular state-led 
development. While this stream do not completely subscribe to a neo-Keynesian model, it does call 
on the state to support agricultural development, and to recognise the human right to food. Within 
the reformist model "governments have a legal obligation to ensure the food security of their 
citizens" although the means through which this is to be accomplished are not specified (Holt-
Giménez & Shattuck, 2011: 122). Reformist food politics often manifests in the call for increased 
safety nets such as food stamps, food banks, and food aid to accommodate the social shortcomings 
of the market economy. Other approaches include industry self-regulation initiatives and civil 
society driven corporate responsibility to address the issues of inadequate sustainability and equity 
within the regime. In doing so, the reformist approach intends to modify both consumers' and 
industries' behaviour by setting new standards that focus on fair, sustainable, and local trade.  
Importantly, the model of reformist food politics still upholds the corporate food regime through its 
support for neoliberal institutions and subsequently the increased application of technological 
solutions. Reformist food politics also encourage free market rhetoric, however it promotes to 
regulate the market for social re-stabilisation until the corporate food regime improves to such an 
extent that it addresses its shortcomings.  
Guiding documents 
The 2008 World Development Report of the World Bank with its theme "Agriculture for 
Development" is a key document for reformist food politics. The report presents agriculture as a 
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tool to be utilised in order to achieve development. Agriculture is highlighted as a unique tool in 
this regard since it "contributes to development as an economic activity, as a livelihood, and as a 
provider of environmental services" (The World Bank, 2008: 2-3). This statement reflects the 
reformist sentiment in that it acknowledges the value of agriculture to prop up both economic 
growth and social and environmental advancements. In contrast with the 2009 World Development 
Report discussed above, this one advocates promoting rural economies as opposed to supporting 
urban migration. The development role smallholder farming and peasants can play is highlighted, 
however still within the context of the corporate food regime as the report encourages increased 
productivity for smallholder farming through the use of technological solutions and market 
incentives (The World Bank, 2008: 10).   
Another key document that reflects the reformist project is the UN High-level Task Force on the 
Global Food Security Crisis' Comprehensive Framework for Action (CFA) (2010) that builds on the 
2008 WDR. The CFA was "designed to encourage concerted responses to the food price crisis with 
actions that respond to the immediate needs of the vulnerable populations and contribute to longer-
term resilience" (UN High Level Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis, 2010: xi). With its 
so-called twin track approach that focuses on both the immediate and ongoing challenges of those 
that are particularly vulnerable, the CFA aims to address social and sustainability issues that relate 
to food security. This is also reflected in their strategies for improving food security which echoes 
the 2008 WDR's focus of utilising agriculture as a tool for development. Similar to the aims of the 
2008 WDR, the CFA strategies are targeted on improving "small-holder farming, pastoralism, and 
environmental sustainability" through the use of social protection from the government and through 
strengthening multilateral trading systems. As such the CFA is representative of the reformist 
approach since it calls for adjustment within the current system in the form of government 
intervention. However, it does not seek to transcend the corporate food regime since it also supports 
addressing food security through business-like approaches that focus on increasing productivity and 
incentives for trade. 
3.3.4. Food politics beyond the corporate food regime 
At the other end of the food politics spectrum is the food movement approaches. These approaches 
challenge the corporate food regime and ultimately seek to bring into existence a new food system 
that is more equitable and ecologically viable than the industrial model. Both the progressive and 
the radical stream are founded in activism and grassroots organisation and find expression in the 
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form of many heterogeneous food movements. In supporting the commonly-cited belief that 
solutions to chronic hunger should be more society-based, these food movements challenge 
neoliberal solutions that promote the globalisation and industrialisation of food production with 
alternative approaches that focus on the socio-political distinctness of local contexts. Both steams of 
food politics campaign for greater control over food production and consumption by people who 
have been marginalised in the corporate food regime. Although the two streams both seek to 
transcend the current food system, their forms of organisation differ: the progressive stream is 
represented by various scattered local food movements in the North, while the radical one 
represents a more militant and united international political network. As such their orientation and 
model to address hunger also differ, as discussed below.   
3.3.4.1. Progressive food politics 
Discourse and main institutions  
Holt-Giménez and Shattuck (2011: 124) explain that the progressive stream of food politics has its 
roots in 1920s US progressivism that advocated for government regulation of large corporations to 
ensure economic and social justice. The discourse this approach adopts is that of food justice which 
represents a transformation of the current system in order to account for disparities and inequities. 
The food justice movement is influenced by the racial justice and environmental justice movements. 
Subsequently they are especially concerned with ensuring access to healthy food for the 
marginalised. The progressive advocates are primarily based in northern countries and are made up 
of the middle and working classes, and also the urban and university youth. Community food 
security and environmental non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that denounce racism and 
classism also forms part of the progressive movement. 
Orientation and model  
The progressives are orientated towards empowerment. They seek to mobilise local and 
marginalised communities by drawing focus to the rhetoric of the right to food. The right to food 
"involves the subsequent demand that peoples and national governments have a real and efficacious 
ability to define their [own] agricultural and food policies" (Schanbacher, 2010: 77). Consequently 
progressives call for political reform in order to lessen individuals' dependency on capitalist inputs 
within the food system. The onus is placed on governments to serve the public interest through the 
protection of civic and environmental common goods that would enable communities to have better 
access to healthy food instead of being subjugated to industrial food put forth by corporate interests. 
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Recognising the key role that governments have to play, advocates of the progressive movement 
also campaign for deepening democracy in order to "make government more accountable and 
responsive to the needs of its citizens" (Holt-Giménez & Shattuck, 2011: 124). Importantly, without 
government accountability, the right to food rhetoric is at risk, as "it can be a mockery to tell 
someone they have the right to food when there is nobody with the duty to provide them with food" 
(O'Neill, 2002 as quoted in FAO, 2003).  
The progressive food politics model is centred on localizing production and creating new business 
models in disadvantaged communities. With their strong focus on the local-national arena, the 
progressive food movement is not active transnationally and as such does not actively challenge the 
corporate food regime. Their approach is decentralised and local as illustrated by one farmer-
activist outlook, "We are islands of good food and good community in a sea of bad news" (quoted 
in Holt-Giménez & Shattuck, 2011: 125). In this regard, Holt-Giménez (2010: 4) importantly notes 
that the progressive movement has a pivotal role to play in steering the transformation of the food 
system. He explains that if the progressive movement were to take their cue from (and form 
alliances with) reformist institutions, the corporate food regime would remain intact with little 
scope for transformation. However, if the progressive movement align with the radical movement, 
the food movement will be united which could result in substantive changes in the status quo due to 
social pressure. 
Guiding documents 
Although there are several guiding documents for each of the individual progressive food 
movements, the Global Report of the International Assessment on Agricultural Knowledge, Science 
and Technology for Development (IAASTD) (2009) serves as an overarching framework. The 
World Bank and FAO initiated the IAASTD in order to determine the impacts of historical and 
anticipated agricultural practices on the hunger rate, the standard of rural livelihoods, and socially 
and environmentally sustainable development. Unlike research organisations affiliated with the 
corporate food regime, the IAASTD employs "tools and models from different knowledge 
paradigms including local and traditional knowledge" in order to present decision and policy 
makers with different options rather than a set of recommendations (IAASTD, 2009: x). As such the 
social, economic, political, and ecological diversity of different contexts are acknowledged by 
subscribing to the belief that agricultural systems are distinct and should reflect the needs of the 
community it is serving. 
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3.3.4.2. Radical food politics 
Discourse and main institutions  
The radical food politics stream adopts the discourse of food sovereignty. Within the debate on 
food, the terms food justice and food sovereignty are often used interchangeably. Although both 
discourses are structured around alternative and local food movements, food sovereignty has come 
to be associated with the global South in their campaign for greater autonomy in structuring their 
food relations according to their own needs (Holt-Giménez & Shattuck, 2011: 127). The food 
justice discourse does not have as strong a political undercurrent, and focuses on pockets of 
transformation that would gradually transform the corporate food regime into a new system, as 
opposed to the food sovereignty discourse that demands an institutional overhaul. 
Food sovereignty as a concept was first brought to light by Viá Campesina at the World Food 
Summit in 1996. This came as a response to the Agreement on Agriculture which coerced the 
developing world to open up their markets and adopt industrial agriculture. Although a multitude of 
definitions are operational, food sovereignty essentially can be defined as: the right of people and 
governments to choose the way food is produced and consumed. As such the concept is an 
extension on the right to food in so much as the right to food is interpreted as not only a right to the 
access thereof, but also the right to organise food in way that supports local livelihoods, reflects 
local needs, and is culturally appropriate (Holt-Giménez & Shattuck, 2011: 127). Food sovereignty 
is thus a political concept but also an alternative policy framework that challenges the mainstream 
solutions to chronic hunger as represented by the neoliberal and reformist projects. 
Viá Campesina is still the most prominent actor within the radical stream of food politics. This 
transnational movement represents 160 farmer's organisations and around 200 million peasant 
families located in 79 countries (Viá Campesina, 2013). Initially radicals were primarily located in 
the global South and rural areas, but farmers and scholars in the North have become more drawn to 
the radical stream of food politics since the shortcomings of the corporate food regime became more 
apparent. Following the food crisis the international coordinator of Viá Campesina sent an open 
letter to the head of the FAO that highlighted the nature of the crisis as inherent to the neoliberal 
model, and re-affirmed the need for government regulation and food sovereignty. This created an 
advocacy space within the UN for the rights of peasants and others working in rural areas. 
Consequently some sentiments of the radical stream find expression within the UN. Many food 
justice and rights-based movements and NGOs also align with the radical stream of food politics.  
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Orientation and model  
The radical project is geared at changing the regime in order to bring to fruition a more equitable 
and sustainable food system. The orientation of radical food politics is that of entitlement which is 
rooted in the entitlement approach to famine as developed by Amartya Sen. Sen (1981: 497) 
explains that entitlement refers to "the set of alternative commodity bundles that a person can 
command in a society using the totality of rights and opportunities that he or she faces", and goes on 
to identify four legal ways of acquiring food within the framework of entitlements. First, individuals 
can employ trade-based entitlements to sell something in order to buy food. Second, they can grow 
their own food in accordance with their production-based entitlement. Third, using labour-based 
entitlement, they can sell their skills or labour to enable them to purchase food. Fourth, through 
transfer-based entitlements, food can be acquired by transfer from one person to another, or from a 
group or the government to a specific person. Drawing on this framework of entitlements, Sen 
reiterates that the reason for chronic hunger is not a problem of availability but a problem of access, 
and in particular a problem of access to entitlements. 
Following this logic, the radical movement aspires to restate vulnerable individuals and 
marginalised groups' set of entitlements by restoring their sovereignty over their food systems so 
that they can determine production, trade and employment relations, and the extent to which 
government can transfer food in the form of social protection. Radical food politics promote self-
determination over local food systems by advocating that corporate agri-food monopolies should be 
dismantled, that food should be de-commodified, and that there should be a redistribution of wealth 
and power to democratise the food system (Holt-Giménez & Shattuck, 2011: 128-9). With its focus 
on food sovereignty, the radial movement does not recommended a particular agricultural model, 
but attempts to restructure the food system to such an extent that communities gain the entitlement 
to organise agriculture according to their unique local model.  
Guiding documents 
Similar to the progressive project, the radical one also supports acroecological and society-based 
solutions to the twin concerns of equity and sustainability as encouraged by the IAASTD Global 
Report (2009) discussed above. Other guiding documents for the radical stream of food politics 
include the Declaration of Nyéléni (2007) that reflects the sentiments of the first International Food 
Sovereignty Forum. The declaration outrightly states that the food sovereignty movement is fighting 
the "domination of our food and food producing systems by corporations that place profit before 
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people, health and the environment" (Forum for Food Sovereignty, 2007: 10) The declaration also 
condemns development models that displace people, food dumping, both the Green Revolution and 
the New Green Revolution, and food practices that damage the environment. The growing literature 
on food sovereignty rooted in Marxist political economy also serves as an influence for guiding the 
objectives of the radical food movement. 
3.4. Conclusion 
This chapter identified the food and financial crises as a turning point in food security analysis. It 
was shown that, following the crises, there was a proliferation of emerging perspectives on food 
security that challenged the productionist paradigm of the old perspectives. The discussion 
highlighted that emerging perspectives on food security follows society-based approaches in order 
to address issues of food access, as opposed to the old perspectives that focus on improving food 
availability through increased production. The chapter presented the food regime/food movements 
framework as an overview of the major perspectives on food security within the corporate food 
regime. These perspectives culminate in four food-politics ideologies. It was pointed out that there 
is an ideological split within the framework between the ideologies that seek to maintain the 
corporate food regime and the ideologies that aim to structurally transform the regime in its entirety. 
The neoliberal and reformist projects were shown to correspond to the former agenda, whilst the 
progressive and radical ones were aligned with the latter. It was pointed out that, although the food 
regime approaches are distinct in their discourse and orientation, both the neoliberal and reformist 
stream largely advocate a model that corresponds to the productionist perspective. In contrast, the 
progressive and radical food movements' model reflects a society-based approach, and as such 
seeks to transcend the productionist one. Drawing on the work of Polanyi, it was noted that these 
contesting forces of liberalisation and reform within the food regime is representative of the double 
movement of capitalism at large. The discussion highlighted that the respective food movements 
challenge the hegemony of neoliberalism and that they aim to establish a food system that is 
equitable and sustainable. The overview on the different ideologies noted the distinctness of each 
stream of food politics by focusing on its particular discourse, orientation and model, and the main 
institutions and documents that support each ideology. 
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Chapter four: Food politics in Southern Africa 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter introduces the case study of Southern Africa. The first section provides an overview of 
the socio-economic evolution of food insecurity in the region as marked by its political 
development through the scramble for Africa, the decolonisation era, and the post-independence 
era. Subsequently the causes of food insecurity in Southern Africa are discussed with specific 
reference to the region's economic inheritance and SAPs, poverty, adverse climate conditions, 
mismanagement and poor governance, and the impact of HIV/AIDS.  
The bulk of the chapter is devoted to examining Southern Africa's approach to food security.  The 
discussion centres on South Africa, Malawi, and Zimbabwe as representative of the Southern 
African case. These agriculturally dominant countries in the region each experience a different 
prevalence of undernourishment. Since these countries have a shared British colonial history, and 
are subjugated to largely similar environmental constraints, it is once again apparent that politics 
has a powerful role to play in human development issues such as chronic hunger. Thus, for each of 
these countries, the national context that influences its food security policies is sketched prior to 
presenting their main institutional frameworks which guide their approaches to food security. 
Concluding the section on each country is an overview of the current actualities in the countries 
since the institutional framework is often not on par with the emergent food security model due to 
deliberate, strategic or misguided official representations of the country's food security approach.  
Throughout the chapter, the influence of the global, regional, and local contexts in influencing 
Southern Africa's food security approach is emphasised. 
4.2. The socio-economic evolution of food insecurity in Southern Africa 
As mentioned above, throughout this discussion "Southern Africa" refers to the states in the 
southernmost region of the African continent as indicated by their membership to the SADC
27
. 
Southern Africa thus consists of: Angola, Botswana, the DRC, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe – see Figure 2 below.  
Southern Africa spans 9.27 million km² and is home to an estimated 292 million people (SADC, 
2012a). Southern Africa is a socio-economically and culturally diverse region, and is furthermore 
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 For notes on the formation of SADC see Appendix C. 
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Figure 2. Map of Southern Africa                        Source: Berglee (2012: 484) 
varied in its geography, which includes forests, grasslands, and deserts. Climatic conditions in the 
region are not uniform, and consequently different crops are produced in different parts of Southern 
Africa. SADC (2012c) estimates that 70% of the region's population "depends on agriculture for 
food, income, and employment", and that the "performance of this sector [therefore] has a strong 
influence on food security, economic growth, and social stability". 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Food insecurity in Southern Africa became prominent when the region suffered two major food 
crises over a period of 10 years (1991-1992 and 2001-2003). The causes of chronic food insecurity 
in the region are provided in the following section, whereas this section maps out the socio-
economic development of food insecurity in the region in the preceding eras. 
4.2.1. The scramble for Africa and the colonial era 
In the late nineteenth century, the discovery of mineral resources in Southern Africa was significant 
for setting in motion what has been termed the scramble of Africa; the partition of Africa among 
European imperial powers. The Berlin Conference of 1884 regulated European colonisation with 
the General Act of the Berlin Conference formalising the scramble of Africa. In the 20 years 
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following the Berlin Conference, the European powers partitioned the entire continent, with the 
exception of Liberia and Ethiopia
28
. 
Under British expansion, its vision to establish an empire from the "Cape to Cairo" proved 
dominant over other imperial efforts at regional dominance in Southern African. Britain's colonial 
policy, as it also manifested in Southern Africa, was based on its economic imperatives for state-led 
development. In seeking a positive balance of trade, Britain looked to the open market Africa has to 
offer. The fact that African countries would import more than they would export to Britain ensured 
that this colonial power would incur a trade surplus. The period between 1890 and the start of the 
First World War was marked with a dramatic increase in global trade. Without any industries of 
their own, African colonies imported a range of manufactured goods and fuels from Europe, to 
which it exported raw materials and food (Reed, 2002: 15).  
Another inducement for colonisation arose from the investment opportunity African countries 
offered; cheap and abundant raw material and labour along with limited competition made capital 
investment especially profitable. Furthermore, Africa provided raw material that was unavailable in 
Europe and on which Britain had become dependent: rubber, palm oil, cacao, cotton, tea, and tin 
(Reed, 2002: 16; Thomson, 2004: 19). In the late-1800s the discovery of gold and diamonds in 
Southern Africa, and in particular in South Africa, also justified capital investment in the region. In 
order to ensure even greater international trade, Britain also considered Southern Africa a valuable 
stopover location en route to Asia. 
The scramble for Africa occurred during the first food regime (1870-1914). As mentioned earlier, 
under Britain's hegemony during this regime, a settler-colonial system was established where staple 
foods were produced in Britain's colonies. Upholding the virtue of specialisation under the model of 
comparative advantage, Britain established monocrop economies in order to produce cash crops, 
that is, crops specifically grown for profitable export (Thomson, 2004: 29). However, agricultural 
development was secondary to mineral exploration and consequently food production was not a 
priority at national government level (Abdalla, 2007:3). Land, labour, and other resources were 
allocated to the mining industry which left the overall industrial development of African economies 
lacking. Thus, despite the unprecedented levels of growth experienced under British rule, the 
development of the colonies was not geared towards "the creation of a strong diversified economy" 
(Reed, 2002: 18) which left African economies vulnerable. 
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 See Appendix C for an overview of the imperial division of Africa. 
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4.2.2. The decolonilisation era 
The era following the Second World War saw the most dynamic growth period for Southern Africa 
because the post-war reconstruction of Europe demanded an increase in the exports of raw materials 
and foodstuffs from the colonial world (Reed, 2002: 19). These new opportunities necessitated 
colonies to further develop their industrial infrastructure and services. However, this was met with 
resistance from the colonial powers that sought to protect their own industries, and consequently 
forced its colonies to continue their focus on the primary sectors of mining and agriculture. 
Eventually, conflicts "between the colonial policies and the developmental needs of the colonised 
gave rise to the struggles for national liberation" across Africa (Reed, 2002: 19). On a continental 
level, white minority rule in especially Southern Africa
29
 served as the common focus of 
opposition
30
 for colonies, which further fuelled the struggle for independence.  
In 1957 Ghana set off the period of decolonisation when it gained independence from Britain. For 
the following 30 years Southern Africa politics came to be dominated with struggles for liberation. 
Nearly all francophone colonies, which are primarily located in Northern Africa, gained 
independence en masse in 1960, whereas Britain followed a more gradual approach to 
decolonisation (Thomson, 2004: 32) – as presented chronologically in Table 3 below. The 
decolonisation of Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) was especially challenging since a minority settler-
government contested the transition to majority rule, which eventually ensued in 1980 after a 
prolonged period of insurgency. Portugal desperately held onto its Southern African countries, 
which only gained independence after guerrilla wars in these colonies, and a military coup in 
Portugal itself (Thomson, 2004: 34).  
Despite the end of colonial rule in Southern Africa by the 1980s, the colonial legacy had a lasting 
socio-economic impact on the region. Spatial configurations and arbitrary boundaries resulted in 
problems of scale for smaller countries, and problems of market access for landlocked ones. Other 
economic problems Southern Africa inherited from colonial rule is its disadvantage in the 
international economy due to its underdevelopment of human resources and its over-reliance on the 
primary sector and exports (Thomson, 2004: 22). 
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 It is worth noting that British (Southern Africa) and French (Northern Africa) colonisation ideologies were distinct in 
nature. In contrast with French settlers, which largely integrated with civil society, British settlers established 
themselves as absolute rulers over their colonies (Thomson, 2004: 32). 
30
 An important development influencing decolonisation was the Pan-Africanism movement. The movement gained 
momentum on the continent after Africa's first independent president, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, invited African 
leaders from territories still under territorial rule to a conference "in order to coordinate independence endeavours" 
(Zajontz, 2013: 57-58).   
Source: Adapted from Thomson (2004: 33-34). 
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The decolonisation era in Southern Africa overlaps with the second food regime (1945-1973). As 
discussed above, this regime was characterised by the US' inner-oriented development that saw a 
dramatic increase in food production within the country. Following decolonisation, Africa exported 
$1.3 billion's worth of food per year; today African countries import 25% of their food
34
 (Holt-
Giménez, 2008). According to Holt-Giménez (2008) "food deficits in the global South mirrors the 
rise of food surpluses and market expansion of the industrial North". During the surplus-system of 
the second food regime, the US strategically made use of its food surpluses to gain the favour of 
newly independent African states in the form of food aid. Decolonisation in Africa occurred during 
the Cold War, and consequently the US and the Soviet Union were in competition for ideological 
dominance over a continent where its countries still largely relied on the West for economic 
guidance (Farley, 2008: 17). The US furthermore influenced Southern Africa's food system by 
                                                        
31
 Although South Africa gained independence from Britain in 1910 when the Union of South Africa was established as 
a self-governing nation state, black majority rule only came to South Africa in 1994 with the end of apartheid (Parsons, 
1982: 220). 
32
 In 1965 the white settler-government in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) unilaterally declared its independence from Britain. 
Although the settler-government has since considered Rhodesia as an independent state, their sovereignty was not 
acknowledged by Britain or the United Nations until 1980, when black majority rule came to power in Zimbabwe 
(Thomson, 2004: 34). 
33
 South West Africa (Namibia) was a colony of Germany from 1884 until 1915. However, after the First World War 
the territory was taken over by the Union of South Africa under a League of Nations mandate (Parsons, 1982: 291). 
Namibia gained independence from South Africa in 1990. 
34
 The amount of food imports various per season since Southern Africa in particular is prone to floods and droughts 
which hampers food production – see section 4.3.3 below. 
Southern African country  Independence Imperial Power 
South Africa  191031 Britain 
DRC (Belgian Congo)  1960 Belgium 
Madagascar  1960 France 
Tanzania (Tanganyika)  1961 Britain 
Malawi (Nyasaland)  1964 Britain 
Zambia (Northern Rhodesia)  1964 Britain 
Botswana (Bechuanaland)  1966 Britain 
Lesotho (Basutoland)  1966 Britain 
Mauritius  1968 Britain 
Swaziland  1968 Britain 
Angola  1975 Portugal 
Mozambique  1975 Portugal 
Seychelles  1976 Britain 
Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia)  198032 Britain 
Namibia (South West Africa)  199033 German; then South African mandate 
Table 3. Decolonisation in Southern Africa 
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promoting the industrialisation of agriculture in this region through the Green Revolution. As 
explained above
35
, the Green Revolution has since become understood as disruptive to local food 
systems and detrimental to food security in Africa. 
4.2.3. The post-independence era
36
 
Even after the decolonisation, the effect of colonial policies is still apparent: most Southern African 
economies remain undiversified with a heavily reliance on one or two commodities for export 
(Reed, 2002: 33). This continued dependence on their natural resource wealth hampers economic 
development in Southern Africa, as Thomson (2004: 179) explains, "these countries [have] no other 
major sources of economic activity with which to generate additional income, or to act as a 
substitute should there be a bad harvest or a slump in that particular commodity market". These 
overtly specialised monocrop economies, established by colonial rule and exacerbated by the 
productivity incentives of the Green Revolution, left most Southern African economies vulnerable 
and dependent on exports.  
Southern Africa's imperial inheritance continues to burden this region's development. In addition to 
their highly specialised export economies, most Southern African countries have a "minute 
manufacturing base, a lack of access to technology, and populations where few [are] trained in the 
way of modern business, social services or public administration (Thomson, 2004: 179). Yet, since 
the advent of neoliberalism, these countries were pressured to open up their economies to partake in 
competition on the global capitalist market. Since the underdevelopment in Southern Africa made it 
apparent that international free trade was to be conducted on an uneven playing field, Southern 
African governments made the decision to borrow from the West in order to invest in 
manufacturing and infrastructure in their countries. Although this was considered "relatively 
responsible borrowing" at the time, unanticipated external factors
37
 transformed the situation into a 
debt crisis by the 1980s.  
The World Bank and the IMF sought to relieve the developing world of its debt through SAPs 
aimed at economic reform. However, the SAPs only brought about modest improvements in some 
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 See section 2.4.1.1.  
36
 This section merely serves to highlight the overarching regional developments during the era. Since independence, 
Southern African countries have had different development trajectories that correspond to their particular political and 
economic climate – this is illustrated through the discussion on South Africa, Malawi, and Zimbabwe below. 
37
 These include: the declining terms of trade due a drop in commodity prices, that hit cash crop economies hardest; a 
dramatic increase in the oil price during the 1970s; and, subsequent higher interest rates on loans to counter the 
economic shockwave of the oil crisis in the West (Thomson, 2004: 182) 
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countries, while the majority of countries continued to be economically unstable. As discussed 
above
38, the WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture also proved to be detrimental to the developing 
world, since it forced governments to cut back on agricultural subsidies whilst opening up their 
economies. The overall effect was that Southern African exports were less competitive on the world 
market, and since these are primarily export economies, their revenue dropped significantly.  
The post-independence era coincides with the third food regime, which started with the advent of 
neoliberalism in the mid-1970s. Neoliberalism entrenched the industrialisation of food production 
and distribution in the food system. Increasingly so, the food system came to be governed by major 
agribusinesses which, in accordance with the neoliberal ideology, advocated increased industrial 
production, unregulated markets, and a greater incorporation of biofuels. The corporate food regime 
preserves the production of monocrops in Southern Africa. With the neoliberal ideal of 
overproduction, the widespread use of GMOs has become a prominent feature of the food system as 
well, especially with regards to food aid
39
, on which Southern African countries, like Zimbabwe and 
Malawi, are dependant. With regards to food security, most of Southern African countries are 
dependent on their capacity to import food. Only a few countries in the region, most notably South 
Africa, produce enough food to meet the needs of their citizens. Despite the fact that the majority of 
the region's poor work in agriculture, over the past 45 years, agricultural performance in Southern 
Africa "has ranked worst in the world according to most conventional measures" (Haggblade, 
Hazell & Gabre-Madhin, 2010: 3). Southern Africa's low agricultural productivity and its lack of 
infrastructure continue to be detrimental to the region since they are at a disadvantage to compete 
globally
40
, given the dominant framework of neoliberal economics. 
4.3. Causes of food insecurity in Southern Africa 
Before Southern Africa's food security strategy can be analysed, it is necessary to take note of the 
causes of food insecurity in the region. As discussed above, on a global level, food insecurity is not 
a problem of scarcity since production levels far exceeds the dietary requirements of the population. 
                                                        
38
 See section 2.4.1.1. 
39
 The WFP's food aid response to the 2001-2003 crisis had an unanticipated effect: several governments, most notably 
Zambia, rejected food aid because it was genetically modified. With regards to governments' response, Bennett (2003: 
28) notes that "[i]t was difficult to distinguish political manipulation and obfuscation from genuine environmental, 
health and economic reasons". Regardless of their motivation, governments' rejection of food aid complicated the 
mitigation of food insecurity in an already-complex context. 
40
 This has propelled the need for greater regional trade that would counter Southern Africa's dependence on the North. 
Subsequently the SADC was established as an intergovernmental organisation with the aim to facilitate socio-economic 
cooperation and integration in the region – see Appendix D. 
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Instead, food insecurity is attributed to poverty which means that although there is enough food 
available, people are going hungry because they cannot access the food given their set of 
entitlements. Despite an ample availability of food globally, at a national level most Southern 
African countries do not produce enough food to meet the needs of their citizens. Although poverty 
is also the main cause of food insecurity in Southern Africa, several other causes endemic to the 
region, exacerbates the situation (Drimie & Mini, 2003: 10). The causes of food insecurity in 
Southern Africa are: economic problems, population growth, mismanagement and poor governance, 
HIV/AIDS, and an adverse climate. However, the severity of these causes varies from country to 
country, as demonstrated in the following section through the examples of South Africa, Malawi, 
and Zimbabwe, as representative of the Southern Africa case.  
4.3.1. Economic inheritance and SAPs 
Several of Southern Africa's economic problems can be traced to the colonial inheritance of the 
region which left countries with underdeveloped economies that are over-reliant on the primary 
sector. Over the past 40 years Southern African countries have struggled to develop their economies 
since they are disadvantaged in the global economy. The economic structure of the countries was 
designed around the specialised agriculture and mining production. In the 1980s over 75% of 
Malawi's total export earnings came from tobacco and tea (Brown, 1995; 28). This left Malawi 
exceptionally vulnerable to fluctuating commodity prices. South Africa and Zimbabwe entered the 
postcolonial era with more diversified export economies. However, both countries had to remediate 
their own colonial legacy, which primarily manifested in skewed land ownership and access, 
through extensive land reform policies aimed at redistributing land from the white minority to the 
black majority. 
Due to underdevelopment, limited growth and undiversified economies, the 1980s marked the start 
of an economic reform era in Southern Africa. As explained above
41
, during the 1980s the World 
Bank and IMF devised Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) as a form of loan conditionality: 
in order for recipients to receive further loans they were required to make changes to their economic 
policies. Thus, nations indebted to these institutions had limited choice in terms of economic policy. 
Primarily this involved a significant reduction in government spending and enforced liberalisation. 
Southern Africa was especially affected by the introduction of SAPs since the region incurred 
                                                        
41
 See section 4.1.1.1. 
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massive amounts of external debts in financing their liberation struggles, and also in their attempt to 
diversify their economies by investing in the manufacturing sector and human resources.  
SAPs are believed to have undermined agricultural development in Malawi and Zimbabwe (Reed, 
2002: 26; Schanbacher, 2010: 15-16). The enforced liberalisation saw a decrease in support 
provided to farmers. This entailed "an end to [farm input] subsidies and stringent limitations on 
marketing boards [...] that provided farmers with guaranteed markets" (Van Riet, 2006: 38). Tariff 
barriers were also dropped. However, in developed countries, agricultural support and other forms 
of support to farmers remained in effect, which meant that these Southern African countries' 
agricultural products became uncompetitive both domestically and internationally. Consequently, 
food production in Malawi and Zimbabwe became partially substituted with food imports. This had 
a significant impact on the economic growth in these countries since they are dependent on 
agriculture as means of income
42
. The unfavourable international trade system affected food 
security in Malawi and Zimbabwe as they become increasingly dependent on food imports and aid. 
Although structural adjustment took place in South Africa in the form of macroeconomic reforms
43
, 
these "reform packages were 'home grown' in that donors were not involved in their design or 
implementation" (USAID, 1996: 32).  
The verdict is still out on what the impact of increased trade liberalisation is on food security
44
. 
Despite possible positive effects on food security, Farley (2008: 31) notes that after the introduction 
of SAPs, all countries in the region (with the exception of South Africa) spent more money on debt 
servicing than on public services such as health and education – a trend still currently visible. This 
has severe implications for the socio-economic development of the region
45
, which in turn affects 
food security, especially through the access and utilisation dimension. 
                                                        
42 During the 1980s, the time when SAPs were implemented in Malawi and Zimbabwe, agriculture contributed 44% and 
37% to their respective gross domestic products (GDPs) (based on own calculations from data by The World Bank, 
2015a). Currently agriculture contributes 33.3% to Malawi's GDP, and 13.6% to Zimbabwe's (The World Bank, 2015a). 
43
 In 1994 these policy reforms were encapsulated in the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), which 
prioritised the inequality in income distribution in post-apartheid South Africa. In contrast with the liberalisation 
objectives of the IMF and World Bank, the "neo-Keynesian-tinged" RDP stipulated that government must play a 
significant role in the economy (Taylor, 2010: 4). However in 1996, with the adoption of the Growth, Employment and 
Reconstruction Plan (GEAR) - aimed at macroeconomic stabilisation, privatisation, the opening up of the economy, and 
an increase in foreign direct investment (FDI) - South Africa "undertook voluntary alignment with the Washington 
Consensus and global neoliberal hegemony" (Evans, 2010: 115). 
44 A recent FAO report acknowledges both the positive and negative effects thereof (FAO, 2015b). A summary of their 
findings is reproduced in Appendix E. 
45
 Given that Southern Africa is already characterised by poor human development. According to Human Development 
Index (HDI) the countries are classified as follow (with the number in brackets representing their rank out of 187 
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4.3.2. Poverty (lack of entitlements) 
The main cause of food insecurity in Southern Africa is poverty. Poverty's connection to food 
insecurity is best explained by employing the entitlement approach of Sen (1981) as outlined 
above
46
. Production-based and labour-based entitlements are especially hampered in Southern 
Africa. More often than not, land reform
47
 negatively impacts production-based entitlement: when 
individuals are displaced from land that they used to cultivate, they become disconnected from their 
livelihoods. Often food insecurity is framed as a predominantly rural problem. However, given that 
Southern Africa has the highest urbanisation rate in the world, this perspective of food security is 
declared as a "rural bias" (Crush & Frayne, 2010: 8). Schlein and Krüger (2006) note that "it is a 
myth that urban populations are healthier, more literate or more prosperous than people living in the 
countryside" since "slum dwellers are more likely to die earlier, experience more hunger and 
disease, attain less education and have fewer chances of employment". According to the State of 
African Cities Report for 2014, a large proportion of Southern Africa's urban population live in 
slums
48
. The result of which is increased food insecurity. Slum-dwellers typically do not have 
access to land to produce food. Furthermore, their labour-based entitlement is also compromised 
due to high employment associated with slum-dwellers. Consequently their access to food is 
distorted, despite the fact that there is enough food available in urban areas. Unemployment remains 
a major cause of lack of food entitlement in Southern Africa. The region's official unemployment 
rate is 21% however; there is a "huge discrepancy between official employment figures and those 
produced by independent organisations" (SADC, 2011: 18). 
Without secure production-based or labour-based entitlements, the food insecure in Southern Africa 
is left with trade-based entitlements and transfer-based entitlements as the only legal way to gain 
access to food. The latter takes the form of food aid which, as it has recently been reported, a record 
27.4 million people in the SADC
49
 are in need of, in what has been called a "humanitarian crisis" by 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
countries): high human development in Mauritius (63), and Seychelles (71); medium human development in Botswana 
(109), South Africa (118), Namibia (127), and  Zambia (141); low human development in Swaziland (148), Angola 
(149), Madagascar (155), Zimbabwe (156), Tanzania (159), Lesotho (162), Malawi (174), Mozambique (178), and DRC 
(186) (HDI, 2014). 
46
 See section 1.2. and "orientation and model" in section 3.3.4.2. 
47 The nature, extent, and impact of land reform policies differs for each Southern African country as illustrated in 
below through the examples of South Africa, Malawi, and Zimbabwe. 
48
 The countries in the region with the highest proportion of slum-dwellers (as a percentage of the urban population) are: 
Mozambique (94%), Madagascar (93%), Tanzania (84%), Malawi (83%), Namibia (66%), Zambia (58%), and South 
Africa (31%) (UN-Habitat, 2014).  
49
 The countries that are the affected the worst are Namibia, Zimbabwe and Malawi (Bloomberg, 2015). 
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the SADC's Director of Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources (Bloomberg, 2015). The looming 
crisis has been largely attributed to the weather conditions of the past year.  
 4.3.3. Adverse climate 
As a region, Southern Africa is prone to droughts and floods which hinders food production. 
Following the harsh drought of 1992, Zimbabwe (that was known as the "bread basket of Southern 
Africa" at the time) was transformed from a food surplus position to a net food importer (Maphosa, 
1994: 53). Rainfall variability affects the region especially because it is overly dependent on rainfed 
agriculture. Up to 95% of Malawi's cultivated land relies on rainfed agriculture (Abdalla, 2007: 23); 
consequently adverse weather conditions results in poor crop yields and sometimes even total crop 
failure. Floods in the region have also created food distribution problems since it has washed away 
railway lines and bridges. Over the past 30 years, extreme weather conditions resulted in substantial 
loss of harvests in Lesotho, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Malawi (van Riet, 2006: 44) that culminated in 
two food crises in 1991-1992 and 2001-2003 respectively. The 1991-1992 season was labelled as 
the "worst drought of the century in Southern Africa", with 20 million people seriously affected by 
the drought through displacement and loss of livelihood (Abdalla, 2007: 21; see Thompson, 1993). 
After this crisis, it was expected that the reforms under SAPs would serve as a buffer against food 
insecurity, however, as evidenced by the 2001-2003 crisis, greater market liberalisation could not 
sufficiently counter the effect of adverse climate. The aforementioned crisis indicated that food 
insecurity in the region is the result of not only the lack of access to food, but also the result of a 
lack of availability (FFSSA, 2004: 16). Thus, in this regard, food insecurity in Southern Africa, 
unlike food insecurity at a global level, also represents a problem of inadequate availability. 
4.3.4. Mismanagement and poor governance 
However, the blame of Southern Africa's food insecurity should not solely fall on the region's 
adverse climate. Despite an unfavourable climate and low soil fertility, the semi-arid country of 
Botswana is considered more food secure than several of its favourable- climate counterparts in the 
region (Yu, You & Fan, 2010: 12). This can be attributed to the fact that Botswana is trade secure, 
that is, for the most part it successfully achieves food security through importing food. Botswana is 
furthermore considered to be the most politically stable and democratic country in the region, and 
also ranks highest on the Human Development Index (HDI). In contrast, although the DRC has a 
favourable climate, it performs below its food provision capability due to poor governance and 
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political instability (Yu et al., 2010: 12). This correlation highlights the effect of politics on food 
security in the region. 
Also with regards to politics, Reed (2006: 36) illustrates the connection between natural resource 
wealth and rent-seeking in the region. He explains that, in Southern Africa, the distinction between 
public and private resources are distorted due to large state monopolies. Since agriculture is a major 
source of income for most Southern African countries, natural resource wealth is a greater 
corruption incentive than in other countries, with the "corruption channel being an important 
explanation for the slow growth of resource-rich economies" (Leite & Weidmann, 1999: 31). As 
such, the root cause of politics' detrimental effect on food security in Southern Africa has been 
identified as the neopatrimonial state (FFSSA, 2004: 19-22). The neopatrimonial state can best be 
described as a state where "the de facto system of rule [differs] from the de jure state structures and 
processes" in so far that a "system of patronage co-exists with the facade of constitutionalism"
50
 (du 
Plessis, 2012: 5-6). The neopatrimonial state distributes resources unequally based on 
discrimination to those that do not form part of the leaders' client-network. In Zimbabwe, where the 
prices of grain are regulated by the state-run Grain Marketing Board (GMB), food was only made 
available to ZANU-PF
51
 supporters at times of food shortages in the past (van Riet, 2006: 43). 
Consequently those that did not support the ruling party were forced to buy food at inflated prices or 
on the black market. 
Mismanagement's effect on food security in Zimbabwe also manifested through the government's 
fast-track land reform programme, which at one point culminated in less than half of the country's 
agricultural land being utilised (Wiggens, 2005: 11). The programme displaced thousands of 
workers thereby leading to unemployment, and ultimately to a decrease in food security. Van Riet 
(2006: 41) illustrates that government capacity is a key issue in ensuring food security by drawing 
parallels between Zimbabwe's GMB and Malawi's parastatal Agricultural Development and 
Marketing Corporation (ADMARC). He points out that there have been incidences of corruption 
within these organisations, and that they do not provide a sufficient incentive for farmers to invest 
in agriculture. 
                                                        
50
 Neo-patrimonialism is ascribed to colonialism's influence since settlers deliberately failed to fully invest in the legal-
rational structure of the state. Settlers exploited the widespread system of patronage in Africa 'to maintain a fragmented 
society in order to avoid the mass mobilisation for an anti-colonial struggle" (du Plessis, 2012: 5). As such they only 
implemented "partial and extremely skewed representations of Europe['s civil apparatus]" (Berman, 1998: 313). 
51
 The Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
60 
 
The existence of state elites, weak links between civil society and the state, along with weak 
political institutions in Southern Africa, offer insight as to why food availability and food access are 
distorted in the region. 
4.3.5. HIV/AIDS 
Southern Africa has the highest prevalence of HIV infections in the world. Nine out of the fifteen 
Southern African countries have adult (aged 15 to 29) infection rates of more than 10%
52
 (UNICEF, 
2014). The Joint Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS estimates that 18.6% of South Africans in the 
same age bracket are infected, and that the prevalence rate is 10% in Malawi, and 16.7% in 
Zimbabwe (respectively UNAIDS, 2014a; UNAIDS, 2014b; and UNAIDS, 2014c).  
HIV/AIDS affect food security via the availability, access, and utilisation dimensions. HIV/AIDS 
has a detrimental effect on food availability because of a decrease in production that occurs due to 
absenteeism/death of workers. Productivity is also lost when family members divert their time to 
care-giving instead of farming. In both cases there is a loss of farming knowledge, which in turn 
also decreases productivity. The FAO (2011: 45) estimates that "by 2020 HIV will have claimed the 
lives of one-fifth or more of all those working in agriculture in many Southern African countries"
53
. 
In this regard, HIV/AIDS is not only detrimental to food production but also in households' access 
to food since there is a decline in income. The economic decline of households results in less-labour 
intensive crops being produced, along with less livestock production and less crop variety, which 
results in a less nutritious diet for those that are dependent on sustenance farming for food. 
Consequently HIV/AIDS also affects food utilisation even for those that are not infected.  
De Waal & Whiteside (2003) have premised that there is such a dynamic interaction between 
HIV/AIDS and food insecurity that it necessitates to be known as a New Variant Famine (NVF). 
The NVF hypothesis highlights the increased vulnerability of households amidst the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic. They demonstrate that the traditional famine coping mechanism of food rationing is 
compromised with the prevalence of HIV/AIDS since those infected cannot skimp on nutrition. 
They also highlight that the premature death of adults, leads to children being the head of 
households, and that children are often not equipped with the skills of farming and/or meal 
planning. Van Riet (2006: 22) adds that due to the loss in the transfer of knowledge, and a lack of 
                                                        
52
 These countries are: Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe. 
53
 The projected loss in the worst-affected countries in the region is: Namibia (26%), Botswana (23%), Zimbabwe 
(23%), Mozambique (20%), South Africa (20%), Malawi (14%), and Tanzania (13%). 
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skills and kinship networks, "an increasing number of young women [engage] in commercial sex, 
which in turn potentially increases HIV transmission". 
4.4. Southern Africa's approach to food security
54
 
The approach adopted by Southern Africa towards food security is heavily influenced by the 
evolution of food insecurity throughout the region's development as well as the context-specific 
causes of food insecurity in the region. Despite similar colonial histories, each country has a unique 
pattern of development according to how the national food system has been embedded in the global 
food regime. As such Southern Africa's approach to food security is not an isolated response but 
rooted in the socio-economic evolution of food politics in the region – as highlighted by the 
representative cases of South Africa, Malawi, and Zimbabwe below. The food security approach of 
these countries is discussed in conjunction with the food regime/food movements framework 
presented in the previous chapter by deconstructing the guiding document and the orientation and 
model for each country. 
4.4.1. South Africa 
4.4.1.1. Context-setting 
Given the importance of gold in the political economy during British hegemony, the discovery of 
gold in South Africa ignited industrialisation in the country. Since its integration in the global 
economy, the subsequent agricultural development of South Africa closely followed the 
development of the second food regime
55
. The Natives Land Act of 1913 also played an important 
role in shaping the food security context of South Africa "in terms of the character, composition and 
contribution of the agricultural sector" (Hendriks, 2014: 2). Institutionalising racism, the Act 
decreed that only certain areas could be owned by non-whites; at most it totalled 13% of the entire 
land mass of the Union (Collins & Burns, 2007: 346). The Act shaped the approach to the 
agricultural policy that was followed for the next 70 years: to increase the support to white 
commercial farmers and to decrease the opportunities for black farmers (Kirsten, Edwards & Vink: 
2010: 147). As such the Act had significant socio-economic repercussions for South Africa's 
development, and ultimately created a dualistic agricultural economy: "a well-developed 
                                                        
54
 For an overview of the SADC's official approach to food security see Appendix C. This institutional framework is 
relevant for the food security approaches of the region, since Southern Africa often takes its cue from this 
intergovernmental organisation's framework 
55
 As demonstrated through the "construction of a livestock-grain complex at the centre of a national production system, 
the creation of a national research and development infrastructure, and heavy reliance on imported chemicals and capital 
equipment to increase yields and facilitate capital accumulation" (Greenberg, 2013: 4). 
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commercial farming sector coexists with a small-scale farming sector […] based on subsistence 
farming" (van der Merwe, 2011: 3). 
In 1951 the creation of Bantu homelands
56
 resulted in further skewed access to land and other 
resources as the mobility of black people were reduced when they were confined to predominantly 
rural areas. Agricultural development and productivity in these areas was very poor which led to 
household food insecurity. Hendriks (2014: 3) notes that, before the country's democratic transition 
in 1994, South Africa's "agricultural policy focused on self-sufficiency through commercial 
production" especially in the 1980s era of international sanctions. For South Africa, food security 
was equated with large-scale commercial farming which was, and still is, dominated by white 
farmers. During this era over 80 Acts of Parliament were passed that provided support to the 
commercial farming sector
57
 (Ministry for Agriculture and Land Affairs, 1998: 2). However, 
towards the end of the 1980s, the state tried to align itself with the emerging neoliberal order, and 
subsequently direct government support for agriculture declined (Marais, 2011: 47). Consequently 
South Africa's food system also underwent the shifts associated with the third food regime, as 
marked by an altered balance of power "towards corporate retailers and brand owners and away 
from agricultural producers" (Greenberg, 2010: 5). 
Following the 1994 democratic transition, the neoliberal process continued. South Africa 
automatically became a signatory to the AoA by becoming a member of the newly established 
WTO in 1995. As part of this agreement, South Africa reduced its tariffs on imported food and 
subsequently the market became flooded by cheap subsidised products from the North. The 
Marketing of Agricultural Products Act No. 47 of 1996 further opened up the agricultural markets 
which eventually led to many smaller farmers selling off their land to large-scale agribusinesses 
since their products were no longer competitive following deregulation (Haysom, 2014: 131; 
Jacobs, 2012: 192).   
With the creation of a more market-driven agricultural sector, the 1990s saw the removal of 
institutional barriers between black and white farmers (Ministry for Agriculture and Land Affairs, 
                                                        
56
 The Bantu Authorities Act allocated land to South Africa's diverse black population based on their ethnicity thereby 
creating a legal basis for self determination in what came to be known as a system of "separate development" (Marais, 
2011: 9).   
57
 Assistance was in particular rendered in marketing with the creation of the Agricultural Credit Board (ACB) that 
granted loans to farmers that was not considered creditworthy by commercial institutions (Ministry for Agriculture and 
Land Affairs, 1998: 2). Support to white farmers was also provided in the form of "subsidies, grants and other aid for 
fencing, dams, houses, veterinary and horticultural advice, as well as subsidies rail rates, special credit facilities and tax 
relief" Ministry for Agriculture and Land Affairs, 1998: 3). 
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1998: 4). The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), released at the time of the first 
democratic elections, was the newly-elected African National Congress' (ANC) growth plan which 
identified food insecurity as "a legacy of the apartheid socio-economic and political order" 
(Hendriks, 2014: 3). In order to remediate the situation, increased social spending was introduced 
along with land reform
58
 to address the racially-skewed distribution of access. However, it is 
important to note that land reform was motivated by political rather than economic imperatives. The 
ANC sought economic continuity which meant that they bought into the neoliberal restructuring 
process initiated by the former-ruling National Party (NP). Greenberg (2013: 1) notes that the 
divergent objectives of economic continuity and the redress of past injustices "produced 
contradictions in land and agricultural policy". Following the neoliberal framework, the land reform 
programme retained the integrity of private property, and was subsequently conducted on a willing-
buyer/willing-seller principle – generally following the approach recommended by the World Bank 
(Kirsten et al., 2010: 159). As such the "redistributive and justice elements of land reform [became] 
subordinated to the logic of capital and its economic imperatives" (Greenberg, 2013: 1). Emerging 
black farmers who could afford land could not compete with large-scale white farmers since the 
former received no assistance from the state whilst the latter still benefitted from subsidies received 
during the apartheid era (Hattingh, 2008). The effectiveness of redistributive land reform has been 
minimal with approximately 8% land distributed since 1994; despite a goal of 30% by 2015
59
 
(Guinn & Hamrick, 2015: 26).   
The view held was that land redistribution would not only bring about socio-economic justice, but it 
would also propel the previously disadvantaged to produce food which would lead to greater food 
                                                        
58 Since 1994 South Africa went through three broad phases of land reform (Greenberg, 2013). The first phase (1994-
1999) followed the market-based approach which involved that willing sellers sold commercial farms to groups of 
individuals that pooled their social grants in order to buy the land. These transfers were market with a decrease in land 
productivity since the new landowners often lacked the resources and skills necessary for commercial farming. In the 
second phase (1999-2007) attempts were made to address the productivity loss associated with redistributed land. The 
vision was to "create a black commercial farming class that could compete with large-scale commercial white farmers" 
which subsequently saw a shift from welfare-based land reform to land reform focused on commercial production 
(Greenberg, 2013: 2). This was encapsulated in the Land for Agricultural Development Programme (LARD) which 
emphasised the role of individual beneficiaries that were capable of co-financing the redistribution process. This was 
during the era of narrow-based black economic empowerment (BEE) which was contested since it, inter alia, created a 
small black elite class instead of providing opportunities for broad economic democratisation. Thus the third phase of 
land reform (2007 onwards) saw a renewed focus placed on small-scale agriculture which coincided with the reformist 
vision of the 2008 World Bank Development Report described above. 
59
 Death (2011: 33) notes that "less than 7% of the land has been redistributed so far, and the ANC government has 
pushed back their target of redistributing one third of the land from 2014 to 2025" (Death, 2011: 33). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
64 
 
security
60
. Although reports state that South Africa is largely food secure, it is important to take into 
account that this is quite misleading since food security is measured at a national level and with 
regards to the stability of maize availability
61
 (Drimie & McLachlan, 2013: 220). It thus overlooks 
household and individual food security, and the important food security dimensions of access and 
utilisation. Although, similar to other developing countries, "there are no precise figures on 
household food security status in South Africa due to the lack of a national monitoring programme" 
(Schönfeldt, Gibson & Vermeulen, 2013: 212).  
Since South Africa experiences food insecurity at a household level, it should be emphasised that 
cash is the primary source of food security in South Africa. Crush & Frayne (2010: 17) explain that 
"the contribution of agriculture to household welfare and food security is particularly low" in South 
Africa. Thus most South Africans do not grow their staple foods themselves; they buy it from 
commercial suppliers instead. Therefore food prices are an important determinant of food security 
in the country. Although South Africa is a middle income country and a net food exporter (FAO, 
2011: 16) it has extremely high levels of poverty, and consequently small changes in food prices 
have a significant impact on food security. South Africa is the most urbanised country in the region, 
with around 65% of the population living in urban areas (Crush & Frayne, 2010: 21). In terms of 
food security, the urban poor are worse off than the rural poor since they do not have access to land 
to grow food as a fall-back plan to procure food during price spikes. Instead, urban households 
adopt different coping strategies
62
 that involve food rationing, skipping out on meals, and cutting 
back on the consumption of meat, fruit, and vegetables (Cohen & Garrett, 2009: 13). These 
strategies might enable households to survive, but does not empower them to transcend the 
circumstances that caused them to be food insecure in the first place. As such, food insecurity is 
                                                        
60
 Hendriks (2014: 4) notes that since 1994 "food security programmes have focused almost exclusively on subsistence 
and smallholder agriculture" in order to address household level food insecurity. However, as Hendriks, Kirsten and 
Vink (2006) point out, household food insecurity in South Africa does not depend on household food production but 
rather on household income. Thus, the approach to address food insecurity via redistributive land reform aimed at 
increased food availability is misguided. In addition, Marais (2011: 218) highlights that land reform in South Africa has 
also proved to be an "ineffective remedy for poverty and joblessness". This highlights that, within this context, land 
reform does not contribute to increased food access either. 
61
 Maize is considered a staple food in South Africa because of the volumes the country produces and because "mealie 
meal" forms an important part of South Africans' diet (Amusan & Kgotleng, 2015). 
62
 Marais (2011: 222) explains that the coping-strategy dogma fits well within South Africa's neoliberal approach to 
development since it emphasises the "resilience, perseverance and ingenuity" of households and communities. Coupled 
with the South African ethos of ubuntu (humanist philosophy that highlights that one exist through one's fellow human 
beings) communialism and mutual obligation are "encoded in many social practices and arrangements" (Marias, 2011: 
223).  
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"not an exceptional short-term event but a chronic threat for a large proportion of South Africa's 
population" (Drimie & McLachlan, 2013: 220). 
In the last two decades South Africa has experienced three food crises which took place in 1992, 
2002-2003, and 2007-2008 – all of which can be attributed to food prices shocks (Pereira & 
Ruysenaar, 2012: 44). The 1992 crisis was caused by drought and saw a 30% increase in food prices 
whilst the 2002-2003 crisis reflected a more complex regional crisis, exacerbated by exchange rate 
shocks, ultimately leading to a 16% increase in food prices (Vink & Kirsten, 2002: 14). As Africa's 
largest economy at the time
63
, South Africa was hardest hit by the global commodity price shock 
characterised with the 2007-2008 food crisis with a 20% increase in food prices (Schönfeldt et al., 
2013: 220). 
4.4.1.2. Institutional framework: main guiding documents 
Hendriks (2014: 1) notes that South Africa's interpretation of food security changed in accordance 
with the social and political developments discussed above, and as such it was interpreted 
differently by different ruling governments. The right to food is explicitly recognised in the Bill of 
Rights of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996). Section 27 reads that "[e]veryone 
has the right to have access to […] sufficient food and water" and that the "state must take 
reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive 
realisation of these rights" (Government of South Africa, 1996: 13).  
As discussed earlier, under the RDP food security was framed as a product of the apartheid regime. 
It was addressed through attempts to restructure the economy through land reform and increased 
social spending. However, due to "the unsatisfactory situation that was occasioned by the 
implementation of many food security programmes by different government departments", it 
became necessary to "formulate a national food security strategy that would streamline, harmonise 
and integrate the diverse food security programmes" (NDA, 2002: 5). This programme is known as 
the Integrated Food Security Strategy (IFSS).  
The IFSS' goal is linked to that of the MDGs
64
, and it follows the "development approach" (NDA, 
2002: 6). Koch (2011: 5) explains that by following the development approach, as opposed to a 
strictly agricultural approach, the IFSS acknowledges household food insecurity amidst national 
                                                        
63 Since 2014, Nigeria has surpassed South Africa in terms of nominal GDP and is currently Africa's biggest economy 
(The Economist, 2014). 
64
 In particular to MDG 1 that aims to "eradicate extreme poverty and hungry" (UN, 2015a). 
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food security. The IFSS is a multidimensional strategy that spans various government departments. 
The strategy identifies five pillars: (a) household production and trading; (b) income generation and 
job creation opportunities; (c) nutrition and food safety; (d) safety nets and food emergency; and (e) 
food information system management (NDA, 2002: 6-7). Thus the IFSS focuses on increasing 
market access through household production and job creation, whilst it aims to provide a buffer to 
food insecurity in terms of social protection. 
The IFSS has been criticised because its institutional arrangements do not acknowledge the reality 
of food insecurity in South Africa, and as such present barriers to meaningful implementation. 
McLaren, Moyo and Jeffrey (2015: 39) mention that, although the IFSS states that it targets 
household food security, it has been driven in practice by a focus on availability rather than access, 
largely because the responsibility of food security is placed within the Department of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF) with the support of the Department of Trade and Industry. As 
explained above, South Africa's food insecurity does not stem from a problem of availability since 
the country produces enough food to feed its citizens. Food security in South Africa is problem of 
access instead; due to entrenched poverty South Africans do not have the set of entitlements to 
secure food. Lack of income, due to the country's widespread unemployment, causes household 
food insecurity within the country as South Africans cannot afford food. Drimie and Ruysenaar 
(2010: 324) also note that the IFSS overlooks the complexity of food security, especially with 
regards to urban food security; the strategy is nationally-driven and has a rural production-oriented 
focus. Furthermore, they point out that response strategy as advocated by the IFSS is "inadequate to 
engage this complexity" since there were not mechanisms in place to hold the various government 
departments involved accountable for not reaching their goals. Thus despite the broad development 
approach stated by the IFSS, the strategy was not realised because of a disjuncture in the 
institutional framework and the reality of implementation. 
The proposed replacement for the IFSS was approved by Cabinet in September 2013, and 
subsequently South Africa's first National Policy on Food and Nutrition Security saw the light in the 
following year (Hendriks, 2014: 8). The five pillars the strategic goals of this National Policy rest 
on are: (a) improved nutritional safety nets; (b) nutrition education; (c) investment in agriculture 
towards development, especially in rural areas; (d) market participation through public-private 
partnerships; and (e) risk management with regards to the production challenges of climate change 
and bio-energy (DAFF, 2014: 7). In comparison to the IFSS, the National Policy does not provide a 
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strategy to stimulate job creation. Increased employment is considered a vital component of an 
effective food security strategy; increase in income will improve the access to food. Although the 
National Policy does situate food insecurity within the context of poverty, it does not provide details 
on how this will be addressed. The National Policy mirrors the IFSS in that it also focuses on social 
development and improving safety nets, whilst ensuring production stability. Overall, the National 
Policy still has a rural bias which neglects the high level of urbanisation in the country. Although 
the National Policy (DAFF, 2014: 4) "seeks to provide an overarching guiding framework to 
maximise synergy between the different strategies and programmes of civil society", it has been 
developed without public consultation (McLaren et al., 2015: 40). The implementation plan of the 
National Policy is still unfinished, and it is hoped that civil society will have the opportunity to 
influence its approach once a draft is finalised ((McLaren et al., 2015: 41).  
4.4.1.3. Current actualities: orientation and model 
Although government has initiated many social and structural policy initiatives aimed at increasing 
food access, these programmes have had limited success. Despite the country's moderate economic 
growth and strong agriculture industry, estimates suggest that over half the country experience food 
insecurity at a household level (Labadarios, Mchiza, Steyn, Gericke, Maunder, Davids & Parker, 
2011: 897). This situation can be partly ascribed to the legacy of apartheid, but it is also due to the 
fact that South Africa adopted neoliberalism which resulted in the deregulation of the agriculture 
sector. As explained above, the effects of increased economic liberalisation have been detrimental 
to emerging black farmers since they were exposed to international competition, commodity 
speculation and the withdrawal of state support
65
. Over the past 30 years, South Africa's food 
system has undergone substantial commodification as reflected by the rise of massive food retailers, 
GMO monopolies
66
 and fast food chains (Moyo, 2015). This neoliberal restructuring has also 
caused the agribusiness sector to gravitate towards the urban areas. Consequently the rural areas 
were deprived of an important source of economic activity as wealth was redistributed away from 
smaller producers towards commercial producers and speculators (Kirsten et al., 2010: 153-154). 
Tsheola (2014: 659) asserts that "South Africa's domestic agri-industry has now been firmly locked 
                                                        
65
 A decade into South Africa's deregulation, Vink and Kirsten (2002: vi) noted that both "[c]ommercial and small-scale 
farmers in South Africa receive less support from the state than their counterparts in every other industrial country in the 
world with the exception of New Zealand". 
66
 Moyo (2015) reports that South Africans are "the subjects of one of history's largest, most unregulated scientific 
experiments" since its citizens are "the first people in the world to consume a genetically modified food as a staple" with 
more than 75% of the country's white maize genetically modified.  
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with the global agr-food systems and networks". Currently South Africa reflects "one of the most 
assertive and enthusiastic embracing of the third food regime processes" (Haysom, 2014: 122). 
Instead of the original intention of creating a freer and more transparent agricultural economy, the 
liberalisation of agriculture resulted in significant consolidation and effectively shut out any new 
entrants to the market. The food model adhered to in South Africa is one of globalised 
accumulation; indicative of the corporate food regime, "a small number of corporations determine 
the availability, price, quantity and nutritional value of all food consumed" (Cock, 2015; see also 
Greenberg, 2010). Thus, rather than land reform, the trajectory of agrarian change saw "the 
consolidation of the hegemony of large-scale commercial farming and corporate agri-business in 
agricultural value chains" (Hall & Cousins, 2015: 4).  
Traub and Meyer (2010: 291-293) illustrates this consolidation by providing an overview of the 
grain subsector. They explain that, all along the value chain – from producers via storage, traders, 
processors, and retailers, to the consumers – the firms involved are vertically integrated in the 
market and have considerable bargaining power. For example, 70% of the storage capacity within 
South Africa is owned by three companies; two multinationals, Cargill and Louis Dreyfus, dominate 
the trading/brokering market; the top four companies account for 73% of all maize milled within the 
country; and four major companies dominate at least 60% of the formal food retail sector (Traub & 
Meyer, 2010: 292; and Jacobs (2012: 194). Cock (2015) explains that these corporations show "a 
total disregard for their pursuit of profit" and cites the example of price-fixing "at almost every 
point in the wheat-to-bread chain"
67
. Furthermore, amidst South Africa's most recent food crisis, the 
financial performance of South Africa's four big supermarkets for the years 2008-2009 show that, in 
comparison to the previous financial year, these companies benefitted handsomely from inflated 
food prices
68
.  
The corporate dominance in South Africa's belies the country's official development approach to 
food security which leads Jacobs (2012: 193) to conclude that policies are "set out to consolidate an 
agro-food sector for agribusiness profitability rather than for food security". Although the National 
Food and Nutrition Policy acknowledges that the emerging agricultural sector is in need of 
                                                        
67 In 2007, the Competition Commission found Tiger Brands guilty of price-fixing after it admitted to have colluded 
with its rivals to raise the price of bread (Jacobs, 2012: 194). Other examples of collusive behaviour in the agri-foods 
industry includes Sasol's 2009 fine for fixing fertiliser prices; and the anticompetitive behaviour of the dairy industry 
(Cock, 2015). 
68
 Jacobs (2012: 195) cites that Woolworths and Pick-and-Pay reported a 13% and 18% in profits respectively, whilst 
Spar increased its profits with 22% and the Checkers-Shoprite group with early 30%. 
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assistance, it does not confront the role of big business within the South Africa's food system as a 
deterrent to its development goals. Consequently the National Policy was recently criticised by the 
Food Sovereignty Campaign (FSC) which called for the "deep transformation of our food system by 
breaking control of food corporations, repositioning the state to realise the constitutional right to 
food as part of creating the conditions and space for the emergence of food alternatives from below" 
(FSC, 2015). 
4.4.2. Malawi 
4.4.2.1. Context-setting  
In Malawi agriculture forms a central part of the economy contributing to approximately 30% of the 
country's GDP (The World Bank, 2015a). Livelihood strategies in Malawi are mainly centred on 
agricultural activities since 80% of the country's workforce is employed in agriculture (Feed the 
Future, 2015). Due to the key role agriculture plays in Malawi, agricultural development policies 
have dominated the policy arena since independence in 1964. Despite regime change and successive 
change in leadership, food security has been a major goal pursued by government – largely through 
self-sufficiency in food production, especially maize.  
For the first 15 years following independence, Malawi was able to produce enough food to feed its 
citizens (Chirwa, 2010: 253). However, economic reforms under the Banda administration pushed 
Malawi out of a situation of food self-sufficiency and into one of increased dependence on food 
imports and even food aid. During Banda's reign, Malawi was ruled by one of the most oppressive 
regimes in Africa which was characterized by autocratic leadership and brutal violations of human 
rights (Sarelin, 2013: 148; Silungwe, 2009: 40). Following decolonisation, government did little to 
alter the colonial patterns of power; essentially the modern nation state "was a superstructure 
erected over a patrimonial system" (Sahley, Groelsema, Marchione & Nelson, 2005: 13). In short, 
government implemented policies that exploited the welfare of the majority of the population in 
order to favour political elites. This most notably manifested in the country's land policy. Malawi 
has a dual agricultural system where commercial estates coexist with smallholder farms. The former 
produces tobacco, tea, sugar, and other cash crops, whilst the latter is mainly used for subsistence 
farming. During Banda's time in office, more than one million hectares of communal land was 
transferred to the state and estate owners which created a new class of landless people (GRAIN, 
2012: 80). Furthermore, at the time Malawi's agricultural policy favoured the estate farmers by 
prohibiting smallholder farmers to cultivate cash crops. As such the estate farmers "had access to 
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favourable prices of the global commodity markets" whereas "the smallholder farmers was only 
exposed to commodity markets run by the state agro-based corporation, the Agricultural 
Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC), which […] bought the smallholders' 
produce at prices below those available on the global market" (Silungwe, 2009: 41). Malawi's land 
reform thus resulted in smallholder farmers persistently experiencing a lack of economic 
opportunity; they were deprived of land that had been used to produce their own food, and if they 
did have access to land, their access to the market was restricted. 
As mentioned above, structural adjustment by the World Bank and IMF during the 1980s saw a 
decrease in government support for agricultural inputs. In Malawi, the poor performance of 
ADMARC and other parastatal "provided a strong basis for advocating for the liberalisation of the 
agricultural sector" (Chinsinga, 2011a: 7). Without subsidies for fertiliser and seed, estate farmers 
were exposed to a volatile market, and smallholder farmers were disadvantaged through the 
withdrawal of ADMARC
69
. Consequently less food was produced and food became more expensive 
which led to widespread food insecurity in the country.  
In the early 1990s pressure groups in Malawi campaigned for a multi-party system, and following a 
referendum which saw an end to autocratic rule, democratic elections were held in 1994 (Sarelin, 
2013: 148-149). Since, the country was ruled by the United Democratic Front from 1994-2004, and 
by the break-away Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) since 2005. Over the past two decades, the 
issue of food insecurity was prominently addressed by presidential candidates during their election 
campaigns. In 1998 the newly-elected UDF re-established seed and fertiliser input programmes in a 
clear violation of the World Bank's loan conditionality (Sahley et al., 2005: 14). The argument was 
that, despite the implementation of SAPs, the Malawian government can "never completely 
abandon state intervention because it frequently ha[s] to react to recurring natural disasters" 
(GRAIN, 2012: 81). Since the country is heavily reliant on rain-fed agriculture, the droughts of 
1991 and 1993 saw a significant decrease in food production. 
It is important to note that, in Malawi, food security is often equated with maize security since it is 
the country's staple food. Malawi has the highest per capita maize consumption in Africa (GRAIN, 
2012: 8) and the desire for maize self-sufficiency has formed an integral part of the country's 
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 In years of surplus production, ADMARC would buy excess produce and store it in reserves in order to sell it in years 
of poor harvests (GRAIN, 2012: 80). Thus farmers were guaranteed an income and access to food in times of 
insufficient production. This is especially true for farmers located in remote areas that do not have access to private 
traders since ADMARC would collect produce from these farmers' holdings.  
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approach to food security
70
. In the early 2000s, Malawi suffered a severe shortage of maize in what 
became known as the Strategic Grain Reserve Scandal. Following the advice of the IMF, Malawi 
liquidated reserves that had built up due to a bumper harvest in 1999 (Sahley et al., 2005: 46). The 
logic was that it was too expensive to maintain high reserve levels, and that losses would be 
incurred as stocks age. Consequently maize reserves were sold to Kenya and Mozambique (FIAN, 
2006: 50). However, the Ministry of Agriculture overestimated the amount to be sold which, 
combined with the harsh drought of 2002, led to a severe maize shortage.  
The backdrop of the 2001-2003 food crisis – the worst experienced in 50 years – set the stage for 
the food security to became a highly charged political issue in the May 2004 elections. All major 
political parties made commitments to address food shortages and chronic food insecurity 
(Chinsinga, 2012a: 3). Ever since the 2001-2003 food crisis, the question of food security has 
"appeared in the platforms of politicians, on the agendas of policy makers, in the programmes of 
public bureaucracies, among the duties of village chiefs, and on the pages of national newspapers 
and it is thoroughly researched and debated" (Sahley et al., 2005: 6). The 2004 election established 
Bingu wa Mutharika as president. Sarelin (2013: 150) notes that from the start of his incumbency, 
Mutharika made a formal commitment to human rights
71
. Mutharika prioritised food security and 
put policies in place that increased government support for smallholder farmers. 
The Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP) launched in the 2005-2006 growing season, enabled 
smallholder farmers to have access to subsidised fertiliser and seed. The FISP originally targeted 
maize and tobacco farmers since these crops are Malawi's most important ones
72
, but later expanded 
to also accommodate cotton, coffee, and tea growers (Curtis, Marcatto & Narayan, 2011: 16). The 
introduction of the FISP was hugely beneficial for food security in Malawi; it brought to an end 
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 Sarelin (2013: 17) notes that Malawians do not value other staple foods such as rice, cassava, and sweet potatoes. Her 
field notes documents diminishing sentiments by educated Malawians that label their country's citizens as "spoiled" 
because they insist on eating maize-based meals three times a day. After conducting interviews with Malawian, Sarelin 
(2013: 17) also reports that at times of maize shortages, they would "complain" that they do not have food even though 
they have access to other staples. Malawi's cultural dependence on maize as a staple food has resulted in an over-
dependence on this grain which has been recognised by government through subsequent attempts made to promote the 
cultivation of diverse crops (see following section). 
71
 This is clearly expressed in Mutharika's decision to break away from the UDF, which under previous leadership 
became associated with upholding the socio-economic structures of neo-patrimonialism and accused of unconstitutional 
practices by civil society. Despite being hand-picked by President Muluzi to take over his position in office, Mutharika 
distanced himself from the UDF and formed the DPP once he held office (Sarelin, 2013: 150). 
72
 As explained above, maize is Malawians' staple food that they are reluctant to substitute for another staple. As for 
tobacco, Malawi is the biggest producer of burley tobacco. This industry makes up 10% of the country's GDP and 
accounts for up to 80% of the country's income (GRAIN, 2012: 86).    
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
72 
 
almost two decades of severe food shortages and chronic hunger. Malawi was even able to export 
food surpluses to Zimbabwe (Magdoff, 2008: 7). The success of Malawi's FISP "has attracted 
considerable international attention and quickly [became] endorsed as a potential model for the rest 
of the African continent to emulate" (Chinsinga, 2012a: 14). What is especially noteworthy about 
the "miracle of Malawi"
73
 is that it reopened the debate on the effect of liberalisation on the 
agricultural sector. Despite recommendations to further deregulate this sector, Malawi reversed the 
course of liberalisation and reintroduced subsidies instead. On the one hand, those that advocate for 
the New Green Revolution in Africa, have ascribed Malawi's success to the fact that the government 
followed the "Green Revolution model", and subsequently Malawi's story became a marketing tool 
for further promoting the New Green Revolution (GRAIN, 2012: 80). On the other hand, those that 
advocate for food sovereignty, have praised Malawi for deliberately "defying its foreign donors [by] 
giving direct support to small farmers" – as opposed to promoting commercial production through 
free market principles. Despite successes experienced, many Malawians still require food assistance 
especially following the 2007-2008 food crisis that left an additional 10% of the population 
vulnerable to food insecurity (Curtis et al., 2011: 16). 
4.4.2.2. Institutional framework: main guiding documents  
Since the agricultural sector plays such a vital role in the performance of Malawi's economy, 
national development policies particularly target the growth of this sector. The importance of the 
agriculture sector is further emphasised since Malawians hold the belief that "more agriculture 
equals more food security"
74
 (Chipeta, 2014: 2). As mentioned above, agriculture is also the main 
economic activity for most of the countries' citizens with up to 80% of the population employed in 
this sector (Feed the Future, 2015). The focus on agriculture is thus prominent in all of Malawi's 
growth strategies. 
In 2005 the Malawian government announced its Food Security and Nutrition Policy (FNSP) that 
was modelled off the Malawi Growth Strategy and Development Strategy (MGDS)
75
. The main 
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 It has been argued that the success of the FISP has been exaggerated: the years following the introduction of the FISP 
was marked with good weather which contributed to production surpluses, and reports also indicate that production 
estimates were overestimated for political reasons (GRAIN, 2012: 83). 
74
 Interestingly, Chipeta (2014: 2) points out that, on a global-level, "the more agriculture-dependent a country is, the 
less food secure it tends to be". There is thus an inverse relationship to the proportion of the population involved in 
agriculture and the level of food security. This can be ascribed to the fact that food security comprises more than just the 
availability of food; a stable income and the subsequent food-purchasing power is important to ensure access to food.  
75
 The MGDS replaced the country's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). Last-mentioned was introduced by the 
World Bank and IMF as a condition for debt relief in Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) under. Like the PRSP, 
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themes of the MGDS are: sustainable economic growth; social protection of the most vulnerable; 
social development; infrastructure development; and improving governance (FIAN, 2006: 28). The 
FNSP was split into a Food Security Policy administered by the Ministry of Agriculture and Food 
Security (MoAFS) and a Nutrition Policy to be carried out by the Department of Nutrition, HIV and 
AIDS
76
 (MoAFS, 2006: 17).  
In 2008 the MoAFS launched the Food Security Action Plan (FSAP) "to ensure systemic, 
coordinated and harmonised operationalisation" of the Food Security Policy (MoAFS, 2008: 7). The 
FSAP identified seven strategies to be followed: (a) promotion of contract farming; (b) 
encouragement of domestic production of high quality improved varieties; (c) promoting the 
integration of livestock in smallholder farming; (d) creation of an enabling environment for private 
sector investment and local community participation; (e) promotion of environment, land and water 
management for sustainable development; (f) promotion of off-farm employment opportunities 
through economic empowerment; and (g) supporting the establishment of community grain banks 
(MoAFS, 2008: 7). Although the FSAP is a top-down policy, Mutharika emphasised that it should 
be decentralised with the implementation activities focused on establishing local support networks 
between farmers, and training opportunities to educate farmers about fertilisers, pest control, timely 
harvesting, compost-making, and the de-worming of animals. This entitlement orientation is further 
expressed through on-site demonstrations for farmers in the construction of dams and drainage 
systems. The FSAP is also rooted in the pass-on-the-gift principle, which entails that farmers with 
skills and knowledge should play an active role in community development by training other 
farmers (MoAFS, 2008: 55). Although the MoAFS also seeks to improve market access by 
fostering private-public partnerships, the FSAP is clear on the fact that this should be done in 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
the MGDS is aimed at poverty reduction, however, in contrast to the PRSP, the MGDS is "home-based, country-owned" 
as the Malawian government formulated the strategy independent of donor requirements (FIAN, 2006: 28). Since 2011, 
the MDGS has been replaced by the MDGS II which represents "a policy shift from social consumption to sustainable 
economic growth and infrastructure development" (MoAFS, 2011: 3). 
76
 Meerman (2008: 6-7) notes that "from a policy perspective, this split is noteworthy in its recognition that food 
security and nutrition, while closely related, are not interchangeable and should not be conflated". This split between 
food security and nutrition security is useful for planning specific programmes to address these two issues. Although 
often a concurrent problem, with food security actually encompassing nutrition security, the specific focus on nutrition 
security as a separate goal is valuable. Nutrition security is severely compromised in most Southern African countries 
since the rural and/or poor population do not have access to a wide range of food resources. Consequently they are 
deprived of micronutrients. The widespread prevalence of HIV/AIDS in the region also deters nutrition security since 
individuals' poor state of health compromise food access and food utilisation as explained above (see section 4.3.5.). 
While food security and nutrition security are equally important, the level of analysis and limited scope of this 
discussion (see section 1.10.) do not allow for nutrition security to be discussed as a distinct goal.  
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accordance with the needs of local contexts and that the community should be involved in 
determining when and how corporate stakeholders are involved. 
The FSAP was also designed to be in line with the strategic objectives of Malawi's Agricultural 
Sector Wide Approach (ASWAp). The ASWAp was developed for the period 2008-2015 in order to 
advance the goals of the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP)
77
 
(MoAFS, 2011: i; Chinsinga, 2012b: 7). The CAADP requires countries to allocate 10% of their 
national budget to agriculture by 2008 and to aim to achieve an agricultural growth target of 6% by 
2015 (NEPAD, 2003). The ASWAp is thus a "priority investment programme" targeted at 
agricultural growth and development through better coordination and harmonisation between 
donors and the government (MoAFS, 2011: i). Malawi has continuously met the CAAPD 
commitment of allocating 10% of the annual budget to agriculture. This has been largely attributed 
to the success of the FISP (Chipeta, 2014: 3; Greenwell, Sibusiso & Pius, 2014: 156).   
4.4.2.3. Current actualities: orientation and model  
Over the past decade Malawi has experienced an average annual economic growth rate of 5.8%
78
. 
The Global Hunger Index
79
 reports that, over the same period, hunger in Malawi has decreased by 
11.8 points – from a severity of "alarming" hunger to a severity of "serious" hunger. However, 
Verduzco-Gallo, Ecker and Pauw (2014: 20) note that, due to the advances made in economic 
growth, this period actually reflects "a poor translation in economic growth into a reduction in 
extreme poverty and improved food and nutrition security". They ascribe this situation to a rapid 
increase in inequality: economic growth benefitted the urban rich at the expense of the extreme poor 
in both the urban and rural areas.  
Several studies highlight the actuality of rent-seeking and neo-patrimonialism that is characteristic 
of the Malawian context (Mkwara & Marsh, 2011: 7-8; Chinsinga, 2011b: 66; Chinsinga, 2012a: 
14; Chinsinga, 2012b: 20; GRAIN, 2012: 87). The main argument advanced by these studies is that 
the agricultural reforms implemented in Malawi were all conducted on the basis of political gain. 
An example of this is how the FISP has been employed for rapid wealth generation as opposed to 
broadening farmers' market access. As such the FISP has become an instrument of patronage 
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  See detailed discussion in Appendix D. 
78
  Based on own calculations from the data of The World Bank (2015b). 
79
 The Global Hunger Index calculates national-level hunger according to four indicators: the proportion of the 
population that is undernourished; the prevalence of wasting in children under five years; the prevalence of stunting in 
children under the age of five; and the mortality rate of children under five years (IFPRI, 2015). 
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employed by elites to further their own security and political enhancement (Chinsinga, 2011a: 18). 
As such, policies have been tailored, not according to technical soundness and feasibility, but rather 
to whether it will deliver a fortunate political outcome for incumbents. Chinsinga and Poulton 
(2014: 145) explain that "food security lies at the heart of the social contract between government 
and citizens in Malawi" and thus serves as a political tool to secure support. Even after the country's 
democratic transition, there have been reports of mismanagement and corruption under Muluzi's 
rule, as well as that of the Mutharika and subsequent Joyce Banda administrations (Kerr & Patel, 
2014: 213). The distribution of subsidised fertilisers is "spatially selective based on political 
influence and affiliation" (Mkwara & Marsh, 2011: 7). Consequently, despite the official model that 
aims to democratise the food system, access to production inputs is skewed in favour of 
smallholders that have social or political ties to government members. This situation is exacerbated 
by Malawi's political culture that "promotes subservience and obedience to authority without 
question"  
Another major challenge to the democratisation of the food system is Malawi's weak policy 
environment which "various actors have, in different ways, exploited [it] to advance their own 
selfish interests" (Chinsinga, 2011b: 66). Since 2006, the private sector became involved in the 
distribution of seed and fertiliser and currently multinationals dominate these sectors. All of 
Malawi's chemical fertilisers are imported from the international market which leaves the country 
susceptible to "currency and commodity price fluctuations as well as profit-taking by the few 
multinational corporations that dominate the global fertiliser industry" (GRAIN, 2012: 86-87). 
Similarly the international seed giant, Monsanto, holds more than 50% of the hybrid seed market in 
Malawi (GRAIN, 2012: 84). Malawi's dependence on these corporations undermines its focus on 
promoting self-sufficiency through local production: rising international prices of seeds and 
fertiliser affect the affordability of government to continue with the input subsidy programme. 
Along with the financial cost associated with the dependence on chemical fertiliser, the effect on the 
environment has also been detrimental on soil fertility and water systems
80
.  
A major hindrance in the democratisation of Malawi's food system has been its dualistic nature of 
agriculture: the co-existence of the estate system with smallholder farming (Chirwa & Matita, 2015: 
1). This system prevents the redistribution of land which consequently undermines true agrarian 
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 Chemical fertilisers leave the soil acidic and if nitrogen leaks into rivers and lakes it has the potential to destroy the 
associated ecosystems (GRAIN, 2012: 87).  
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reform. Without access to enough land to feed their families, "all the fertilisers and seeds in the 
world cannot make much difference for the great mass of farmers in Malawi" (GRAIN, 2012: 85). 
Smallholders' access to land is also compromised through land grabs
81
 which deprives local 
communities of their land as it is transferred to foreign nationals.  
The institutional framework's focus on community development through entitlement is also 
contested by the loss of traditional knowledge within Malawi's food system. Due to the dual 
agriculture system of the country, there is a "social stigma associate with certain traditional ways" 
(Kamwendo & Kamwendo, 2014: 97). Decreasing soil fertility was traditionally managed by 
leaving the land uncultivated for a few years (GRAIN, 2012: 87). However, Malawi's socio-
economic context does not allow for this system, since the country's high population growth has left 
little room for shifting cultivation. Furthermore, Malawi's cash crop system established during the 
colonial era and continued under Banda after liberalisation, has led to a decrease in the variety of 
crops produced as it became more profitable to focus on tobacco production. The traditional 
practice of intercropping, which "mitigates the risks of disease, market fluctuation and weather 
disaster", (GRAIN, 2012: 87) thus became replaced by the cultivation of monocrops. Indigenous 
storage and preservation techniques
82
 have also been phased out with the advent of modern 
agriculture.  
Behind the "miracle" of Malawi's New Green Revolution lies the current actuality of a dualistic 
food security that manifests in increasing inequality between estate farmers and smallholder farmers 
since the latter do not have sufficient access to land to be self-sufficient in their subsistence farming.  
4.4.3. Zimbabwe 
4.4.3.1. Context-setting  
Following Zimbabwe's independence in 1980, the country enjoyed the benefits of its thriving 
agriculture-based economy. At the time Zimbabwe was referred to as the "bread-basket" of 
Southern Africa since it was well-established as a net exporter of grain. Mukherjee (2002: 9) asserts 
                                                        
81
 Examples include a 55,000ha deal with the Government of Djibouti, negotiations with China for a similar-sized 
operation, and deals with UK-based companies (Cru Investment Management, Lonhro, and Associated British Foods) 
(GRAIN, 2012: 84). 
82
 Kamwendo and Kamwendo (2014: 99) describe several of these techniques that have previously been widely-
employed by subsistence farmers. They explain how a variety of crops were stored in a table-like structure right above 
the kitchen's fireplace; the smoke would protect the food from pests. This was a costless and safe practice as opposed to 
the current system which relies on pesticides. Food was also preserved in a trench dug behind the kitchen, underneath 
the overlay of the roof. Potatoes could last for over a year in this hole, provided it was stored according to specific 
methods (see Kamwendo and Kamwendo, 2014: 100). 
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that the performance of Zimbabwe's agricultural sector "has always been crucial to the overall 
economic performance" of the country.  
The colonial legacy of Zimbabwe is an important determinant of how the economy came to be 
structured. Under British rule, the settlers "deliberately created a dualistic system of agriculture" 
(Ndlela & Robinson, 2010: 205). This involved that the most arable land were exclusively allocated 
to European farmers whereas African farmers were confined to areas that were not as suited for 
agriculture
83
. Characteristic of the second food regime, the European farmers also received support 
and assistance from the state in order to promote the industrialisation of production. African famers 
were subordinate to this large-scale agricultural production since they did not receive equal support. 
As such African farmers could not compete with their European counterparts; their agricultural 
production merely served the purpose of communal subsistence (Maposa, Gamira & Hlongwana, 
2010: 195).Consequently there was a marked decrease in production by Africans. Furthermore, in 
the process, indigenous agricultural knowledge
84
 was lost which came to negatively impact food 
security in the subsequent eras when the food security situation in Zimbabwe became dire.  
The racially skewed land ownership pattern became a central focus of Zimbabwe's liberation 
struggle. The restoration of land ownership was one of the main aspirations of independence
85
; it 
was arguer that reclaiming land expropriated by the colonialists would establish Africans' 
sovereignty. Land was thus framed as an important material and symbolic resource (Sachikonye, 
2003:228) in the sense that it would not only economically empower Africans, but that it would also 
reinstate their identity
86
.  However, after independence the land reform process was slow to take off. 
Reed (2002: 97-98) explains that the government sought to balance two contradictory forces, 
namely: to uphold the economic structure dominated by the white minority, and to empower the 
black majority through the politics of national unity. Consequently land reform was (initially) 
rooted in the government's policy of national reconciliation which entailed that it was conducted on 
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 The Land Apportionment Act of 1930 (superseded by the Land Tenure Act of 1969) provided the legal foundation for 
this divide. Maposa et al. (2010: 196) cites Moyana (2002) who states that the white European minority was allocated 
51% of the total arable land whereas the African majority owned only 22%. 
84
 See Chirimuuta and Mapolisa's discussion (2011) on local communities' agricultural practices that ensured soil 
fertility, and provided mechanisms for strategic grain storage.  
85
 Sachikonye (2003: 228) even goes as far as to argue that the liberation struggle "was not primarily about building 
‘democracy’ and the institutions and values which sustain it" since land reform was the main driving force. He 
elaborates on this argument by highlighting that Robert Mugabe's authoritarian rule following independence was not 
contested since democracy was not the main goal of the liberation struggle.   
86
 In accordance with the Pan-Africanism described above. 
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a willing-buyer/willing-seller approach as required by the restrictive Lancaster House Agreement
87
 
(Zikhali & Chilonda, 2012: 147). However, even after the Lancaster House Agreement expired in 
1990, land reform still proceeded slowly. During the 1990s, government paid little attention to 
resolve the land question. The official explanation for this delay was that the willing-seller/willing-
buyer approach "limited the scope of spatially matching land supply with demand for resettlement" 
(Sachikonye, 2003: 231). 
The neoliberal model employed for land reform, was also extended to agriculture as a whole with 
increased liberalisation in this sector. In the previous era of rule, following the internationally 
unrecognised UDI, the country experienced trade and investment sanctions and consequently had a 
closed economy. Because of import substitution, this period stimulated rapid agricultural growth in 
the country (Ndlela & Robinson, 2010: 206). However, following independence, growth in the 
Zimbabwean economy depended on "accessing new markets, acquiring new technology, and 
putting the economy on a more competitive foundation" (Reed, 2002: 98). Since land reform would 
disrupt this process, it was back-burnered by government which prioritised the attending to the 
needs of the white-dominated economy instead. As consolation to the black majority, the ZANU-
PF
88
 government launched a programme extending social services to the African population through 
providing education and health services.   
Zimbabwe first entrenched its economic liberalisation through the Economic Structural Adjustment 
Programme (ESAP) in 1990 with the overall goal to integrate the industrial, agricultural and mining 
sectors into the global economy. The Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social 
Transformation (ZIMPREST) launched in 1996 marked the second phase of the reform process 
which "reinforced plans to open the economy to world markets" (Reed, 2002: 108). Economic 
liberalisation altered the structure of the agricultural sector through the creation of export incentives 
as well as the free-flow of foreign capital. Land use, in particular, was altered with large-scale 
commercial farms shifting to the increased horticultural production and the cultivation of cash 
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 The Lancaster House Agreement of 1979 internationally legitimated Zimbabwe's independence following the former 
Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965 which was not recognised by Britain or the UN (Thomson, 
2004: 34).With regards to land reform, this agreement entailed that the willing-seller/willing-buyer approach should be 
followed, and that compensation should be according to market prices – to be paid in a currency of the seller's choice 
(Logan, 2007: 204; Moyo, 2012: 132).  
88
 ZANU-PF was formed in 1988 following a merger between the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the 
Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU). Farley (2008: 76) explains that the merger introduced a "degree of apparent 
quietism" into Zimbabwean politics as it diminished the size and strength of the opposition. As such this merger paved 
the way for the country's one-party system and the authoritarian leadership of Robert Mugabe, both of which only 
became challenged at the turn of the century with the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC).  
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crops
89
. The emphasis placed on export-oriented agriculture undermined food security since it 
created an incentive for cultivating for profit instead of food. 
Since embarking on these reforms, Zimbabwe's economic performance deteriorated; at the end of 
the 20th century the country was on the brink of collapse due to political and economic setbacks. 
This was met with discontent for the government of Robert Mugabe, which the latter sought to 
address by reprioritising the land-ownership issue (Farley, 2008: 77). The political base of ZANU-
PF was mainly confined to the rural poor whose land demands had not been addressed since the first 
period of land reform
90
 only benefited the black elite who could acquire land through market 
mechanisms. Sadomba (2013: 88) points out that, in the midst of increased grievances from the 
rural poor and war veterans
91
, Mugabe "decided to 'hijack' the land movement in a bid to use its 
cultural capital" to further his monopoly on political power. As such, a second period of land reform 
was initiated in 1997. This period was rooted in a radical approach and rested on "extensive 
compulsory land acquisition and redistribution" (Zikhali & Chilonda, 2012: 147) as granted by the 
Land Acquisition Act of 1992
92
.  From 1998 onward, there was a "gradual retreat of Western 
investment capital and the construction of an elaborate sanctions regime" as the US and European 
Union (EU) expressed its discontent with the radical approach to land reform (Moyo, 2012: 141). 
The radical phase of land reform intensified after Mugabe's defeat in the referendum of 2000
93
. He 
resorted to "arbitrary and extra-constitutional tactics" in a scramble to maintain in power (Farley, 
2008: 79). With regards to land reform, this involved that Mugabe let it be known that war veterans 
can forcibly occupy white farmlands without fear of intervention by the police authorities. 
Furthermore, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, and his 
supporters were actively harassed by members of the ZANU-PF, and the Zimbabwean media was 
also censored by the state in an effort to intimidate those opposing the government (Farley, 2008: 
                                                        
89
 This brought on the return to tobacco exports, of which the production had to be curtailed during the sanctions of the 
UDI period (Ndlela & Robinson, 2010: 206).  
90 It should be noted that different scholars split up Zimbabwean land reform in different phases. For example, Moyo 
(2001) identified four phases from 1980 till 2000, while Sadomba (2013) recognises two main periods (1998 to 2002, 
and thereafter). 
91
 Guerrilla fighters of the liberation war of Zimbabwe; mostly comprised of the forrmer military youth (Sadomba, 
2013: 79).  
92
 Under this Act the State could claim five categories of land for redistribution: "derelict land, under-utilised land, 
multiple-owned land, foreign-owned land, and private farm properties adjacent to communal areas" (Logan, 2007: 205). 
93
 The referendum proposed a new constitution of Zimbabwe to replace the one drawn up under the Lancaster House 
Agreement of 1979. It was during the era preceding the referendum that the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) 
was formed to mobilise civil society against the government (Zondi, 2012: 18) 
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79). In this highly politicised environment, white farmlands were expropriated en masse and 
subsequently the large-scale commercial sector shrank from 39% in 2000 to 8% in 2002 (Ndlela & 
Robinson, 2010: 207). The ZANU-PF described the widespread land reform as an "agrarian 
revolution"; according to official estimates, when this process drew to a close in October 2002, 11 
million hectares had been transformed from white commercial farmers to 300,000 smallholder black 
farmers (Sachikonye, 2003: 227). 
This "fast-track" land reform programme had a severe impact on the agricultural sector. Prior to the 
second period of land reforms, commercial agriculture upheld Zimbabwe's socio-economic stability 
by "assuring food security, foreign exchange, employment, and government revenues to invest in 
social services" (Besada & LaChapelle, 2012: 5. However, land reform transferred skilled and well-
equipped farmers to smallholders that lacked the necessary skills and capital to sustain investments 
in industrial agriculture (Ndlela & Robinson, 2010: 207). Farley (2008: 82) highlights that, although 
government had a policy for land reform, it did not have a policy on how to train new land owners 
in agricultural techniques. Consequently there was a dramatic decrease in agricultural productivity 
which led to the rapid deterioration of the Zimbabwean economy. Robertson (2012: 85) ascribes the 
unanticipated effects of the fast-track land reform programme to government's error in judgement 
about the nature and role of the agricultural sector. Before the second period of land reform, this 
sector was one of Southern Africa's most advanced and robust; heralded as a great success story in 
the region. 
Zimbabwe's "human-made crisis" (Grant, 2007: 178) gave rise to widespread unemployment, 
poverty, and food insecurity. Ignowski (2012: 9) notes that most Zimbabweans' are involved in 
agriculture and consequently dependent on a good harvest to ensure food security. The impact of 
land reform, coupled with "the longest dry spell in 20 years" led government to declare a state of 
disaster in 2002 (Mukherjee, 2002: 8). During 2003-2004 Zimbabwe, previously able to sufficiently 
feed its citizens throughout the postcolonial era, was the biggest recipient of emergency food aid
94
 
in Southern Africa (Grant, 2007: 159). However, food aid itself also became a strategic political 
tool in the Zimbabwean narrative. The ZANU-PF insisted on taking responsibility for the 
distribution of food aid. Tension between the ZANU-PF and the MDC was especially high during 
this period following the 2002 presidential election, that Mugabe won under questionable 
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 Adding further complexity to the situation, was that Zimbabwe demanded GMO-free products (Khumalo, 2007: 218) 
which re requirement that maize (the country's staple food) must be milled prior to its distribution in the country out of 
concern that GMOs would contaminate indigenous crops (Grant, 2007: 185). 
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circumstances of "voter coercion and intimidation of political opponents" (Mukherjee, 2002: 5). 
Subsequently, under a system of excessive patronage, the government channelled food aid to areas 
supportive of the ZANU-PF, whilst the areas supportive of the MDC where deprived thereof 
(Farley, 2008: 82; Sachikonye, 2003: 239). Since the MDC's support base is mainly located in the 
urban areas, food insecurity in cities was deliberately undermined through the politically skewed 
distribution of food. 
The period from 2003-2008 was marked with hyperinflation which culminated in Zimbabwe 
suspending its own currency
95
. When inflation peaked between July and October 2008, it was at the 
height of the global food crisis, and subsequently the price of food increased threefold within a 
single day (Tawodzera, Zanamwe & Crush, 2012: 22). In 2008 Zimbabwe also experienced a "huge 
maize shortfall following the worst harvest for 15 years" (Chikuhwa, 2013: 146) and like elsewhere 
in the world, these food shortages spurred on strikes and unrest in the country (Zvavahera & 
Chigora, 2015: 68). Like before, MDC supporters were denied food supplies and had to adopt other 
strategies
96
 to access food.  
However, the year 2008 also marked the first step in rebuilding Zimbabwe's political system. A 
power-sharing agreement was signed by ZANU-PF, the MDC and an MDC splinter group (Besada 
& LaChapelle, 2012: 1). The Government of National Unity (GNU) was formed in the following 
year, and since then the socio-economic situation in Zimbabwe started to improve. 
4.4.3.2. Institutional framework: main guiding documents 
In summarising Zimbabwe's land, agricultural, and food security policies, Anseeuw, Kapuya and 
Saruchera (2012: 20) note that the country had no official food security policy since its 
independence in 1980. Its approach to food security articulated in ensuring food self-sufficiency 
through the parastatal Grain Marketing Board (GMB) which rigidly controlled the trade in maize 
and wheat till it was liberalised in 2009. The government has also been accused of haphazardly 
formulating one agricultural policy after another without any implementation which led to the 
"mystification" of the policy context (Zvavahera & Chigora, 2015: 60). 
                                                        
95
 Zimbabwe's suffered major budget deficits through: government's increase of war veterans' pensions; its intervention 
against the invasion of the DRC from 1998 to 2002; and international sanctions that resulted in a decrease in FDI 
(Moyo, 2012: 140).   
96
 Tawodzera et al. (2012: 24) explain that the urban population (read MDC supporters) had to resort to the informal 
market to acquire food since supermarkets were closed or understocked. The urban population was thus reliant on non-
market channels to access food, and subsequently resorted to urban agriculture, rural-urban food transfers and 
households' increased dependence on their social networks (Ignowski, 2012: 49). 
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In 2012 the Government of Zimbabwe (Goz) announced its Country Programme Framework that it 
drafted together with the FAO. The policy identifies three priority areas: (a) to establish policy 
frameworks; (b) to improve sustainable agricultural productivity and competitiveness; and (c) to 
improve disaster risk and reduction management (GoZ, 2012: 17-18). The policy is not particularly 
prescriptive on how the policy frameworks and disaster management priority areas should be 
developed. However, with regards to the second priority area, the policy's outcomes are to 
strengthen national agricultural institutions, increase the commercialisation of the smallholder 
sector, and improve rural and urban production and marketing infrastructures (GoZ, 2012: 17-18).  
In contrast to this neoliberal framework, the Food and Nutrition Security Policy announced by 
government in 2013, is predominantly rooted in radical principles. The main policy goal is to 
"promote and ensure adequate food and nutrition security for all people at all times in Zimbabwe, 
particularly amongst the most vulnerable and in line with our cultural norms and values and the 
concept of rebuilding and maintaining family dignity" (GoZ, 2014: 1). The policy is described as 
"holistic" and "multi-sectoral", and it is underpinned by the right-to-food rhetoric. 
Zimbabwe's most recent economic policy, the Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic 
Transformation (Zim Asset) highlights "Food Security and Nutrition" as one of four strategic 
clusters
97
 "that will enable Zimbabwe to achieve economic growth and reposition the country as one 
of the strongest economies in the region" (GoZ, 2013: 6). The Food Security and Nutrition cluster is 
informed by the CAADP
98
 and thus reflects the notion that investment in the agricultural sector 
would lead to economic growth. Crop production and marketing, livestock production and 
development, infrastructure development, environmental management, and protection and 
conservation form the key areas of the Food Security and Nutrition cluster. The approach 
government adopts to the development of production is unmistakably neoliberal as reflected in this 
selection of strategies that aims to "establish agro-dealer networks", "facilitate establishment of 
agricultural commodities market", "train agro-dealers in business management", "establish livestock 
breeding and multiplication centres", "support the production of feeds and chemicals" (Goz, 2013: 
52-56). The focus on the industrialisation of agriculture is also mirrored in the strategies advanced 
for infrastructure development. The Zim Asset (GoZ, 2013: 56) aims to increase mechanised 
agriculture and improve storage facilities. The approach towards environmental management is also 
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 Along with the Food Security and Nutrition cluster, the other clusters identified in the Zim Asset are: Social Services 
and Poverty Reduction, Value Addition and Beneficiation, and Infrastructure and Utilities (GoZ, 2013). 
98
 See the discussion thereof in Appendix D. 
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tinged with neoliberalism as this strategy entails "improved natural resources management" 
arguably for the generation of income in the form of FDI (GoZ, 2013: 57). However the focus on 
climate change and ecosystem preservation reflects a more progressive ideology.  
A National Nutrition Strategy
99
 (Goz, 2014) was launched in 2014 in which the Food and Nutrition 
Policy's radical focus on the right to food is reflected. 
4.4.3.3. Current actualities: orientation and model  
It has been widely recognised that the socio-economic difficulties of Zimbabwe can be traced back 
to the decisions made by government – especially since 1997 (Robertson, 2012: 83; Moyo, 2012: 
131; Ndulovu-Gatsheni, 2014: 9). One study even concludes that "it is just rhetoric by the 
government to say that Zim Asset is going to grow the economy" since there is no political will to 
support the programme (Zvavahera & Chigora, 2015: 68). However, in the absence of sufficient 
follow-through by government on its agricultural policies, other stakeholders' actions have shaped 
the food model of the country. 
Amidst reduced government spending, the private sector has become more actively involved in 
Zimbabwean agriculture. Through agreements between agribusinesses and smallholder farmers, 
contract farming has gained prominence within the country. Contract farming involves that process 
or marketing firms provide support for smallholder farmers by providing agricultural inputs, 
financial assistance or by guaranteeing markets for their products (Duma, 2007: 19). This assurance 
creates an incentive for smallholder farmers to increase production. 
The increased presence of the private sector is also apparent in their agro-investments in land. 
Matondi (2011: 135) notes that the private sector has "partnered with the state to benefit 
economically from land that ideally would have been intended for public resettlement". Although 
foreign land investment in the country is not a new phenomenon, the radical land reform's nature of 
forced land takeovers should have deterred investment by agribusinesses. However, in the absence 
of well-developed property rights, large-scale land deals are lucrative for the government since it 
can sell off land as it pleases. Zimbabwean officials have also welcomed and even encouraged 
commercial investments since it offers the prospect to develop the underutilised agriculture sector, 
to increase national food supply, and to create employment (Matondi, 2011: 148).  
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 As mentioned before, an analysis of nutrition security and its subsequent policies is beyond the scope of this 
discussion due to the restrictive level of analysis that does not allow for an investigation on the status of individuals' 
food security. 
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Thondhlana (2014: 2) discusses the how agro-investments for biofuel development in particular has 
been pitched as a scheme that will "foster rural development and enable energy sufficiency and 
security". However, by analysis the methods of the Chisumbanje bio-ethanol plant
100
, Thondhlana 
(2014: 8) concludes that rural development has in fact been compromised since the project was 
launched. The project was characterised by the forced removal of rural households and the 
disruption of communal farming as food and cash crops that were almost ready for harvesting were 
ploughed down. Since, there has been a delay by farmers to invest in food production due to 
uncertainty over the private investors' actions.  
Thus, despite the potential of agro-investments in land to unlock Zimbabwe's agricultural potential, 
current agro-investments are "not informed by local needs and interests which creates a situation 
whereby a few elites seem to benefit" from the deals at the expense local people's land rights 
(Matondi, 2011: 135). The overall winners are the political elite and private investors, whilst the 
local communities are deprived from land and food availability.  
Agro-investments in lands are entirely inconsistent with the model of radical land reform and right 
to food discourse advanced by government with the fast-track land reform policy. A growing body 
of literature has come to praise the fast-track land reform policy as the only example of radical land 
redistribution since the end of the Cold War (Moyo and Chambati, 2012: 1). Despite the adverse 
effects on the Zimbabwean economy, fast-track land reform has been elevated as "a gradual process 
of black emancipation" (Duma, 2007: 69), that dismantled "white-owned farms and agribusiness 
land" (Jacobs, 2013: 4) in the true spirit of radical reform. It has also been argued that Zimbabwean 
land reform has been viewed out of context due to the negative Western media attention it received 
(Hendricks, 2013: 27), and that "getting to grips with the realities on the ground is essential" to 
challenge the myths that agricultural production collapsed and that food insecurity is rife (Scoones, 
Marongwe, Mavedzenge, Murimbarimba, Mahenehene & Sukume, 2010; see also Death, 2011: 33). 
It is argued that agrarian reform has resulted in a livelihood transition with the "the emergence of a 
significant and successful ‘middle farmer’ group, reliant on ‘accumulation from below’" (Scoones 
et al., 2012: 35). 
However, despite the promising food sovereignty platform created by the Zimbabwe's reformed 
agrarian structure, the greater economic model did not break from the neoliberal framework, which 
causes contradictions in the country's approach to food security. 
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 The project started in 2009 and claims to be the largest of its kind in Africa (Thondhlana, 2014: 8). 
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4.5. Conclusion 
This chapter presented the food security approaches of Southern Africa as depicted through the 
representative cases of South Africa, Malawi, and Zimbabwe. The discussion highlighted the 
importance of the socio-economic evolution of food security in the region as it developed from the 
colonial era to the post-independence era, and the context-specific causes of Southern African food 
insecurity. It was also shown how diverse national contexts gave rise to specific challenges in each 
of the countries discussed, and how these challenges in turn shaped the food security framework in 
each country. The way in which the official approaches to food security deviates from the actual 
experiences was also emphasised by providing an overview of the emergent food security 
orientation and model in each country.  
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Chapter Five: Key findings and concluding remarks 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter concludes the discussion on the politics of food in Southern Africa. First, Southern 
Africa's prevailing food ideology is discussed, thereby reflecting on the research question of the 
study. Second, other key findings of the study are presented. This section include commentary on 
the food regime/food movements framework's (Holt-Giménez & Shattuck, 2011)
101
 applicability to 
the Southern African case, and considerations for future research. The latter section emphasises the 
transformative power of ideas with specific reference to critical theory, and advances the expansion 
of transdisciplinary research by highlighting its uses for complex subjects such as food security. The 
final section of the chapter provides concluding remarks on the overall discussion by summarising 
the study's most important themes. 
5.2. Reflecting on the research question: Southern Africa's prevailing food ideology 
As the previous chapter has shown, Southern Africa's approach to food security is sub-regionally 
nuanced by national conditions and policies. Despite facing similar food security challenges
102
, 
South Africa, Malawi, and Zimbabwe's food ideologies are rooted in different economic and 
political narratives.  
Through employing food regime analysis, it was highlighted how the region's socio-economic 
evolution of food insecurity is embedded in the development of the global food system. During the 
first food regime of British expansionism, Southern African countries – which were for the most 
part food secure at the time – were subjugated to the implementation of monocrops which 
subsequently transformed these countries to export economies. The second food regime coincided 
with decolonisation in Southern Africa. The US surplus-model became engrained in the region; 
large-scale industrialisation of agriculture was promoted. This was disruptive to the local food 
system since it further entrenched Southern Africa's dependence on monocrop systems. This decline 
in diversification had a lasting impact on the region's food system. Production shifted from the 
cultivation of food crops to that of cash crops, which compromised Southern Africa's ability to feed 
its citizens. Through monocrop production, the region's dietary patterns were also altered as noted 
in the case of Malawi where there's a cultural bias against substituting maize. Similarly, 
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 The main theoretical framework of this study – as discussed in section 3.3. 
102
 As discussed in section 4.3: economic inheritance and SAPs, poverty (lack of entitlements), adverse climate, 
mismanagement and poor governance, and HIV/AIDS. 
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Zimbabweans are also overly-reliant on maize for both consumption and export income. During the 
third food regime, liberalisation worsened Southern Africa's food security since the ideals of free 
trade were advanced on an uneven playing field which resulted in Southern African agricultural 
exports being less competitive. Thus, throughout the development of the global food regime, 
Southern Africa's food system was restructured in order to serve hegemonic interests, and without 
consideration for the local context's needs.  
Because Southern Africa's food systems and natural resources "have been relentlessly appropriated 
by foreign capital" since colonial times (Holt-Giménez et al., 2010: 132), there are parallels to be 
drawn between the region's historical movement for independence and its current struggles to 
govern their own food system. Consequently this results in an "annoying combination of 
progressive and neo-liberal objectives" (Bond, 2005: 21) since the region's empowerment discourse 
promotes the right to food without acknowledging its embeddedness in and dependence on the 
global food regime. As such, the official approach to food security largely reflects an unquestioning 
endorsement of the neoliberal framework as illustrated through production-orientated policies. 
This is most apparent in South Africa's institutional framework. Unlike, the other two countries 
studied, South Africa does produce enough food to feed its citizens. Yet, the food model advanced 
in the country primarily focuses on improving and increasing production to alleviate food 
insecurity. This is clearly reflected through the fact that the institutional responsibility for food 
security rests with Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, and the Department of Trade 
and Industry – as opposed to a specific food and nutrition security department. Consequently, 
although the IFSS
103
 follows a development orientation, the food security discourse is overshadowed 
by that of food enterprise; overproduction, public-private partnerships and market integration are 
promoted as strategies to address chronic hunger in the country. When also taking into account the 
corporate presence in South Africa, it is clear that the country's food ideology is undeniably 
neoliberal. 
It should be noted, that as a regional hegemon, South Africa had a strong presence in shaping the 
SADC's agenda. South Africa remains an economic giant in Southern and consequently it plays a 
key role in influencing the organisation's approach to food security
104
. Thus, even in Malawi the 
neoliberal food ideology is promoted by the country’s adherence to the SADC food security 
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 The Integrated Food Security Strategy - as discussed in section 4.4.1.2 
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 SADC's institutional food security strategy is discussed in Appendix D. 
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framework even though Malawi has a fundamentally different agricultural profile than South 
Africa
105
. By following the SADC's advice for agricultural growth in the region
106
, Malawi 
committed to allocate 10% of its budget to agriculture. However, the ways in which the budget is 
allocated does not subscribe to the neoliberal ideology of food. Instead, through the FSAP
107
, 
Malawi adopts an entitlement orientation with its strong focus on community development and 
agricultural training. As discussed above, this increased support to smallholder farmers have been 
interpreted differently by different actors. Some see it as Malawi embracing the New Green 
Revolution (thus essentially subscribing to the neoliberal food ideology), whereas others view it as 
clear sign that Malawi promotes food sovereignty (thus follows a radical approach to food security). 
The discussion on the current actualities of Malawi also highlighted that this tension between top-
down and bottom-up food security approaches can be ascribed to official discourses masking the 
"less altruistic political or commercial agendas" (Holt-Giménez et al., 2010: 133) of the ruling elite. 
This is reflected by agricultural rent-seeking and Malawi neopatrimonial system, as well as the dual 
system of estate famers and smallholder farmers, where the latter's access to land is undermined by 
the former's ownership.  
Similarly, access to land is a major food security issue in Zimbabwe – apparent in the aftermath of 
the country's notorious fast-track land reform programme. As discussed above, Zimbabwe's radical 
land redistribution policy has been elevated as a clear sign of the country's commitment to the 
human right to food sovereignty but true agrarian reform and rural development have been 
compromised by mismanagement and poor governance. The institutional approach to food security 
is largely rhetorical since policies are not sufficiently developed or backed by political will. 
Consequently neoliberal interests have come to shape the Zimbabwean model as reflected by the 
increased presence of the private sector in agriculture through contract-farming, land deals, and 
biofuel production. As highlighted above, Zimbabwean officials have welcomed these commercial 
investments, especially since they – through corruption – directly benefit from aligning with this 
corporate orientation.  
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 As discussed in the previous chapter, agriculture contributes 30% to Malawi's GDP – compared to 3% in South 
Africa (The World Bank, 2015a). Furthermore, with the absence of a manufacturing sector, the majority of Malawians 
are employed in agriculture; specifically the cultivation of maize and tobacco. This is also in contrast with the Southern 
African case which has a strong manufacturing sector, and has a diversified agricultural sector.   
106
 As rooted in the CAADP - see Appendix D. 
107
 The Food Security Action Plan (FSAP) is Malawi's institutional food security strategy – as discussed in section 
4.4.2.2.  
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Thus, despite the development orientation and the entitlement one being advanced by the South 
African, and Malawian and Zimbabwean governments respectively, Southern Africa's overall food 
ideology subscribes to that of neoliberalism. The state, for a variety of reasons, some less clear, has 
continued to support the liberalisation of agriculture. However, the espoused goal of attracting 
foreign investment is in on-going tension with food sovereignty, redistribution, and land reform 
goals. It can thus be concluded that, despite the 2007-2008 being a clear signal of the failure of the 
corporate food system, the hegemony of neoliberalism is still intact to the extent that it determines 
Southern Africa's approach to food security without consideration for the context-specific needs of 
region. 
5.3. Other key findings 
5.3.1. Applicability of the food regime/food movements framework to the case study 
To the extent that shifting politics and regional dynamics play a role in Southern Africa, the three 
countries studied above offer great insights into both the food security challenges in the region, and 
more importantly, to how the state and society, the private sector, and international relations all play 
a role in the countries' agricultural system. 
As anticipated in the section on the limitations and scope of the study
108
, the food regime/food 
movements framework
109
 has proved to be too simplistic, especially for the Southern African 
context. The different ideologies (neoliberal, reformist, progressive, and radical), although well-
developed within the framework
110
, is too restrictive to properly account for the variability of 
Southern Africa's food ideology. As explained above, since independence the region's interpretation 
of food security has changed in accordance with the social and political developments. 
Consequently countries' official approach to food security is marked with often-contradictory 
policies as it seeks to mitigate past injustices but also attempts to integrate its economy in the global 
economy. Furthermore, policies are not well-developed or properly implemented, and subsequently 
these countries’ guiding documents largely belies their actual food orientation and model. 
However, of special note is the consideration that the food regime/food movements framework is 
lacking in its applicability to the Southern African case since the region has a dissimilar political 
culture to other regions. Southern Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa as on whole, is characterised by a 
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distinct form of democracy where the de facto system of rule differs from the de jure state structures 
and practises. As such, Southern African harbours warped democracies where political authority, in 
the absence of a strong civil society, largely goes unchallenged. A key component of the food 
regime/food movements framework is the onus that is placed on civil society to challenge the 
dominant food regime – in accordance with the Polanyian thesis of the double movement of 
liberalisation and reform
111
. However, in Southern Africa, the political culture inhibits civil society 
from questioning political authority. As explained above, political authority in itself is often upheld 
by patronage and corruption. Consequently approaches to food security, just like the economic 
model, are designed to serve the interests of the elite – largely at the expense of and the detriment to 
the most vulnerable members in society. In this light, it can be argued that the only way to 
transform Southern African food systems to be more equitable, would pre-necessitate the 
development of healthy democracies in the region, since informed public debate and institutional 
transparency and accountability are foundational requirements for mobilising civil society. 
5.3.2. Considerations for future research 
In each of the countries studied above – arguably the dominant agricultural countries in the region – 
history and the role of the state intersect to reflect different international relations, different socio-
economic logics, and ultimately nuanced food systems. Thus, whilst often presented as a single 
entity, Southern Africa is in fact very diverse. As such, it can be argued that the model advanced by 
the New Green Revolution
112
 is not suited for transforming the food system; the diverse regional 
context implies that "no single magic 'technological bullet' is available for radically improving 
[Southern] African agriculture" (InterAcademy Council, 2004: 9).  
As shown through the discussion on the causes of food insecurity in Southern Africa
113
, food 
insecurity is not a production challenge to be overcome, but rather a socio-economic condition to be 
regulated and managed: the factors that impede food security can largely be mitigated through apt 
governance. Drimie and Mini (2003: 20) also assert that increased food production alone will not 
lift Southern Africa out of poverty, and that to prescribe this model is to equate food security with 
food production. As highlighted throughout the discussion and illustrated through the example of 
Southern Africa, food security goes beyond the mere availability of food. For example, South 
Africa produces enough food to feed its citizens, yet food insecurity is persistent due to citizens' 
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 See section 2.3. 
112 Essentially, this entails boosting development through the industrialisation of agriculture – see section 
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 See section 4.3. 
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lack of entitlements; due to widespread unemployment they do not earn an income with which they 
can access food. Thus reports of low levels of food insecurity in South Africa, is only reflective of 
the national condition and as such does not account for household food insecurity. As discussed 
above, households adopt coping strategies
114
 to alleviate chronic hunger, and since it is 
subsequently perceived that household food security is "under control", the causes thereof are not 
sufficiently addressed. Furthermore, with South Africa's official approach to food security geared at 
developing rural livelihoods, the issue of urban food insecurity is not addressed by government 
either. Marias (2011: 217) notes that "it is generally assumed that a [food security programme] that 
promotes and supports smallholder production is a potent anti-poverty strategy", when in fact this 
strategy does not acknowledge urban food insecurity, which in a rapidly urbanising context is 
becoming a problem of great magnitude. 
5.2.3.1. The transformative power of ideas 
At this point, the power of ideas cannot be emphasised enough: how we define the problem of food 
security make some solutions seem obvious whilst other solutions go unnoticed. In assessing food 
security at a national level, or by framing it as a primarily rural challenge, the scope of possible 
solutions is severely restricted. In order to adequately address food security, the rationale for policy 
reform at regional and national levels should be driven and informed by the needs of those that are 
marginalised within the specific system. In this regard, the discussion again necessitates a reference 
to the distinction made by Cox between problem-solving theory and critical theory
115
. When 
attempting to construct solutions to food security, it is essential to scrutinise the system as a whole; 
that is to employ critical theory. This is required because problem-solving theory simply "takes the 
world as it finds it, with its prevailing social and power relationships and institutions to which they 
are organised, as the given framework for action" (Cox, 1981: 128-129), thereby limiting the range 
of solutions. In contrast, critical theory can be described as utopian since it offers a holistic 
perspective on the shortcomings of the system in order to transcend the current system and establish 
a more equitable and sustainable order. With regards to food security, Murisa (2013: 195) asserts 
that "the resolution of the crisis cannot be limited to discrete in-country agrarian reforms: it requires 
a comprehensive overhaul of global agricultural institutions, policies and programmes" – thus a 
fundamental change in the structure of the food regime.  
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By employing critical theory, perspectives on how to achieve food security can be altered by, for 
example, adopting a constructivist approach
116
 to food security. As such, for instance, the concept 
of "development" can be scrutinised with regards to how it perpetuates the idea that Southern Africa 
is in need of development as defined by the Western conceptualisation of industrialisation, 
macroeconomic stability, and democracy. A critical approach to food security allows for rethinking 
perspectives on "development" – to perhaps account for the development of Southern Africa's 
indigenous agricultural knowledge
117
. Similarly, a better understanding of food security can be 
achieved by reframing food security; for example: as a health issue (given that chronic hunger 
compromises the proper functioning of the human body) or as a legal issue (given the state's 
obligation to be held accountable for its citizens' right to food).  
5.2.3.2. Call for transdisciplinary research 
Relatedly, when taking into account that food is where many socio-economic and environmental 
issues converge, one cannot not emphasise the importance of transdisciplinary research for 
addressing food security. It is of importance to distinguish "transdisciplinary" from 
"interdisciplinary" research; whereas the latter constitutes research between different academic 
disciplines, the former is more encompassing since it entails cross-departmental research whilst also 
acknowledging knowledge beyond the sphere of academia. Thus, transdisciplinary approaches 
recognise that "not only […] scientific knowledge [is] relevant for the resolution of persistent 
societal problems [….] but that social knowledge or experiential knowledge is also important" 
(Drimie & McLachlan, 2013: 219). As such, transdisciplinary research is a powerful tool that can be 
used to engage civil society in order to produce socially relevant as well as new scientific 
knowledge and insight. When accounting for the fact that civil society is often demobilised by 
oppressive political systems, as illustrated through the case of Southern Africa, transdisciplinary 
research should be viewed as especially important in empowering civil society to contribute to 
redefining the concept of food security in order to promote to a more equitable and sustainable food 
system. The usefulness of a transdisciplinary approach is apparent when the complex nature of food 
security is taken into account; food security consists of a weave of inter-linkages between its 
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 Constructivism seeks to “denaturalise the social world” (Hopf, 1998: 179) by showing that it is the product of 
“human invention that is based on a particular, yet arbitrary set of norms” (du Plessis, 2013: 1). As such, constructivism 
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thinking within these boundaries. 
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economic, social, and environmental aspects. Complex systems operate in a "non-linear and 
unpredictable manner and can therefore affect a diverse range of stakeholders and interest groups in 
different ways" (TSAMA Hub, 2013). The diagram below provides an overview of possible 
research topics within food security literature
118
; illustrating that food security, albeit comprised of 
different entities, is connected in a social-ecological system.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This range of topics relevant to food security highlights that social sciences, economic and 
management sciences, agricultural and natural sciences, and health sciences all have a role to play 
in constructing food security solutions. However, as Bernard (2015: 223) aptly points out, "the 
scientific community has created many boundaries
119
 that work against the effective implementation 
of transdisciplinary approaches" to the extent that "the economic theories that have been identified 
as perpetuating social and environmental problems are frequently being taught at the same tertiary 
institutions which are training social scientists to criticise them". Thus, addressing food security not 
only necessitates a reframing of its conceptualisation, but also rethinking the dominant research 
paradigm that restricts transdisciplinary design and methods. 
                                                        
118 As discovered through this explorative study. 
119
 Bernard (2015: 223) explains that these include boundaries "between disciplines, institutions, sectors, cultures, as 
well as between knowledge-producers (e.g. researchers) and knowledge users (e.g. policy-makers)".  
Figure 3. Possible research topics within the complex field of food security 
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5.4. Conclusion 
This study explored the politics of food in Southern Africa by employing the food regime/food 
movements framework of Holt-Giménez and Shattuck (2011). Food regime analysis was explained 
by tracing the historical development of the food system as it manifested in three food regimes: the 
settler-colonial regime, the surplus regime, and the corporate food regime. The concept of 
hegemony was emphasised in explaining how each of these regimes were upheld by Britain, the 
United States, and neoliberalism, respectively. It was explained how the transition from one regime 
to the next occurred due to a loss of the hegemon's dominance; ultimately the corporate food regime 
came to be due to the rise of neoliberalism which subsequently was characterised by the loss of 
nation states' power in the global political economy. However, the discussion emphasised, that – 
following the 2007-2008 food crisis – neoliberalism became viewed in an increasingly negative 
light. It was explained how the causes of the food crisis, which left 1.02 billion individuals 
undernourished (FAO, 2009), are rooted within neoliberalism, and as such, are embedded in the 
design and workings of the corporate food regime.  
Amidst what has been referred to as a crisis of neoliberalism, renewed focus was placed on food 
politics. The food regime/food movements framework identifies four ideologies around food: 
neoliberal, reformist, progressive, and radical. Each of these ideologies was discussed with 
reference to the core components of their make-up, namely, their discourse and main institutions, 
orientation and model, and guiding documents. It was emphasised that there is an ideological split 
between neoliberal and reformist food politics and progressive and radical food politics. Whereas 
the former fundamentally seeks to maintain the corporate food regime, the latter is rooted in the 
belief that a complete overhaul of the corporate food regime should occur in order to establish a 
system that is equitable and sustainable. This ideological divergence is attributed to the double 
movement of capitalism, which is, alternating periods of liberalisation and reform in the system. 
The role of civil society in bringing about this reform was also addressed. 
It was found, that in the absence of a strong civil society, Southern Africa’s approaches to food 
closely resembles the neoliberal model. Although national frameworks targeted at food security, 
reflect reformist, progressive, and even radical sentiments, the actual model of food politics mirrors 
that of the corporate the corporate food regime. It was shown that, throughout the evolution of the 
global food regime, Southern Africans’ food security had been compromised by the respective 
hegemonic orders. Consequently, the socio-economic evolution of food insecurity in the region can 
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largely be attributed to the lasting impact of Southern Africa’s continued marginalised position 
within the global food regime. It was also explained that food insecurity in Southern Africa is 
exacerbated by widespread poverty, adverse climate, mismanagement and poor governance, and 
HIV/AIDS. 
Throughout the discussion, it was also emphasised that, although Southern Africa, is often 
presented as a single entity, the cases of South Africa, Malawi, and Zimbabwe illustrates that 
national politics has a major impact on food availability, access, and stability. As such, the food 
system lens allowed insight into how history, the role of the state, and international relations 
intersect to produce diverse outcomes. Relatedly, Chang (2009: 512) notes that such an historical 
analysis “frees our policy imagination by showing us the range of policies and institutions” are 
“much wider than any particular ideological model”. Consequently in order to address food security 
in Southern Africa, the rigid food regime/food movements framework should not serve as a 
guideline for possible food models. Instead, by accounting for the complexity of food security, and 
by engaging civil society to participate in constructing context-specific solutions, transdisciplinary 
research should guide the exploration of alternative food security models that are both equitable and 
sustainable.  
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Appendix A: Conceptualisation of food security  
A.1. Extension of the food security concept                 
Along with the evolution of the definition of food security to recognise the different dimensions 
thereof, the concept was further developed to account for different levels and forms of food 
security. An outline of the forms and the levels of food security are discussed below by drawing on 
Gibson's The Use of Conceptual Frameworks in Understanding Food Security (2011) that first 
contextualises the dimensions of food security. 
A.1.1. The dimensions of food security 
As noted in the section on the conceptualisation of food security
120
, food security comprises of 
availability, access, utilisation, and stability. Gibson (2011) presents a comprehensive model that 
illustrates the various determinants of these food security dimensions. The Gibson Framework of 
food security is reproduced on the following page. The framework gives a detailed account of many 
variables to provide a deeper and more holistic sense of understanding of the food security concept 
(Gibson, 2012: 529). It shows that availability is determined by production and demand. Access to 
food is shown to be dependent on wealth/poverty, natural resources, social capital, human capital, 
and physical elements. The model restates that utilisation corresponds to the health and nutritional 
portfolio of individuals, and that the stability of food security is shaped at the contextual level. 
The model is also useful since it contextualises the different dimensions' status as products of the 
interplay between governance, sustainability, and the environment and natural resources. Within 
each of these spheres different information domains are identified in order to aid a better assessment 
of food security. This depiction is enlightening since it schematically portrays the complexities of 
attaining food security. By highlighting that governance, sustainability, and the environment and 
natural resources are of equal importance, the model infers the usefulness of adopting a wider 
perspective to address food security. In food security literature recent calls for interdisciplinary 
research (Allen, 2013: 13; Havnevik, 2011: 35) also support this notion that a larger level of 
analysis in required in order to analyse the functioning of the system and the forces behind it
121
. 
 
 
                                                        
120
 See section 1.2. 
121
 See "The call for transdisciplinary research – section 5.2.3.2.  
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A.1.2. The levels of food security 
It is also crucial to draw a distinction between different levels of food security since the approach to 
analyse and consequently address food security at those levels will not necessarily be similar. A 
distinction can be made between the following levels: individual, household, national/regional, and 
context/underlying situations
122
. 
Food availability is assessed at the national/regional level since production and trade is typically 
coordinated at this level. The context level is also of importance for food availability since 
demographic, economic, environmental, political and social conditions affect the status of food 
availability. Food access is associated with both the household and national/regional level. The 
factors of care and feeding practices, household characteristics, and health and sanitation are at play 
at the household level (Gibson, 2011: 10). Policies implemented at a national/regional level can also 
affect food access. Food utilisation refers to individuals' absorption of nutrients which is determined 
by food safety, the food's nutritional value, and individuals' health status. It follows intuitively that 
the utilisation dimension is assessed purely at the individual level. The stability dimension relates to 
the national/regional and context levels since it is affected by war/conflict, human rights and 
institutional infrastructure, political and financial stability, and shocks/natural disasters (Gibson, 
2011: 11). By adding the time dimension it is recognised that food security conditions should not be 
regarded as fixed. The stability dimension of food security is primarily associated with the context 
level and national/regional level since stability at these levels facilitates stability at the other levels. 
In order to gauge and respond to the vulnerabilities within the dimensions of availability, access, 
and utilisation it is necessary that food security is stable. However, as noted before, the state of food 
security is not permanent.  
A.1.3. The forms of food security 
The changeable nature of food security calls for identifying different forms of food security based 
on the nature of the specific case. This distinction separates cases of endemic or structural insecurity 
from those that are more transient as a result of unexpected shocks that are often associated with the 
                                                        
122
 It is important to note that individual food security is reliant on household food security, which in turn is 
underpinned by national/regional food security. Contextual factors form the basis that determines whether 
nations/regions are food secure. However, due to an unequal distribution of wealth and resources, individuals and 
households might be food insecure even though food security at the national level is intact and vice versa. Nevertheless, 
there is a significant interplay between the different levels of food security. Thus achieving individual and household 
food security when the national/regional conditions are not favourable proves to be difficult.  
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sudden onset of emergencies. The different forms of food insecurity as acknowledged by the FAO 
(2000: 10) are chronic (continuous); temporal (temporary or transitory); and cyclic (seasonal).  
Chronic food insecurity refers to instances where the insecurity is endemic or structural in nature 
and occurs when people are unable to meet their food requirements over an extended period of time. 
These situations are usually associated with poverty and low income and consequently chronic food 
insecurity can be foreseen or predicted. Temporal food insecurity on the other hand is not 
predictable since this form of food insecurity is caused by unforeseen shocks to the food system. 
Conflict, natural disasters, floods and droughts, production shortfalls, economic collapse, as well as 
prices changes can all be considered as factors that contribute to add pressure on the access and the 
availability of food requirements. Cyclic food insecurity can be regarded to sit between or alongside 
the other two forms since cyclic food security is both chronic and predictable. This is because cyclic 
food insecurity is associated with seasonal fluctuations and is thus inherent to existing patterns of 
endemic hunger.    
Thus a situation of food security only exists when there is sufficient protection against all forms of 
food insecurity (chronic, temporal, cyclic) via all dimensions (availability, access, utilisation, 
stability) and at each level thereof (spanning from the individual to the contextual level).  
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Appendix B: Operationalisation of food security: FAO 
indicators per dimension of food security 
Availability 
Average dietary energy supply adequacy (%) (3-year average) 
Average value of food production (constant I$ per person) (3-year average) 
Share of dietary energy supply derived from cereals, roots and tubers (%) (3-year average) 
Average protein supply (g/capita/day) (3-year average) 
Average supply of protein of animal origin (g/capita/day) (3-year average) 
Access 
Percentage of paved roads over total roads (%) 
Road density (per 100 square km of land area) 
Rail-lines density (per 100 square km of land area) 
Domestic food price index (index) 
Gross domestic product per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international $) 
Prevalence of undernourishment (%) (3-year average) 
Share of food expenditure of the poor (%) 
Depth of the food deficit (kcal/capita/day) (3-year average) 
Prevalence of food inadequacy (%) (3-year average) 
Stability 
Cereal import dependency ratio (%) (3-year average) 
Percentage of arable land equipped for irrigation (%) (3-year average) 
Value of food imports over total merchandise exports (%) (3-year average) 
Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (index) 
Domestic food price volatility (index) 
Per capita food production variability (I$ per person constant 2004-06) 
Per capita food supply variability (kcal/capita/day) 
Utilization 
Access to improved water sources (%) 
Access to improved sanitation facilities (%) 
Percentage of children under 5 years of age affected by wasting (%) 
Percentage of children under 5 years of age who are stunted (%) 
Percentage of children under 5 years of age who are underweight (%) 
Percentage of adults who are underweight (%) 
Prevalence of anaemia among children under 5 years of age (%) 
Prevalence of anemia among pregnant women (%) 
Prevalence of vitamin A deficiency in the population (%) 
Prevalence of iodine deficiency (%) 
Source: FAO (2015) 
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Appendix C: Colonisation in African  
 
The contesting colonial powers each had a distinct strategic vision on how to expand its empire in 
Africa. Britain envisioned an empire that spans from "Cape to Cairo". Portugal harboured the notion 
of a "Rose Coloured Map" that would link "Mozambique to Angola through the Zambezi basin" 
(Birmingham, 1999: 114). Germany entertained the idea of "Mittelafrika" as "a central African 
German empire stretching from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean" (Louis, 1967: 35 as cited in 
Zajontz, 2013: 55). However, Britain became the imperial power in almost all Southern African 
countries, which left little room for other countries to fulfil their strategic visions. 
 
 
  Source: Berglee (2012: 481) 
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Appendix D: The SADC's institutional framework for food 
security 
C.1. The formation of SADC 
The roots of the SADC can be traced back to the Southern African Development Coordination 
Conference (SADCC) formed in April 1980. SADCC, which comprised of Angola, Botswana, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, was formed with the 
main objective to advance national political liberation in Southern Africa by reducing the region's 
dependence, particularly, but not only, on apartheid South Africa (SADC, 2012b). This objective 
was targeted through the "effective coordination and utilisation of the specific characteristics and 
strengths of each country and its resources" (SADC, 2012b) aimed at promoting basic development 
and regional integration.  
However, SADCC's had limited success in promoting development that was independent from 
South Africa in the region. Niemann (2000: 11) explains that during colonial times "the entire 
region had been constructed around South Africa with the peripheral states tightly integrated into 
the core". As the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa neared an end, the SADC Treaty was 
signed to establish SADC as the successor to the SADCC. The Treaty was signed in August 1992 
by the SADCC founder members as well as Namibia, and it sets out to promote economic 
integration in Southern Africa. SADC (2012b) states that its main objectives are: "to achieve 
development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, [and] enhance the standard and quality of life 
of the peoples of Southern Africa". These objectives are pursued through promoting regional 
integration, democratic principles, and equitable and sustainable development. Furthermore, SADC 
supports the sovereignty of its member states and stands for upholding human rights and the rule of 
law, and the peaceful settlement of disputes.  
Although SADCC and SADC share a commitment to development integration in Southern Africa, 
the approach followed by SADC differed starkly from that of its predecessor. Söderbaum (2004: 70) 
notes that this involved a "pragmatic shift from introverted towards more open and market-
orientated regionalism". In contrast to SADC's laissez-faire approach to regional integration, 
SADCC "opted for a functionalist process of project cooperation and development coordination" 
with an approach to trade that is not based on "orthodox trade liberation strategies" (Zajontz, 2013: 
60). SADCC rejected the ideal of market integration since it upheld that regional development 
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should precede such integration. This opposes the SADC approach that views market integration as 
a precursor for regional development. As such SADC subscribes to the neoliberal notion that greater 
market integration would bring about redistribution, poverty alleviation, and development through 
growth. Subsequently SADC has pushed its members "to meet certain macroeconomic benchmarks 
such as low inflation, fiscal deficit and current account of the balance of payments, in order to be 
competitive on the regional and global markets" (Godsäter, 2011: 44).  
Gibb (2009: 712-713) explains that the SADC's market integration approach reflects the influence 
of Western donors that provide the majority of the organisation's funds. Consequently the SADC 
agenda reflects the neoliberal values and practices that have become hegemonic in most global 
institutions (Taylor, 2011: 1240; Godsäter, 2011: 13) instead of allowing the distinct Southern 
African to guide its agenda. SADC's market integration approach does not take into account the 
economic realities of Southern Africa
123
 which is cumbersome since the organisation is influential 
in shaping its members' approach to food security. 
C.2. SADC's institutional food security framework  
Overall SADC's approach to food security is that it is to be attainted through increased regional 
integration, especially in agricultural trade. This is captured in their Food and Nutrition Security 
Strategy (FNSS) that adopts a multi-sectoral perspective in an aim to holistically address food and 
nutrition security. The goal of the FNSS is "to significantly reduce food and nutrition insecurity in 
the Region by 2025" (SADC, 2014: 1). The strategy has its roots in several other strategy 
documents that subsequently influence the approach thereof
124
.  
C.2.1. The Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme 
Setting the tone at a continental level is the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development 
Programme (CAADP) of the African Union's (AU) New Partnership for Africa's Development 
(NEPAD). The CAADP was released in 2003 and is underpinned by the core belief that agriculture 
has a key role to play in the economic growth of African countries. The programme identifies four 
pillars for investment: (a) extending the area under sustainable land management and reliable water 
                                                        
123
 First, Southern African economies, with the exception of South Africa, are "highly dependent on primary production 
and lack tradable manufactured goods and services" (Zajontz, 2013: 63). Second, Southern Africa is not yet successfully 
integrated into the world economy due to "disadvantageous terms of trade between African economies and the 
industrialised North" (Gibb, 2009: 712). Third, since colonists only focused on developing infrastructure in order to 
support exports from Southern Africa, the region face "severe structural inadequacies in transport, services, banking, 
labour skills and competitiveness" (Gibb, 2009: 713).   
124
 The FNSS states that it specifically implements "the food and nutrition aspects of the SADC Regional Agricultural 
Policy" (SADC, 2014: 2) – described below. 
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control systems; (b) improving rural infrastructure and trade-related capacities for market access; 
(c) increasing food supply and reducing hunger by increasing small farmer productivity levels, use 
of irrigation, and support services and complementing production-related investments with targeted 
safety nets; and (d) agricultural research, technology dissemination and adoption (NEPAD, 2003). 
African countries are asked to incorporate these objectives in their development policies; by signing 
the CAADP compact
125
, countries indicated their commitment to invest in agriculture
126
. 
Bond (2005: 21) notes that NEPAD has "an annoying combination of progressive and neo-liberal 
objectives". On the one hand, NEPAD's progressive sentiments are illustrated by its focus on 
sustainability, small-holder farming, increased safety nets, and the priority placed on research. The 
CAADP's focus on "fostering equitable distribution of wealth for rural populations as well as 
environmentally sound agricultural production and management of natural resources" (Mkandawire, 
Nyantakyi-Frimpong, Armah & Akru, 2014: 10) encapsulates this progressive agenda. On the other 
hand, NEPAD's unquestioning endorsement of the neoliberal framework is evident in its focus on 
increased production, trade, and technology, which subscribes to the New Green Revolution 
model
127
. As explained above, this arguably assigns a subordinate role to African economies in the 
food system.  
C.2.2. The Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan 
By coordinating its agricultural development strategies with that of the CAADP, the SADC also 
follows a production-orientated approach to its food security agenda. The Regional Indicative 
Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) drafted in 2003 served as a blueprint for SADC's emergent 
food security strategy. The RISDP's is meant to promote regional integration through sectoral 
cooperation and integration in four intervention areas of which "sustainable food security" is one
128
. 
With regards to food security, the RISDP has an undoubtedly neoliberal rhetoric as indicated by 
these selections in its strategy: "intensification of agricultural production systems"; "adoption of 
technologies"; "encouraging the involvement of commercial or large-scale farmers in food crop 
                                                        
125
 The Southern African countries that have yet to sign the Compact are South Africa, Namibia, and Botswana 
(NEPAD, 2014). 
126
 Heads of state "pledged to allocate 10% of their national budget to agriculture by 2008", and to aim to achieve an 
agricultural growth target of 6% by 2015 (NEPAD, 2003). 
127
 Akokpari (2008: 43) analyses whether NEPAD's policy framework is suited for the African context, and notes that it 
is patterned along "textbook economics are not written for economies in decline such as those in Africa, which defy 
basic neo-classical logic". 
128 The other intervention areas are: trade/economic liberalisation and development; infrastructure support for regional 
integration and poverty eradication; human and social development; and sustainable food security (SADC, 2003). 
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production"; "removing trade barriers"; "encouraging private investments in agriculture" (SADP, 
2003: 71). However, similar to the CAADP, the RISDP also has a progressive tinge in that it seeks 
to, for example: "empower women and small-scale farmers", "strengthen farmer support services 
and farmers associations"; and "protect the environment and promote sustainable use and 
management of natural resources" (SADP, 2003: 71).   
C.2.3. Dar es Salaam Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security 
In 2004 all the SADC member states signed the Dar es Salaam Declaration on Agriculture and Food 
Security to signify their commitment to "promote agriculture as a pillar in national and regional 
development strategies and programmes" (SADC, 2004). This declaration has a strong focus on 
establishing support for vulnerable groups through its "provision of key agricultural inputs" for 
smallholder farmers, its focus on gender equality through "repealing discriminatory laws", and its 
aim to enhance the "mitigation of HIV and AIDS and other Chronic Diseases" (SADC, 2004: 3; 
SADC, 2004:7; and SADC, 2004: 7). Along with its empowerment orientation, indicative of 
progressive ideology, the declaration also has a corporate orientation as reflected through its aim to 
strengthen the private sector's involvement in agriculture (SADC, 2004: 7). The declaration also 
aims to improve market access "in accordance with WTO provisions on domestic support for 
agriculture" which further indicates its alignment with the neoliberal ideology. 
C.2.4. Multi-Country Agricultural Productivity Programme 
To bring to fruition the intentions of the RISDP and the Dar es Salaam Declaration, SADC initiated 
the Multi-Country Agricultural Productivity Programme (MAPP). In accordance with pillar 4 of the 
CAADP, the MAPP sets out a plan to increase the agricultural capacity of the region through 
technology, and research and development. The underlying belief of the MAPP is that research and 
development, along with technology dissemination and adoption, will foster agricultural 
transformation in order to achieve food security, economic growth, and poverty reduction (SADC, 
2008: 12). It is worth noting that the financial support for the preparation of the MAPP was 
provided by a grant administered by The World Bank, which highlights this organisation's influence 
in the programme. The MAPP's focus on technological advancement for increased productivity 
reflects the neoliberal model. However, the MAPP does deviate from the neoliberal model since 
some of the prominent objectives are to make Southern Africa less dependent on international food 
aid, and to empower smallholders. The ideology of the MAPP thus closely follows that of its 
guiding documents in that it is predominantly neoliberal, albeit with strong progressive sentiments.    
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C.2.5. Regional Agricultural Policy 
In 2013 SADC developed its Regional Agricultural Policy (RAP) to provide a framework for the 
harmonisation of all SADC agricultural policies. The RAP's policy strategies are to: (a) enhance 
sustainable agricultural production, productivity and competitiveness; (b) improve regional and 
international trade and access to markets of agricultural products; (c) improve private and public 
sector engagement and investment in the agricultural value-chains; and (d) enhance disaster 
preparedness for food security (SADC, 2013). As such the RAP emphasises improving regional and 
international trade through reducing tariffs and other market access barriers. The RAP also includes 
strategies for transforming Southern Africa's agricultural sector "from being mainly subsistence-
based to being more commercially orientated" (Mutamba, Dlamini, Ngepah & Simelane, 2015: 5). 
This model of unregulated markets and the phasing out of the peasant agriculture is quintessential of 
the neoliberal ideology. Although the RAP does echo the progressive sentiments of the other policy 
documents insofar as it seeks to empower smallholder farmers and marginalised groups, it "lacks 
specifics on programme design, implementation and budgetary imperatives" (Mutamba et al., 2015: 
5). Consequently, without the necessary institutional support in place, these more progressive 
objectives will not be easily attainable. 
C.2.6. Summary of the SADC's food ideology 
Overall the SADC's food security initiatives and efforts predominantly subscribe to the neoliberal 
ideology. Through acknowledging the special needs of smallholders and women, the SADC's 
approach can also be viewed as representative of the progressive ideology. However, the model 
advised to attain food security is neoliberal since the focus is on increasing agricultural productivity 
(through technology) and economic growth (through trade). The progressive objectives of human 
development are thus believed to be attained through the trickle-down effect that results from 
increased agricultural capacity. 
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Appendix E: Possible positive and negative effects of trade 
liberalisation on the dimensions of food security 
 
 Possible positive effects Possible negative effects 
Availability  Trade boosts imports and increases both the quantity 
and variety of food available. 
Dynamic effects on domestic production: Greater 
competition from abroad may trigger improvements 
in productivity through greater investment, R&D, 
technology spillover. 
For net food-exporting countries, higher prices in 
international markets can divert part of production 
previously available for domestic consumption to 
exports, potentially reducing domestic availability of 
staple foods. 
For net food-importing countries, domestic 
producers unable to compete with imports are likely 
to curtail production, reducing domestic supplies and 
foregoing important multiplier effects of agricultural 
activities in rural economies. 
Access For net food-importing countries, food prices 
typically decrease when border protection is reduced. 
In the competitive sectors, incomes are likely to 
increase as the result of greater market access for 
exports. 
Input prices are likely to decrease. 
The macroeconomic benefits of trade openness, such 
as export growth and the inflow of foreign direct 
investment, support growth and employment, which 
in turn boosts incomes 
For net food-exporting countries, the domestic prices 
of exportable products may increase. 
Employment and incomes in sensitive, import-
competing sectors may decline. 
Utilisation A greater variety of available foods may promote 
more balanced diets and accommodate different 
preferences and tastes. 
Food safety and quality may improve if exporters 
have more advanced national control systems in 
place or if international standards are applied more 
rigorously. 
Greater reliance on imported foods has been 
associated with increased consumption of cheaper 
and more readily available highcalorie/low-
nutritional-value foods. 
Prioritization of commodity exports can divert land 
and resources from traditional indigenous foods that 
are often superior from a nutrition point of view. 
Stability Imports reduce the seasonal effect on food 
availability and consumer prices. 
Imports mitigate local production risks. 
Global markets are less prone to policy- or weather-
related shocks. 
For net food-importing countries, relying primarily 
on global markets for food supplies and open trade 
policies reduces the policy space to deal with 
shocks. 
Net food-importing countries may be vulnerable to 
changes in trade policy by exporters, such as export 
bans. 
Sectors at earlier stages of development may become 
more susceptible to price shocks and/or import 
surges. 
Source:(FAO (2015b) 
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